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Abstract
This research investigates the effectiveness of monetary policy in 11
countries from the COMESA-EAC-SADC free trade area of the
sub-Saharan Africa region. The study provides a historical account on the
environment upon which monetary policy operated in each country and
examines the transmission channels of monetary policy using factor
augmented vector auto-regression models. It also uses auto regressive
distributed lag models to assess the size and nature of the interest rate pass
through (IRPT) of the central bank’s policy rate to average lending and
deposit rates in each country. The results reveal heterogeneities in the
strength of the transmission channels and IRPT across the countries due to
differences in macroeconomic and financial developments; and the conduct
of monetary policy. Using bank level data from Malawi the research further
provides evidence of heterogeneities in IRPT across financial institutions
mainly due to market power, liquidity and risk conditions; and across
products on account of menu costs. The findings suggest that in different
degrees, all countries need to adopt policies that would improve the
effectiveness of monetary policy; and that the authorities of the
COMESA-EAC-SADC need to take into account the heterogeneities across
the countries when establishing the criteria for harmonisation of economic
policies in the region.
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1.1 Effectiveness of Monetary Policy
Monetary policy is classified as effective when central bank’s policy actions
achieve their objective of affecting macroeconomic variables such as
investment, consumption, output and prices in a desired way as authorities
seeks to direct the economy in a certain path. There is less agreement about
how exactly monetary policy exerts its influence on the real economy such
that the transmission mechanisms of monetary policy has been referred to as
a ”black box” by Bernanke and Gertler (1995). The need for the central
bank to formulate effective policy has led to an increase in theoretical and
empirical research in the transmission mechanism of the monetary policy
from the instruments used to the main final goals of price stability and
economic growth. With effective monetary policy, an economy is able to
experience stable prices and economic growth ceterus paribus.
The literature provides several factors that influence the effectiveness of
1
monetary policy. One of the factors is monetary policy orientation (i.e
whether liberal or controlled regime), its level of accountability and
transparency. Monetary policy is found to be more effective when
authorities do not exert direct control of the targeted variables but rely on the
markets to adjust freely after the policy actions have been undertaken (Egert
et al 2007). Another factor that influences the effectiveness of monetary
policy is related to the health of the financial system (Cottarrelli and
Kourelis, 1994), its structure (Thomson, 2006) and efficiency in supporting
monetary policy. This is because the financial system acts as a conduit to the
transmission process of monetary policy.
Apparently, most countries from the sub-Saharan Africa region started to
modernise their monetary policy frameworks during the 1990s. The
modernisation processes included opting for market dynamics compared to
direct controls, restructuring the financial systems and implementing
changes in the conduct of monetary policy. These measures were aimed at
enhancing the effectiveness of monetary policy in achieving the goals of
price stabilisation and economic development. However, most countries
from the region still experience high inflation rates and volatile real GDP
growth rates. These conditions have led to the need to further analyse the
effectiveness of monetary policy in the region.
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In the COMESA-EAC-SADC1 free trade area of the sub-Saharan Africa
region, studies that assess the strength of the channels of monetary policy
include Maturu (2010), Mugume (2011), Ngalawa and Veigi (2011), Kabundi
and Ngwenya (2011), Zgambo and Chileshe (2014), Lungu (2008), Buigut
(2009), Davood et al (2013), Morales and Raei (2013) and Chiumia (2015).
These studies present mixed results which are also difficult to compare across
the countries because of differences in main points of focus. The studies have
used different methods of analysis but the standard vector auto regression
(VAR) method is the dominant one (Mishra et al, 2012).
The popularity of the standard VAR analysis in macroeconomic analysis
is mainly attributable to their simplicity in the estimation of dynamic
responses as all the main variables of interest in the system are endogenous.
The interpretation of results is also found to be straight forward due to the
use of impulse response and variance decomposition analyses. Moreover,
the results from these analyses are found to be plausible and useful.
However, a down side of this method is that it uses a limited amount of
information although in practice there is a wide set of economic indicators
upon which authorities base their policy decisions. According to Sims
(1992) one of the effects of not including adequate information in the
estimations is that it leads to results that are contrary to theory (puzzles).
1COMESA - Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa; EAC - East African Community; SADC -
Southern Africa Development Community.
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In order to address the problem of using inadequate information in
macroeconomic modelling, other studies use factor augmented vector auto
regression (FAVAR) estimation methods. FAVAR models are known for the
advantage of addressing problems of over-parameterization while
simultaneously using more information. Bernanke et al, (2005), Kabundi
and Gwenya, (2011) and Chiumia, (2015) have applied FAVAR models in
analysing monetary policy transmission mechanisms. These studies have
proved that FAVAR models solve the issue of puzzles and also provide more
insights on the dynamics of the transmission. This thesis uses FAVAR
models in assessing monetary policy transmission mechanism in 11
countries from the COMESA-EAC-SADC free trade area in order to provide
updated evidence and more insights in the transmission mechanisms. The
countries are Angola, Botswana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Namibia, South
Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia.
In addition to examination of transmission channels, another area of
research on effectiveness of monetary policy focuses on the financial
system’s role of influencing the effectiveness of monetary policy. Most
studies in this area examine the interest rate pass through (IRPT) from the
central bank’s policy rate to different financial products (Aziakpono et al,
2012; Cas et al, 2011; Karagiannis et al, 2010; Sorensen and Werner, 2006;
Sander and Kleimeier, 2004). IRPT studies consider the percentage change
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in retail interest rates resulting from a one percentage change in a policy
rate. The results of the studies show that the size of the IRPT can be
incomplete as the financial institutions may not include the full amount of
the change of the policy rate in their interest rates. In some cases IRPT has
been found to be symmetric in the sense that the response of the financial
institutions did not depend on whether the change on the policy rate was
positive or negative, whilst in other cases the results showed asymmetric
responses. The literature also provide different results across countries and
regions. This shows the importance of empirical studies of IRPT to get
specific results which can guide authorities appropriately in every country.
This thesis seeks to provide a uniform approach in studying the interest
rate pass through in the above listed 11 countries from the
COMESA-EAC-SADC region for comparable results across the countries.
The study examines the central bank’s policy rate pass through to average
lending and deposit rates in each country. The analysis focuses on the size
(completeness) of the IRPT in both the short and long run, its evolution over
time and predictability (presence of asymmetries). The econometric analysis
is conducted on a country by country basis using auto regressive distributed
lag (ARDL) models for the period of 1995 to 2015.
More insights on the assessments on the efficacy of the banking system in
facilitating monetary policy are found when a deeper analysis is conducted
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on how different financial institutions, respond to changes in monetary
policy (De Graeve et al, 2006; Fuertes and Heffernan, 2009). Studies on
heterogeneities across financial institutions are mostly conducted on
developed countries and emerging markets. In developing countries the
main challenge for this type of analysis is availability of disaggregated data.
This thesis further seeks to contribute to the literature on heterogeneities in
IRPT across financial institutions by providing evidence for developing
countries using data on Malawi. The next section gives details of the specific
contributions of the thesis.
1.2 Thesis’ Contribution
In general, this study contributes to the literature by investigating the
effectiveness of monetary policy in the COMESA-EAC-SADC free trade
area. Firstly, the study applies the FAVAR method to a new dataset of 11
countries area for an examination of the transmission channels of monetary
policy in the region. Most of the previous studies in the region have used
standard VARs which only use limited information in the analysis whilst the
FAVAR includes more variables from the central bank’s information set.
Secondly, this research provides comparable results across the countries
from the COMESA-EAC-SADC free trade area on the overall transmission
mechanism and interest rate pass through as it uses the same approaches in
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methods of analysis and choice of exogenous and endogenous variables for
all the countries. Thirdly, the research investigates how commercial banks in
the COMESA-EAC-SADC region facilitate monetary policy in their
adjustments of retail interest rates.
Finally, the study uses detailed bank level data for one of the countries,
Malawi, and provides further evidence on heterogeneities across financial
institutions and retail products in interest rate pass through. This study also
provides insights on the influence of bank-specific characteristics on the
interest rate pass through in Malawi.
The results provide mixed evidence on the effectiveness of monetary
policy in the region. The variations are attributable to different levels of
macroeconomic stability, financial development, and also in the conduct of
monetary policy among the countries. On the examination of transmission
channels, positive shocks to the policy rate results in decreases in both prices
and output as expected by theory in Botswana, South Africa, Kenya, Malawi
and Zambia. We note that the effects are only statistically significant in
countries with deeper financial markets. These are South Africa, Kenya and
Botswana. The results also suggest that positive shocks to reserve money
raise both output and prices in most countries. These are Angola, Botswana,
Kenya, Malawi, Namibia, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia. The effects are
statistically significant in Kenya, Botswana, Malawi, Tanzania and Uganda.
7
Additionally, our results reveal that the exchange rate channel is important
in explaining inflation outcomes in all countries.
We also find heterogeneities in IRPT across countries in terms of
completeness of the pass through and presence of asymmetries. The short
run pass through (SRPT) is incomplete in all countries but the sizes differ
across the countries. The long run pass through (LRPT) to the average
lending rate is statistically complete (not different from 1) in Botswana,
Namibia and South Africa. In the remaining countries the LRPT is
incomplete. In addition to the low levels of financial development in most of
these countries, the results further suggest that the transmission is impeded
by high concentration in the banking system and poor signalling power of
monetary policy. Nonetheless, results from recursive window analysis of
IRPT suggest that in most countries the pass through has been improving
over time after adopting market based policies and becoming more
transparent in their conduct of monetary policy. These findings corroborate
Morales and Raei (2013) and IMF (2010).
An investigation on whether banks adjust their interest rates in the same
manner regardless of the direction of the change in the policy rate suggest
that in Angola, Botswana and Namibia banks respond faster in adjusting
lending rates only when the change in the central bank’s policy rate is
upward. This conduct is called collusive pricing. On the side of deposits, the
8
results suggest that in Angola and Namibia, banks are reluctant to reduce
deposit rates when the change in the policy rate is negative. This type of
rigidity in the deposit rates is explained by the customer reaction hypothesis.
Asymmetric adjustments are not good as they make the outcome of
monetary policy unpredictable and consequently less efficient. In this
research, asymmetric adjustment is largely attributed to high concentration
levels in the banking market. To a lesser extent, we also attribute the
downward rigidity of deposit rates in Angola to high levels of inflation lead
to negative real interest rates.
Finally, the results for the bank-by-bank and product-by-product analysis
provide evidence for heterogeneities in the IRPT across commercial banks
and type of interest rates in Malawi. The heterogeneities across commercial
banks are mainly explained by differences in bank characteristics mainly in
terms of type of clients, the banks’ market power and refinancing needs.
Heterogeneities across financial products are attributable to menu costs and
balance sheet effects. On the determinants of the LRPT the results suggest
that bank size, liquidity level, quality of credit and return of assets have
significant influence on the pass through to some of the interest rates. The
influence of capital level is not significant in all the banks. The differences
in the response to the changes in the policy rate reveal the unpredictability of
commercial banks’ reactions to changes in the central bank’s policy rate
9
which makes the transmission through the interest rate channel to be less
effective in Malawi than in, for example, South Africa.
In general, the study reveals that in different degrees, all countries in this
sample need to adopt policies that would improve the effectiveness of
monetary policy. The policies should aim at increasing levels of financial
development, reducing levels of concentration in the banking sector,
adopting market based policies, increasing the level of central bank’s
independence and adopting a clear strategy of achieving the objectives of
monetary policy whilst avoiding conflicts among different goals. The results
also suggest that harmonisation of policies for financial and monetary
integration in the COMESA-EAC-SADC region need to be approached with
caution as it requires taking into account heterogeneities among the
countries.
1.3 Organisation of the Thesis
The rest of the thesis is organised as follows;
• Chapter 2 provides a historical review of the conduct of monetary
policy and macroeconomic performance for the sampled countries in
the region.
• Chapter 3 conducts an empirical investigation of monetary policy
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transmission in the region. The main focus is on how shocks to the
central bank’s policy rate and reserve money influence the output and
prices in each of the countries. The study is conducted on a
country-by-country basis using the FAVAR method. In implementing
the FAVAR, the study largely follows Davood et al (2013)’s approach.
• Chapter 4 examines the efficacy of the banking system in facilitating
monetary policy by assessing the central bank’s policy rate pass
through to average lending and deposit rates in the countries discussed
above. In general, the estimation techniques follow Sander and
Kleimeier (2004), Sorensen and Werner (2006) and Kwapil and Schaler
(2010) where the market rate is regressed on the policy rate based on
the Monti-Klein (1971)’s profit maximisation theory for commercial
banks. The study is conducted on a country-by-country basis using
time series techniques on aggregated quarterly data from 1995 to 2015.
The econometric analysis used is the auto regressive distributed lag
(ARDL) model in an asymmetric error correction framework. The
analysis focuses on the size (completeness) of the IRPT in both the
short and long run, its evolution and predictability (presence of
asymmetries). Recursive window analysis is used for the investigation
of the evolution of the pass through. The study also investigates the
presence of asymmetries in the adjustments of the interest rates.
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• Chapter 5, uses disaggregated data on Malawi for 10 commercial banks
on 5 retail products and examines heterogeneities of the IRPT across
the retail products and the commercial banks. It also tracks the
performance of the short and long run pass through for each product
over time using recursive analysis. Unlike chapter 4, this study uses
bank level data which is more detailed hence providing an opportunity
for a deeper analysis of the IRPT in the country.
• Chapter 6 concludes the research, provides policy recommendations and
areas for further study.
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Chapter 2
Macroeconomic Background and the
Conduct of Monetary Policy
13
2.1 Introduction
The COMESA-EAC-SADC free trade area was launched on 10th June
2015. The region is comprised of 26 countries from three already existing
economic groupings, the COMESA, EAC and SADC 1, as presented in
Figure 2.12 which shows the geographic location of the free trade area. The
main objective of the grouping is to strengthen and deepen economic
integration of the region through harmonisation of policies and programs
(SADC, 2015). As it can be noted in Figure 2.1, most countries belong to
more than one regional economic community (REC). This tripartite free
trade area was also created to address challenges that are created by
overlapping memberships in the region.
The research is conducted on 11 countries from the
COMESA-EAC-SADC free trade area. The countries are, Angola,
Botswana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland.
Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia. Countries in the sample were chosen based
on availability of data for the period of 1995 to 2015. Freund and Ornelas
(2010) state that a regional trade area is a natural starting point for achieving
deeper economic integration. Ehrmann (2000) argues that deeper integration
first requires that the economies of the member countries converge
1More information about the objectives of each of the regional groupings can be found on
https://www.comesa.int/ for COMESA, https://www.eac.int/ for the EAC and https://www.sadc.int/ for SADC.
2Map was created by TMSA - www.trademarksa.org; ’REC’ stands for Regional Economic Communities.
’SACU’ stands for Southern African Customs Union.
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Figure 2.1: Map of the Free Trade Area
sufficiently and the criteria for convergence are expected to be based on the
existing economic structures across the countries. This chapter provides
background information on the similarities and differences in
macroeconomic and financial development; institutional structures; and the
conduct of monetary policy across the countries.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows; section 2.2 analyses the
countries’ performances in macroeconomic and financial development
during the study period and section 2.3 reviews the monetary policy
frameworks; section 2.4 provides background information on the conduct of
monetary policy and 2.5 concludes the chapter.
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2.2 Macroeconomic Background
Per Capita GDP and Real GDP Growth Rate
Table 2.1 highlights the macroeconomic conditions in the countries from
1995 to 2015. Per capita GDP has increased, albeit marginally, in all
countries. Countries with high per capita GDP as at the end of 2015 are
South Africa, Botswana, Namibia and Angola. Notably, these four countries
are also rich in natural resources.
Angola is one of the resource rich countries in the sample. It is the largest
oil producer in the sub-Saharan Africa and the world’s fifth largest producer
of diamonds, supplying 7 % to 9% of the global diamond output. The oil
sector dominates the economy, accounting for over 80% of the country’s total
foreign earnings (AfDB, 2011). However, Table 2.1 shows relatively low
average per capita GDP from 1995 to 2004. This is attributed to the period
of civil war 3 which destabilised the economy. After the war ended in 2002,
the country adopted several economic reforms (AfDB, 2011) such that the
average real GDP growth rate for the period of 2005 to 2009 reached 15.56%
and by the end of 2015 the average per capita GDP was higher than most of
the other countries in the sample although inflation was still relatively high.
The main characteristic of the countries with lower per capita GDP is
reliance on agriculture as the major sector for steering economic growth.
3The war started in 1975 and ended in 2002 with some very short periods of peace in between.
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The countries are Malawi, Tanzania, Uganda and Kenya.
Table 2.1: Macroeconomic Description Statistics (in Percent)
Angola Botswana Kenya Lesotho Malawi Namibia SA Swaziland Tanzania Uganda Zambia
Per capita 1995-99 0.434 3.09 0.42 0.84 0.19 2.24 3.41 1.63 0.25 0.28 0.39
GDP* 2000-04 0.723 3.72 0.42 0.92 0.23 2.23 3.38 1.79 0.32 0.25 0.41
2005-09 2.72 5.45 0.78 1.05 0.34 3.97 5.77 2.95 0.55 0.43 1.07
2010-15 4.27 7.01 1.2 1.28 0.40 5.37 7.01 3.58 0.83 0.65 1.62
Real GDP 1995-99 7.91 6.26 2.93 3.79 6.96 3.59 2.59 2.23 4.04 7.73 3.44
growth 2000-04 3.28 3.13 2.59 3.32 1.89 5.19 3.61 3.45 6.56 6.07 5.54
2005-09 15.56 3.96 4.55 6.71 4.43 3.83 3.58 3.88 6.45 8.19 8.10
2010-15 4.52 5.48 6.00 4.42 4.55 5.60 2.34 2.12 6.77 5.46 6.02
Inflation 1995-99 8.74 6.85 3.26 40.92 8.32 7.34 8.01 17.04 5.55 30.73
2000-04 145.6 7.87 7.82 8.40 17.61 8.23 5.49 8.18 5.29 3.47 21.80
2005-09 14.94 9.60 14.00 7.12 10.89 6.47 6.76 7.65 8.35 9.39 12.77
2010-15 10.76 6.05 7.76 4.70 18.21 5.16 5.22 5.97 9.08 8.61 7.73
* (per capita GDP) is in thousands of United States Dollars. The other statistics are in percent.
Source: Datasteam, IFS and World Bank
Table 2.1 shows that these countries have been experiencing low and
unstable growth rates of real GDP. Apart from other exogenous factors
which affect the economies’ main sectors of economic growth, the low
levels of economic growth in sub-Saharan Africa have also been attributed
to less effective monetary policy due to distortions in the financial system
coupled with direct intervention in the markets, large government domestic
financing requirements that crowd out credit to the private sector, high levels
of inflation and poor quality of institutions that govern the economies
(Mishra et al, 2012).
Inflation
Table 2.1 shows that over time, most countries in the sample have managed
to bring down inflation levels to single digits. Inflation in Kenya has been
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relatively stable (between 7 and 8 percent) for a large part of the period. The
highest inflation is recorded during the period of 2005 to 2009 which Sichei
(2012) attributed to increased government expenditure on economic
recovery programmes after effects of post-election violence, global
recession, unfavourable weather conditions, high costs of production and
high international crude oil prices. In all the other countries, inflation has
been relatively low and stable during the period under review except in
Angola (which of course still shows a great improvement as it comes from
periods of hyper-inflation) and Malawi.
Average inflation was also very high in Zambia up to 2009. Malawi and
Zambia’s history of high inflation levels is partly attributed to high
transportation costs as they are both landlocked and depend on
Mozambique’s ports. Both countries were therefore affected by
Mozambique’s civil war from 1977 to 1992. The rate of inflation started to
slow down from year 2000 in both countries, as Mozambique continued to
recover from the effects of the civil war. Table 2.1 however shows a reverse
of the downward trend of inflation in Malawi during 2010-2015. This is
mainly explained by the country’s adoption of floating exchange rate in May
2012 soon after its currency was devalued by 49.5 percent.
Apart from the experiences that led to high inflation in Angola, Malawi
and Zambia, the literature highlights conflicting policy objectives as the
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main challenge for monetary authorities from developing countries which
leads to failures in containing inflation. Since the countries start from
relatively high inflation levels, there are always conflicts between stabilising
inflation and addressing negative output gaps (World Bank, 2018).
Developing countries also face frequent supply side shocks such as adverse
weather conditions which affect agricultural production and subsequently
both inflation and output. In this case stabilising inflation would require
sacrificing the output objective (Nguyeni et al, 2017).
Another source of conflict is the lack of central bank independence from
fiscal policy. Central banks face pressures to provide cheap financing to
governments hence neglecting the objective of price stability (Mas, 1995).
Exchange rate policy is also more important in developing countries than in
advanced countries and sometimes causes conflicts with the goal of price
stability as the countries are not well integrated financially with the global
market (IMF, 2006; World Bank, 2018; Mishra, 2012).
Financial Development
Most of the countries in our sample started liberalising their financial
systems during the 1990s. The reforms in the financial sector were mainly
aimed at increasing the level of competition and widening the range of
financial instruments. They were also aimed at deregulating interest rates,
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removing credit ceilings, improving the overall process of financial
intermediation and gaining efficiency in the mobilisation and allocation of
resources (Rono, 2002). Following this, the countries registered increases in
financial development but the magnitudes vary across the countries as
presented in Table 2.2. South Africa has the highest ratio of financial
development indicators (average credit to GDP ratio for the whole period is
66.95% and deposits to GDP ratio is 54.13%.) Other countries with
relatively deep financial markets are Namibia, Kenya and Botswana. In
these three countries, the average of each indicator of financial development
is above 20% whilst in the remaining countries they are below 20%.
Table 2.2: Financial Conditions (in Percent)
Angola Botswana Kenya Lesotho Malawi Namibia SA Swaziland Tanzania Uganda Zambia
Credit to 1995-99 1.66 11.54 24.48 17.01 4.94 41.64 62.40 13.56 4.27 5.34 6.91
GDP 2000-04 2.16 18.45 25.86 11.87 4.08 42.47 64.21 10.58 6.21 7.55 6.36
2005-09 8.49 23.43 24.52 9.13 6.92 48.34 73.82 18.62 10.36 10.52 9.27
2010-15 19.37 30.26 31.31 16.59 13.07 49.37 68.18 19.21 13.12 13.97 11.96
Deposits to 1995-99 6.57 18.82 30.02 30.04 11.15 38.96 47.95 18.50 13.59 8.55 13.09
GDP 2000-04 8.15 24.31 31.39 26.02 9.66 36.11 50.75 15.29 15.05 12.67 15.98
2005-09 15.12 39.44 34.89 28.44 10.53 38.99 58.95 18.83 16.58 13.08 17.49
2010-15 29.85 40.15 45.55 32.26 19.39 54.38 58.85 21.94 18.49 15.29 17.82
Spread 1995-99 42.28 4.96 13.77 7.03 17.22 7.44 4.93 7.57 17.26 10.82 15.63
2000-04 59.42 5.96 12.56 10.96 22.09 6.53 4.92 7.10 12.29 12.55 20.22
2005-09 18.87 7.17 8.41 7.95 21.74 4.96 3.86 6.32 8.13 10.26 13.40
2010-15 12.39 6.35 8.52 7.58 25.25 4.50 3.32 6.33 6.79 10.56 6.91
Source: International Financial Statistics (IFS); Spread is lending rate minus deposit rate;
Credit to GDP - commercial banks’ total credit to the private sector as a percentage of GDP;
Deposits to GDP - total deposits as a percent to GDP.
Table 2.2 further shows that the spread, the difference between lending and
deposit rates, also shows that banking market efficiency has improved in
Angola, Kenya, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania and Zambia.
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In the other countries, the level of efficiency has worsened such as in
Malawi, Botswana and Lesotho; or remained the same as in Uganda.
The above differences in the levels of financial development across the
countries are expected to be reflected in the effectiveness of monetary policy
across the countries. More successful monetary policy is expected in
countries with deeper financial markets, more competitive banking sector
and active interbank markets. Heterogeneities in the effectiveness of
monetary policy may also be on account of whether the institutional
environment that govern the financial systems in terms of existence of laws
and their enforcement are strong or not. The degree of the financial system’s
international integration also influences the effectiveness of monetary policy
through levels of arbitrage between domestic and foreign financial assets
(IMF, 2006; Mishra et al, 2012).
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2.3 Monetary Policy Frameworks and Exchange rate
Management Regimes
A monetary policy framework guides the central bank in formulating and
implementing monetary policy in order to deliver on its mandate. Four major
types of monetary frameworks can be identified. These are direct targeting
of interest rates, credit or prices; monetary aggregates targeting; exchange
rate targeting, and inflation targeting. Handa (2009) states that the choice
of monetary policy framework adopted by a country largely depends on its
economic, financial and institutional environment within which the policy is
operating.
Table 2.3: Monetary Policy Frameworks and Exchange Rate Management Regimes
Monetary De Jure Exchange De facto Exchange
Policy Framework Rate Management Rate Management
Angola Monetary Targeting Managed Managed
Botswana Composite Crawling Peg Crawling peg
Kenya Inflation Targeting Floating Managed Float
Lesotho Exchange Rate Conventional peg Conventional peg
Malawi Monetary Aggregate Floating Managed Float
Namibia Exchange Rate Conventional peg Conventional peg
South Africa Inflation Targeting Floating Managed Float
Swaziland Exchange Rate Conventional peg Conventional peg
Tanzania Monetary Aggregate Floating Managed Float
Uganda Inflation Targeting Floating Managed Float
Zambia Monetary Targeting Floating Managed Float
Source: various IMF publications
Table 2.3 shows that in our sample, we have three main types of monetary
policy frameworks, exchange rate targeting, monetary targeting and inflation
targeting with an exception of Botswana which follows a mixed approach.
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2.3.1 Monetary Policy Frameworks
Exchange Rate Targeting
Under this framework, the value of domestic currency is fixed to a currency
of another country which is expected to have low inflation. The monetary
authority of the domestic country buys or sells foreign exchange to maintain
the exchange rate at its predetermined level or within a range. The exchange
rate thus serves as the nominal anchor or intermediate target of monetary
policy.
Figure 2.2: Annual Inflation Rates (in percent per annum)
Three countries, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland follow this framework
as their currencies are pegged to the South African Rand. The main
challenge for this framework is that the country has limited control over
monetary policy as it can only respond to shocks that are independent from
those of the anchor’s country. Basically, in these three countries, the goal of
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price stability is therefore achieved by importing stable inflation from South
Africa as their anchor country. Figure 2.2 shows that inflation rates in the
three countries largely follow South Africa’s trend.
Monetary Aggregate Targeting (MAT)
Under this framework, central banks regulate the stock of broad money
stock (M2) to levels required to support the theoretical relationship between
the price level and output. This is based on the monetarist view that money
supply has a major influence on national output in the short run and price
level in the long run. The main assumption under this view is that there is a
strong relationship between excess money supply growth and inflation and
that the central bank can reliably control reserve money through its balance
sheet items. Lewis and Mizen (2000: pg 339) note that, “this framework
relies on a definable quantity of money, a stable demand for the aggregate
and a supply process readily controllable by authorities”.
The authorities set broad money as an intermediate target based on
macroeconomic policy goals of economic growth and inflation. The
intermediate target is not under the perfect control of the central bank but
provides a useful signal about prevailing and prospective movements in
output and inflation. It is then related to reserve money which is under the
control of the central bank. The target for reserve money is set taking into
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account assumptions about the money multiplier that relates broad money to
reserve money and seasonalities (Davood et al (2013).
Almost all countries in our sample were following monetary aggregate
targeting frameworks in the 1990s with the exception of Botswana, Lesotho,
Namibia and Swaziland which were targeting the exchange rate. Some of
the countries started adopting other frameworks in the 2000s following the
failure of the MAT in achieving goals due to instability in velocity and
money multiplier as the financial systems were becoming more developed.
According to Table 2.3, Angola, Malawi and Tanzania were the only
countries that were still following monetary aggregate targeting as at the end
of 2015.
Inflation Targeting (IT)
Inflation targeting is a framework whereby a central bank publicly expresses
its commitment to controlling inflation as its primary policy objective. The
central bank announces an explicit inflation target and implements policy to
achieve this target directly. New Zealand was the first country to adopt
inflation targeting monetary policy approach in 1990. Over the years, other
countries have been adopting IT framework such that by the end of 2015,
there were 36 central banks4 with IT frameworks across the globe. The
4IMF 2016 Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions
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empirical literature shows that in most countries, the IT framework has
succeeded in lowering the rate of inflation. (Mishkin and Posen, 1998;
Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel, 2007; Walsh, 2009; Roger 2010; Kumo,
2015).
In our sample, three out of the eleven countries adopted inflation targeting.
South Africa started targeting inflation in May 2000, followed by Kenya and
Uganda in 2011. Goodhart (1994) argues that inflation targeting is unpopular
in Africa because it requires a high level of central bank independence which
is very difficult to attain in developing countries. This is because developing
countries incur large and persistent fiscal deficits which calls for the central
bank to align its policies to the fiscal need. This weakens the central bank’s
control over monetary policy.
In addition to central bank independence, Mishkin (2004) and Roger
(2010) outline other elements that distinguishes the IT framework from the
others as follows; (i) declaring explicit quantitative targets for inflation; (ii)
high transparency and accountability for policy strategy and
implementation; and (iii) a forward-looking approach to policy strategy
based on assessment of inflation pressures from a wide set of economic
indicators. Section 2.3 on monetary policy conduct shows that the other
central banks which do not follow the IT framework have improved their
frameworks by adopting some of the above elements. The specific elements
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are transparency through increased communication and use of a wide set of
economic indicators to assess inflation pressures. These measures are
expected to improve the effectiveness of monetary policy.
2.3.2 Exchange Rate Management Regimes
Table 2.3 shows that the de jure and the de facto exchange rate regimes are
different in Kenya, Malawi, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia.
Officially, the central banks for these countries report a floating exchange
rate regime however, in practice they intervene in the foreign exchange
market in order to either influence the level of foreign exchange reserves or
for exchange rate stability. This implies that the de facto regime in these
countries is a managed float. In Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and
Swaziland, there is no difference between the de jure and de facto exchange
rate regimes. This section discusses expected outcomes of monetary policy
based on the de facto exchange rate management regimes.
Monetary Policy in a Managed Float Regime
The de facto regimes in central banks of Angola, Kenya, Malawi, South
Africa, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia is a managed float. IMF (2008)
argues that for policy to become more effective, these counties need to
follow “constrained discretion” (Bernanke et al, 1999). This means that
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monetary policy should be conducted in a way that “greater discretion
regarding monetary targets should be constrained by a clear commitment to
price stability.” (IMF, 2008: page 34) The outcome of monetary policy in
these countries therefore depends on the extent of commitment towards
price stability. In Kenya, Uganda and South Africa this can be easily
achieved as they follow inflation targeting (IT) framework which holds the
central banks accountable to achieving the end objective of low inflation.
Other elements of the IT framework such as transparency and a good
communication strategy also helps to make monetary policy more effective
through formation of inflation expectations which becomes a strong nominal
anchor. In Angola, Malawi, Tanzania and Zambia, unconstrained discretion
may limit the effectiveness of monetary policy with the managed float
exchange rate regime.
Monetary Policy in Fixed Exchange Rate Regimes
As noted in section 2.3.1 under “Exchange Rate Targeting”, the countries
with fixed exchange rate regimes have limited control over monetary policy.
In our sample, we have two types of fixed pegs, the crawling peg in
Botswana (the currency is allowed to move within a prescribed band) and
the conventional peg in Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland (the currency is
pegged at one to one with the anchor’s currency). We expect monetary
28
policy to be relatively effective in Botswana as their peg allows for some
movements to deal with shocks compared to the other three countries which
can not adjust the exchange rate. Generally, in the countries with no
flexibility in the nominal exchange rate, there is a need to rely on supportive
fiscal policy and structural reforms that encourage wage flexibility and
promote productivity growth. Monetary policy needs to be consistent with
the demands of the exchange rate regime. Limited capital mobility may help
to make monetary policy influential in the short run (IMF, 2008).
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2.4 The Conduct of Monetary Policy
This section provides the building blocks of the monetary policy framework,
focusing on the institutional setup of the central bank, its statutory mandate,
governance structure, strategy in the policy formulation, implementation and
communication5. In terms of ownership, all central banks for the countries
in the sample are owned by their government except the central bank of
South Africa which is owned by private institutions (SADC, 2014). In most
countries the central banks are mandated to formulate and implement
monetary policy and also determine the exchange rate policy except in
Kenya where formulation is the responsibility of the Minister of Finance;
Botswana which is expected to consult government first when formulating
monetary policy or determining the exchange rate regime and in Swaziland
where the central bank is established as an organisation under the Ministry
of Finance.
The subsequent sections provide specific country details on the conduct
of monetary policy. More information related to the central banks’ legal
status, mandate, responsibilities and relationship with government is
summarised in Figure 2.1 in the appendix.




The Central Bank of Angola is responsible for the formulation and
execution of monetary and foreign exchange policies. The policy targets are
aligned to national economic goals that are worked out by the Ministry of
Planning and the Ministry of Finance. The main objectives of monetary
policy in Angola are to achieve a stable national currency unit and price
stability (SADC, 2014).
From 1992, the central bank of Angola was using direct instruments such
as credit controls and interest rate ceilings. The system was liberalised in
June 1999 and the bank adopted money supply (M2) as its intermediate
target and base money as the operational aggregate. The main instruments
are open market operations, discount rate and reserve requirements. Angola
follows a managed floating exchange rate system since the exchange rate is
market determined but the central bank intervenes from time to time to
promote orderly conditions in the market.
Botswana
Although the Central Bank of Botswana is solely owned by the Government,
it has considerable autonomy in the formulation and implementation of
monetary policy. Government only retains the responsibility for major
changes related to the exchange rate and currency specifications. The main
31
objective of Botswana’s monetary policy is to achieve a sustainable, low and
predictable inflation that will contribute to macroeconomic stability and
attainment of a stable real effective exchange rate (REER) and, in turn,
support diversified economic growth (SADC, 2014). The Bank’s
intermediate targets are the nominal effective exchange rate and inflation
forecast. The main instruments used are the bank rate and open market
operations.
Botswana’s currency, the Pula, is pegged to a weighted basket of
currencies comprising the United States Dollar, Special Drawing Rights and
the South African Rand. Previously, the basket also included the
Zimbabwean dollar but it was dropped in 1994 due to a reduction in trade
flows between the two countries. Since May 2005, the central bank follows
a crawling band exchange rate mechanism in order to maintain stability in
the real effective exchange rate and to manage foreign exchange reserves.
The crawl is based on the Bank’s inflation objective and the partner
countries’ inflation forecasts. Botswana achieved full capital account
convertibility in February 1999 after removal of exchange controls.
Kenya
As with all countries in the sample, initially, Kenya was using direct
monetary policy instruments such as interest rate controls and credit
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rationing up to 1991. Financial sector reforms commenced with the
adoption of indirect instruments for monetary policy, adoption of a market
based exchange rate regime in 1993, liberalisation of the current and capital
accounts in 1994 and narrowing the scope of the central bank’s objectives
from multiple goals to price stability and economic growth in 1996
(O’connell et al, 2010; Nyorekwa and Odhiambo, 2014; Sichei, 2012;).
Although the above reforms were adopted, Sichei (2012) observes that the
institutional framework remained weak as formulation of monetary policy
was under the responsibility of the Minister of Finance and implementation
and review of progress by only central bank staff members.
In July 2005, a Monetary Policy Advisory Committee (MPAC) was
established and was later replaced by Monetary Policy Executive Committee
(MPEC) in 2008. In addition to the Governor and the Deputy Governor, the
MPEC includes two staff members from key departments, 4 external
members who are appointed by the Minister of Finance and 2 government
officials as non-voting members. The MPEC meets very two months and
decisions are communicated through press releases. The Minister of Finance
however retains the power to overrule monetary policy decisions (Morales,
2014). Every six months the committee is expected to present a report that
highlights its activities to the cabinet and also prepare a monetary policy
statement of the bank for the general public. Instruments used in
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implementing the policy decision are cash reserve requirements, discount
facilities and open market operations. The central bank of Kenya follows a
flexible exchange rate regime but also intervenes in the foreign exchange
market to manage the fluctuations.
Malawi
In Malawi, the National Economic Management Committee is responsible
for the production of projections of gross domestic product (GDP) growth
rates and inflation that supports the country’s macroeconomic framework in
a given year (RBM, 2016a). The Ministry of Finance leads the committee
and other members include the Ministry of Economic Development and the
Reserve Bank of Malawi. The projected inflation rate is then taken as a target
for monetary policy purposes. The bank seeks to control the growth of money
supply as the intermediate target. However, the operating procedure focuses
on monitoring growth in reserve money and money market rates. Monetary
policy instruments are used to direct other economic variables on the desired
path towards the attainment of these targets.
In order to facilitate the formulation of monetary policy, the Monetary
Policy Committee (MPC) was established in February 2000. The committee
is chaired by the Governor of the Central Bank, and its current membership
comprises deputy governors of the central bank, two representatives from
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the Government (the Permanent Secretary to the Treasury, and the
Permanent Secretary for Development Planning and Cooperation), two
representatives of the private sector and one senior economist from
academia. The two government officials do not have voting rights. The
MPC meets regularly to assess economic and financial developments, and to
determine the stance of monetary policy in relation to program targets,
(Mangani, 2012; RBM, 2016a). The MPC makes decisions on the policy
rate, liquidity reserve requirement and open market operations to be
implemented in order to direct the economy on the right path towards the
medium term targets. These decisions are based on reports on economic and
financial developments and projections of various measures of economic
activity written by the staff of the central bank. Policy decisions on interest
rates are announced immediately after the meeting. The financial markets
department implements the decisions through open market operations.
Malawi’s exchange rate system has been through different exchange rate
policy regimes. From 1965, it was being fixed to different types of
currencies. It was floated in February 1994 for only 11 months then fixed
again up to the end of 1997. From 1998, the currency went through several
adjustable regimes until it was fixed to the United States Dollar in 2007. In
May 2012, the exchange rate was devalued by 50.0 percent and floated.
There is a minimum intervention from the central bank for the purpose of
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managing the fluctuations.
Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland
The primary objectives of the central banks for these three countries is to
achieve and maintain price stability mainly through maintenance of an
adequate level of foreign currency reserves for supporting the peg of their
currencies, to the South African Rand. Although these countries pursue a
fixed exchange rate regime, they have some scope of monetary policy as
their capital accounts are not fully open i.e they use exchange controls
which are exercised especially on the financial and capital accounts. The
controls are mainly in terms of outward flows whilst all inward financial
flows are liberalised (Seleteng and Khoabane, 2015).
In the three countries, the central banks work together with the
government in coming up with macroeconomic targets. Although the
formulation of monetary policy is under the responsibility of Monetary
Policy Committee, adoption of major policies are done in consultation with
the Minister of Finance. The composition of the MPCs vary. In Namibia, all
members are staff members of the central bank whilst in Lesotho, the
committee includes one external member who is appointed by the Minister
of Finance and has an experience in monetary and financial economics. In
Swaziland, the Governor is the only member of the MPC who is affiliated to
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the central bank. The other members of the committee are external
individuals with experience in monetary and financial matters and they are
appointed by the Minister of Finance. The main instruments that are used
are open market operations, reserve requirements, policy rate and moral
suasion.
South Africa
Unlike all other central banks in this sample, the South Africa Reserve Bank
(SARB) is not owned by the government but by private companies,
institutions and persons. It pays company tax to government and it is not
involved in development financing. Monetary and fiscal policies are
coordinated through regular meetings between the Minister of Finance, the
Governor of the SARB, officials from the National Treasury and the SARB
where different points of view are taken into consideration (SADC, 2014).
Monetary policy is formulated by the Monetary Policy Committee which
was instituted in 1999. The committee is composed of the Governor, three
deputy governors, and four senior staff members of the central bank. The
committee meets six times every year in an interval of two months between
the meetings. Decisions on the stance of monetary policy are based on staff
reports on the analysis of domestic and international economic developments
and the subsequent inflation forecasts. The MPC produces a statement on
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monetary policy decisions which is publicised through a press conference.
The South African Rand floats freely against international currencies.
However, the SARB sometimes purchases foreign currency with the aim of
managing the level of external reserves. There are no exchange control
restrictions on current account transactions and also under the capital
account, there are also no restrictions on the inward investment or
disinvestment by nonresidents.
Tanzania
Since the establishment of the central bank, the implementation of monetary
policy was through direct controls such as provision of cheap finance to the
public sector. In 1986 the central bank started to introduce market reforms
by eliminating controls in the financial and foreign exchange markets. In
the mid 1990s, the Bank of Tanzania adopted indirect instruments in order
to support a market based system of economic management. The central
bank sets annual monetary targets in consultation with the Government, the
Minister of finance. The targets are published in a Monetary Policy Statement
which is subjected to a mid-year review on progress towards attaining the
targets and make decisions on appropriate measures to be undertaken.
Tanzania’s Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) is responsible for
monetary policy decisions. The MPC is a sub-committee of the Board of
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Directors for the central bank and includes two external members with full
voting power (Morales, 2014). Implementation of monetary policy is by the
central bank’s Liquidity Management committee which meets on a weekly
basis. Tanzania also follows a flexible exchange rate management regime
with the central bank intervening in the market in order to smooth any
fluctuations and maintain the appropriate level of external reserves
Uganda
Before 1993, monetary policy in Uganda operated through direct
instruments such as ceilings on commercial bank credit and administered
interest rates. During that time, the Minister of Finance was responsible for
formulating monetary policy. Uganda started to reform its conduct of
monetary policy in the mid-1990s. In 1994, they adopted a flexible foreign
exchange regime and instituted an inter-bank foreign exchange market with
a minimum intervention by the central bank. Formulation of monetary
policy was transferred to the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) and
implementation is done by the Financial Markets Operations department.
Previously, the Bank of Uganda was targeting money supply. In July 2011, it
changed from targeting the growth in money supply to a partial inflation
targeting framework called Inflation Targeting Lite (ITL) (Mugume, 2011).
The change was on account of the unstable relationship between money
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supply and prices. Under ITL, the Bank of Uganda monetary policy publicly
expresses its commitment to maintain low and relatively stable inflation.
Zambia
Just like other countries, during the period from the 1980s to early 1990s, the
conduct of monetary policy in Zambia was geared towards achieving multiple
objectives such as provision of cheap credit for government’s budget and state
owned enterprises; and promotion of economic growth through funding of
various projects (Zgambo and Chileshe, 2014). To achieve these objectives,
direct instruments such as interest rate controls, credit allocations as well as
core liquid assets and statutory reserve ratios were used up to 1992 when
several economic reforms and policies that aimed at creating a market-based
economic system driven by the private sector, were adopted. Some of the
measures that were taken included the liberalisation of the foreign exchange
market through the removal of exchange controls and the decontrolling of
interest rates.
In 1996 the central bank of Zambia’s objective was narrowed to
promoting price and financial stabilisation. The Ministry of Finance in
consultation with the Bank of Zambia developed a medium term plan which
highlights various economic targets including output and price level. The
central bank of Zambia has the mandate to use monetary policy instruments
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at its discretion in order to manage liquidity conditions for achieving the
inflation target.
The Bank of Zambia is also responsible for determining the exchange
rate policy in conjunction with the Ministry of Finance and National
Planning. The exchange rate is market determined but the central bank
participates in the market to build reserves and also to manage the
fluctuations (Zgambo and Chileshe, 2014). There are no exchange controls
on current or capital account transactions (SADC, 2014). In April 2012, the
Bank of Zambia changed from targeting monetary aggregates interest rates.
The central bank’s policy rate is the operating target but broad money
remains the intermediate target (SADC, 2014).
2.5 Conclusion
This chapter has provided historical information about the environment
under which monetary policy has been operating in this region. Before the
1990s, the countries’ implementation of monetary policy was through direct
controls such as setting interest rate and credit ceilings. The countries began
modernising their frameworks in the mid 1990s when they started adopting
reforms that aimed at implementing market based policies. The progress in
modernising the frameworks and markets differ across the countries leading
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to differences in levels of macroeconomic and financial developments.
Among other features, monetary policy is expected to be more effective
in countries with deeper financial markets, greater degree of central bank
independence, more transparent strategy, and greater reliance on market
based procedures. In our sample, South Africa has almost all of the above
characteristics. Kenya has a deeper financial market but a low degree of
central bank independence as the Minister of Finance has the authority to
overrule monetary policy decisions and this might impede the effectiveness
of monetary policy. Other countries with deeper financial markets are
Botswana and Namibia however, both of these countries have limited scope
of independent monetary policy due to fixed exchange rate regimes.
High degree of effectiveness is also expected in countries with a clear
objective of monetary policy and strategy. However, Table A2.1 in the
appendix shows that almost all countries pursue multiple objectives. Thus
on top of price stability other objectives such as economic growth, and
exchange rate stability are also pursued hence creating a source of conflicts
that could mask the effectiveness of monetary policy. In summary, the
information in this chapter is important to provide insights on country
specific results for the empirical investigations of the effectiveness of
monetary policy in the individual countries and also in the region as a whole.
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2.6 Appendix









Chapter 2 shows that almost all countries in the COMESA-EAC-SADC free
trade area have price stability and economic growth are the ultimate goals of
monetary policy. However, the central banks also target other economic
objectives such as financial stability and exchange rate stability. The main
instruments are open market operations and the central bank policy rate.
Most central banks also intervene in the exchange rate market to manage
fluctuations. This chapter aims at investigating how the transmission
mechanisms work.
The literature suggests six main channels of monetary policy. The
channels are (i) money, (ii) interest rate, (iii) the exchange rate, (iv) asset
prices, (v) credit and (vi) the expectations channels. However, it also
presents differing views and findings on how the channels of transmission
work. The differences are prevalent in studies for both advanced and
developing countries. In low income countries, the results are more diverse.
Whilst some studies find that monetary policy actions are effective in
influencing the final goals, other studies report results that show that the
policies are ineffective. This shows that research on monetary policy
transmission mechanisms in less developed countries remain an issue
worthy of further empirical investigation.
46
The aim of this chapter is to provide further evidence on the effectiveness
of monetary policy in the sub-Sahara African region focusing on 11
countries from the COMESA-EAC-SADC region. The countries are
Angola, Botswana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Namibia, South Africa,
Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia. In this study, the word effective
implies that the ultimate goals of monetary policy respond in the
theoretically-expected way to shocks in the instruments. Thus prices and
output decrease in response to tight monetary policy such as an increase in
the policy rate or decline in reserve money. Weak means that although the
goals may respond in a theoretically-expected way, the results may not be
significant; whilst strong implies theoretically-expected and statistically
significant results.
The chapter uses a factor augmented vector autoregression (FAVAR)
models in examining the transmission mechanism. Most studies on
monetary policy transmission mechanisms in the sub-Sahara African region
use standard vector autoregression (VAR) models (Mishra and Montiel,
2012). Standard VAR models limit the amount of economic variables that
are included in the analysis to preserve degrees of freedom and avoid
over-parameterization. Sims (1992) argued that failure to control for a wide
set of information that is used by policy makers in making decisions may
lead to counter-intuitive results (puzzles). The FAVAR method allows
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inclusion of more variables in the analysis without subjecting the model to
the problem of over-parameterization. This method has however mostly
been applied in studies on developed countries and in only a few studies
from less developed countries.
The main contribution of this chapter is therefore in the use of the FAVAR
method in examining the effectiveness of monetary policy transmission in
11 countries from the COMESA-EAC-SADC region. The investigation is
conducted on a country by country basis in order to provide more insights on
the way the transmission mechanism works in each country and how country-
specific features enhance or impede monetary policy. In general, the results
show that monetary policy is effective in most of the countries analysed, but
the channels of transmission and their strengths vary across the countries,
largely reflecting differences in levels of financial development, monetary
policy framework, exchange rate regime or the general conduct of monetary
policy (i.e whether transparent or not).
Monetary policy through shocks to the policy rate is more effective in
countries with deeper financial markets such as Botswana, Kenya and South
Africa. In these countries, both prices and output respond negatively to
positive shocks to the policy rates. These results corroborate Mishra and
Montiel (2012) who argue that financial development and reforms are key to
enhancing the effectiveness of monetary policy. Similar to the findings of
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the IMF (2010) for the sub-Saharan Africa region, our results provide
further evidence that reserve money shocks are more effective in influencing
both monetary policy goals of output and prices in most countries (Angola,
Malawi, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia) than shocks to the policy rate.
In some cases our results show counter-intuitive outcomes which are
mainly explained by having multiple objectives of monetary policy. This
leads to inconsistent policies which bring confusion to market participants
and cause the policy to be ineffective. Overall, based on country level
results, we provide recommendations for improving the effectiveness of
monetary policy in that country. The findings of this research can provide
guidance to the authorities of the COMESA-EAC-SADC free trade area
when coming up with the criteria on the harmonisation of economic policies
in the region.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows; section 3.2 provides a
literature review; section 3.3 outlines the method, data and estimation
technique; Section 3.4 provides a discussion of results firstly as a summary
of all results and secondly on a country by country basis. In section 3.5 we
conclude the findings of the chapter and provide areas of further research.
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3.2 Literature Review
3.2.1 Channels of Monetary Policy Transmission
The monetary policy transmission mechanism is the process by which policy
actions feed through the financial and economic system to affect the final
goals of output and prices (Lewis and Mizen, 2000). In the literature, there
is little agreement about how exactly monetary policy exerts its influence on
the real economy, to the extent that the monetary transmission mechanism
itself has been referred to as a “black box” by Bernanke and Gertler (1995).
Nonetheless, theory points to the existence of six main transmission
channels namely the money, interest rate, credit, exchange rate, asset price
and expectations (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995; Mishkin, 1996; Taylor,
1995). The following sections provide insights on how the channels operate.
Money Channel
This is the most traditional and oldest channel. It is based on Fisher’s
quantity theory of money (QTM) which directly links price developments to
changes in monetary aggregates. Derived from the “equation of exchange”,
MV = PT , where M is nominal money supply, V is velocity of circulation,
P is general price level and T is the volume of transactions in the economy.
The equation of exchange shows that the amount of money in an economy
50
when multiplied by the number of times it is used will equal the value of
transactions in the economy (Fender, 2012). Assuming the volume of
transactions (T ) is constant and equals gross domestic product (Y ) for the
economy. The equation can further be expressed as MV = PY where Y is
nominal GDP and implies that with velocity and nominal GDP constant, the
rate of inflation is approximately equal to the rate of growth of money
supply. Therefore central banks can control inflation by regulating the
growth of money supply. In practice, central banks control the levels of
reserve money (which is linked to money supply by a multiplier) through
open market operations such as repurchase agreements in bills and bonds.
The assumption of stable velocity is the basis for central banks’ choice of
broad money as their intermediate target in their monetary targeting
frameworks (Mishkin, 1998).
Interest Rate Channel
The interest rate channel shows that changes in short-term nominal policy
interest rates affect real interest rates, which in turn feed through to
aggregate demand and prices by changing firms’ and households’
investment and consumption decisions. Taylor (1995) shows how the
resulting output gap (the deviations of aggregate demand from the potential
output) lead to pressures on the general price level. Raising nominal policy
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rates leads to higher real short-term and long-term interest rates, thus
increasing the cost of capital which lowers the demand for credit and
consequently real investment, real consumption and finally reducing real
output. Bernanke and Gertler (1995) argue that it is difficult to identify a
significant impact of the interest rate on the cost of capital even in developed
countries. Mishra and Montiel (2012) state that for developing countries,
changes in the interest rate are even less likely to have a strong impact on the
cost of capital as many other factors such as cost of doing business and
institutional limitations may have a larger influence.
Credit Channel
The role of credit in the transmission mechanism of monetary policy arises
as a result of imperfect information between parties in the credit relation.
The channel operates when shifts in monetary policy alter the efficiency of
financial markets in matching borrowers and lenders to the extent that
borrowers face rationing in credit influenced by liquidity constraints (Walsh,
2010: 478). However, according to Bernanke and Gertler (1995), this
channel may be perceived “as a set of factors that amplify and propagate
conventional interest rate effects”. The argument is that information
asymmetry between lenders and borrowers puts a wedge between the costs
of externally-raised and internally-raised investment funds. This wedge is
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called the external finance premium and is positively related to changes in
market interest rates due to monetary policy shifts.
Bernanke and Gertler (1995) identify two sub-channels of the credit
channel namely the balance sheet and the bank lending channels. The
balance sheet channel argues that tight monetary policy affects borrowers’
credit worthiness by directly weakening their balance sheets, reducing their
collateral on loans and increasing their external finance premium. This in
return increases both adverse selection and moral hazard problems which
cause a decline in provision of loans by commercial banks. The bank
lending channel works through adjustments in the amount of banks’ reserves
and deposits. Changes in monetary policy alters the banks’ ability and
willingness to lend especially when they cannot perfectly substitute deposits
and reserves with other sources of funds. A tightening of monetary policy
will translate into a lower availability of credit, slower growth of aggregate
demand and lower inflation.
Exchange Rate Channel
Open macroeconomic models developed by Fleming (1962) and Mundell
(1963) explain the link between monetary policy and exchange rates
(Dornbusch, 1976) which is also confirmed by Clarida and Gali (1994) in a
study on German, Japan, Canada and Britain. Under uncovered interest rate
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parity, the difference between the domestic and foreign interest rate is equal
to the expected change in the exchange rate. With floating exchange rates
and perfect capital mobility, arbitrage between domestic and foreign
short-term government securities causes capital flows which change the
equilibrium value of the exchange rate required to sustain the uncovered
interest parity. Accordingly, the relative price of imports and exports change
and this affects aggregate demand and supply.
On the demand side, assuming that the Marshall-Lerner condition holds,
monetary policy that lowers domestic interest rates will cause the currency
to depreciate, making exports cheaper and imports more expensive. This
increase in net exports, positively affect aggregate demand and output
(Mishkin, 1996). On the supply side, however, the higher domestic price of
imported goods increases inflationary pressure and contracts output (Taylor,
1993; Mishkin, 2001). Morales and Raei (2013) argue that the condition
may not hold for developing countries due to closed capital account regimes
and low elasticity of exports to changes in the exchange rate. However, even
if the condition may not hold, the exchange rate channel could work through
the impact on the level of prices and on inflationary expectations.
Asset Price Channel
This channel is developed in two ways, either through Tobin’s Q theory
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whereby aggregate demand is affected through investment; or through the
wealth effects under life cycle hypothesis of consumption. Using Tobin’s Q
theory, monetary policy can influence the stock market. Expansionary
monetary policy raises the money supply and causes the public to consider
buying stocks and this leads to an increase in share prices. Higher stock
prices will lead to a higher Q and thus to higher investment expenditure
(Mishkin, 2001). Another way is through the life cycle hypothesis of
consumption which states that consumers smooth out their consumption
over time based on their lifetime resources. When an expansionary
monetary policy influences stock prices to rise, the value of the consumers’
financial wealth increases and consequently, they raise their consumption.
The literature questions the applicability of this channel in developing
countries due to the absence of highly developed non-bank financial markets
and institutions (Cecchetti, 1995) and also due to the presence of weak
institutional frameworks (Mishra and Montiel, 2012).
The Expectations Channel
This channel is believed to be fundamental in the working of all channels and
key in forward-looking monetary policy. Levels of expenditure increase if
output and income are expected to be high in future. Similarly, if inflation
is expected to be high in the future, this would stimulate current spending
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(Fender, 2012; 189).
Financial market expectations of the future path of monetary policy also
affect the structure of market interest rates (Bank of England, 1999). It is
therefore believed that a credible and transparent monetary policy strategy is
critical as it provides an anchor for expectations about inflation and general
economic activity and guides the market along the best possible path. This
highlights the important role of central bank communications in the
transmission process. In the chapter 2, we noted that countries in the
COMESA-EAC-SADC region have started to modernise the conduct of
monetary policy during the 2000s through increased communication on
monetary policy strategies and outcomes using press briefings, stakeholder
meetings and various publications. This is expected to improve the
effectiveness of monetary policy in the region.
3.2.2 Empirical Literature Review
Several studies on the effectiveness of monetary policy have been conducted
on the channels of monetary transmission in sub-Saharan Africa. Tables 3.1
and 3.2 summarise the main studies that are related to this study. Some of
the studies are at an individual country level whilst others are on multiple
countries.
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Cheng (2006) used structural vector autoregression (SVAR) on monthly
data in Kenya for the period of 1997–2005 in a study that investigated the
effects of changes in the policy rate to output and prices. He found that an
exogenous positive shock to the policy rate resulted to a price puzzle in the
initial period and followed by a decline in the price level that is statistically
significant for about two years. In a similar fashion, output rises following
the tight monetary policy and decreases eventually, though the decline is not
statistically significant.
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Table 3.1: Studies on Monetary Policy Transmission in COMESA-EAC-SADC
Country and Policy Main
Authors Sample Period Method Variable Findings
Shocks to Policy Rate have
Cheng Kenya Recursive VAR Policy rate significant effect on prices
(2006) 1997M1 2005M12 and exchange rate but
not on output
Negative shocks to money supply
Saxegaard Uganda Threshold VAR Money Supply lead to a decline in price level
(2006) 1990Q1 2004Q4 and the effect is statistically
significant.
Mixed evidence as lending
Lungu Botswana, Malawi and deposit rates respond
(2008) Namibia, South Recursive policy rate significantly to shocks in
Africa and Zambia; VAR the policy rate but their
1990M1 2006M12 influence on prices
and output is limited.
Shocks to reserve money are
IMF Sub Saharan Africa Single Reserve Money more effective in influencing
(2010) equation & and discount both output and prices.
Panel VAR rate Mixed results on shocks
to discount rates
A positive shock on TB rate
Buigut Kenya VECM T-bill rate leads to price puzzle and
(2010) 1979A - 2008A a negative impact on real GDP
Maturu, Maana Kenya Recursive M3 No effect on real output,
Kisinguh (2010) 2000Q1 2010Q4 Structural VAR positive effect on prices
Ngalawa and Veigi Malawi Structural Bank rate Real output and price level
(2011) 1988M1 2005M12 VAR and change in the expected
reserve money direction (negative) following
a positive shock in the bank
rate. But the effect
is insignificant.
Structural VAR: CPI reacts
positively to tight
monetary policy (puzzle).
Kabundi and South Africa Structural VAR Policy rate FAVAR: Real and Financial
Ngwenya 1985M2 2007M11 and sector variables respond




Source: Compiled by the Author
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Table 3.2: Studies in COMESA-EAC-SADC continued
Country and Policy Main
Authors Sample Period Method Variable Findings
Tight monetary policy lead
Mugume Uganda Recursive VAR T-bill rate to negative effect on output
(2011) 1999Q1 2009Q1 and prices. Only output is
significant. Shocks to broad
money has no significant
effect on output and
prices.
Burundi, Kenya
Davood, Rwanda, Tanzania, Structural Reserve Money Output increases significantly
Dixit, Pinter Uganda; 2000M1 Bayesian Policy Rate following positive shocks in
(2013) to 2010M12 VAR reserve money only in
& Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda.
FAVAR No significant price effect
for the other countries.
Negative shocks to policy
rate increases prices significantly,
in Kenya and Uganda and output
in Kenya, Burundi and Rwanda.
Burundi, Kenya Exchange Rate and Interest
Morales and Rwanda, Tanzania Exchange Rate rate channels are more
Raei (2013) Uganda; 2000Q1 VECM & T-bill rate effective in explaining
to 2011Q4 the dynamics of inflation
and growth in all countries.
Recursive VAR; small
Montiel, Adam, Tanzania Recursive and Reserve Money but significant effect
Mbowe, 2001M12 to structural VAR on prices only.
O’Connell 2010M12 Structural VAR: Expected
(2014) effects on output and
prices but not significant.
Interest rate were ineffective
Zgambo and Zambia Recursive VAR Interbank & in influencing prices and
Chileshe 1995Q2 2013Q3 T-bill rates output. Important channels are
(2014) Money and exchange rate.
Recursive VAR:Prices and
Chiumia Malawi Recursive Policy rate output respond positively to
(2015) 1990Q1 to VAR & a rise in policy rate.






Source: Compiled by the Author
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Maturu et al (2010) employed both a recursive and non-recursive SVAR
model to investigate the effects of a monetary policy shock, using change in
M3 as the monetary policy instrument, with quarterly data from 2000 to 2010
for Kenya. They found no effect on real output for an expansionary monetary
policy, but there was an effect on the level of prices, where the expansionary
policy resulted in rising prices. In another study for Kenya, Buigut (2010)
applied a vector error correction model (VECM) to annual data for the period
of 1979–2008. His study investigated the effect of changes in the 91-day
treasury bills rate on price and output. He found a price puzzle as increases
in treasury bills rate raised the level of prices.
Saxegaard (2006) employed a threshold VAR technique on quarterly data
from 1999 to 2004 in Uganda using money supply as the monetary policy
instrument. The results indicated a negative effect of a contractionary
monetary policy on the price level. The effect was statistically significant
and the magnitude was larger when commercial banks’ excess liquidity was
low. Mugume (2011) also examined quarterly data for 1999 to 2009 for
Uganda using structural VAR models. A monetary policy shock was
identified as a shock to the 91-day treasury bill rate. He found that positive
shocks to the treasury bills led to negative effect on output and prices. The
effect on prices is not significant whilst the output effect was statistically
significant and lasted up to two quarters. He also found that changes in
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broad money (M2) had no statistically significant effects on either output or
inflation.
Ngalawa and Veigi (2011) applied the SVAR on monthly data from 1988
to 2005 in Malawi. The policy variables were the bank rate and reserve
money. Their study controlled for a structural break related to a change from
fixed to floating exchange rate in 1994 by splitting the sample into 2 periods.
Overall the study found that real output and price levels responded
negatively to changes in both policy variables. The impact was more
effective when the bank rate was used compared to reserve money.
However, all results were not statistically significant. With regard to the
effectiveness during the two different sub-sample periods, they found that
monetary policy was more effective in the period of floating exchange rate
than the fixed exchange rate regime as expected by theory.
Mangani (2012) applied a VAR framework to assess the impact of
monetary policy on inflation in Malawi. He found that money has a weak
impact on prices but exchange rate has a major impact on inflation. Contrary
to Mangani’s findings, Simwaka et al (2012), using single equation error
correction models for the period of 1995 to 2011, found that money supply
growth has an impact on prices with a lag of 3 to 6 months. Both studies
however agree that depreciations raise the level of prices with a persistent
effect. They therefore recommend targeting exchange rate stability in order
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to anchor inflation expectations.
Mwabutwa, et al (2013), used quarterly data from 1981 to 2010 in a time
varying parameter vector auto-regressive (TVP-VAR) model to investigate
how real GDP and inflation respond to changes in exchange rate, policy rate
and credit shocks over time. The study was conducted on Malawi and
showed evidence that monetary policy transmission has evolved over time.
The transmission mechanism was not observed in the period before the
financial reforms; it was blurred during the reforms and performs according
to economic theory after the reforms. Chiumia (2015), used a factor
augmented vector auto-regressive model (FAVAR) on quarterly data from
1990 to 2013 to examine the transmission mechanism in Malawi. He found
that inflation was responsive to money supply and policy rate shocks. The
results further indicated that it took less time for inflation and GDP to
stabilise under the interest rate shock than they did under money supply
shock.
Bova (2009) estimated a six variable cointegrated structural VAR on
monthly data from 1996 to 2008 to study the effect of monetary policy on
food price inflation in Zambia. Using money supply (measured by broad
money) and nominal exchange rate as the instruments, the study found a
long run effect of money supply shocks on changes for both food and
non-food price levels. However, they found that transmission mechanism
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through the money was weak while the exchange rate channel is strong,
especially for food prices. Zgambo and Chileshe (2014) used a vector auto
regressive framework to study the monetary transmission mechanism for
Zambia. The study was conducted on quarterly data from 1995 to 2013. The
policy instruments were inter-bank treasury bill rates. The study found that
broad money and exchange rate were important channels of monetary policy
transmission, while interest rates were found to be ineffective in influencing
both prices and output. They recommended continued use of monetary
targeting and adoption of polices that aim to promote financial depth before
modernising the monetary policy framework to inflation targeting.
For Tanzania, Montiel et al (2012) employed recursive and structural VAR
models on monthly data from 2001 to 2010. Reserve money was used as an
operational instrument. The findings show that expansionary monetary policy
through innovations in reserve money resulted in a positive effect on the price
level which was statistically significant. When a structural VAR model was
used, the statistical significance disappeared. In both models, the study found
no effect of monetary policy on output.
Kabundi and Ngwenya (2011) investigated the effect of contractionary
monetary policy on real, nominal and financial variables in South Africa.
They used SVAR and FAVAR model on monthly data from 1985 to 2007.
The results from SVAR indicated a price puzzle as CPI responded positively
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to changes in the policy rate. On the other hand, the FAVAR results show that
monetary policy influences the outcomes of key macroeconomic indicators
in South Africa. Real and financial sector variables were found to respond
negatively to tight monetary policy stance in the economy as expected by
theory and the results were significant. Moreover, the the study could not
establish the existence of a price puzzle found in the SVAR analysis.
The above literature review was on individual countries. We conclude by
reviewing empirical literature on regional studies. Lungu (2008)
investigated the existence of the bank lending channel in five countries from
the SADC region1 using monthly data from 1990 to 2006 and the recursive
VAR identification. His results were mixed. Bank loans declined in
Botswana, Malawi, Namibia and South Africa following a positive shock on
the policy rate hence confirming the existence of the bank lending channel in
these countries.
Lungu (2008) also found that in all countries, increases in short term
interest rates resulted in declines in output within the first quarter and
continued to decline for the rest of the period. Similarly, as expected by
theory, prices responded negatively to an increase in the policy rate in South
Africa, Botswana and Zambia. However, in Malawi and Namibia, he found
a positive response of price to changes in interest rate suggesting that
1Botswana, Malawi, Namibia, South Africa and Zambia
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contractionary monetary policy increases inflation. He attributed the
counter-intuitive results to limited amount of information used in the
analysis based on the argument by Sims (1992). Our study will extend this
literature on SADC by firstly using data that takes into account recent
periods and including more variables that are monitored by monetary
authorities in making policy decisions.
A study by IMF (2010), on sub-Sahara African countries used single
equation and panel VAR models to investigate the effectiveness of monetary
policy. The study also found that positive shocks to reserve money led to
increased output and price as well as changes in monetary aggregates. On
the other hand, the study found evidence for a price puzzle as increases in
the discount rate resulted raised prices. Meanwhile, expected results were
found on output and exchange rate. Tight monetary policy through a positive
shock to the discount rate resulted in a decline in output and also
depreciation of the exchange rate. Based on these results, they concluded
that use of reserve money as an operational instrument is more effective in
controlling inflation in sub-Saharan Africa than the use of interest rates.
Davood et al (2013) studied the transmission mechanism on all countries
from the EAC using SVAR, BVAR and FAVAR for the period of 2000 to
2010. The data was on a monthly basis and the instruments were base
money and interest rate. Based on the SVAR method, the study found that in
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Tanzania, there were no statistically significant effects on output and prices
by both instruments. Under the FAVAR, they find significant positive effects
of expansionary policy when reserve money was used. Thus suggesting that
the central bank takes into account developments in more economic
indicators when making monetary policy decisions as FAVAR analysis
controls for those variables.
In Uganda, positive shocks in the base money resulted in increases in
output over a 2 to 4 months horizon but no effect on prices. On the other
hand, positive shocks to the interest rate were found to have no significant
effect on output but a persistent negative effect on prices. The same picture
was displayed in all the three methods. However, the magnitude of the
decrease in prices following a positive shock in the interest rate was larger
when FAVAR method was used compared to SVAR and BVAR. In Kenya,
Davood et al’s study found statistically significant effects on prices
following an interest rate shock, but no effect on output. When the base
money was used, no significant effect was found on both output and prices.
Overall, the results indicated that policy rate was more effective in
influencing prices in countries with deeper financial markets such as Kenya
and Uganda. We draw extensively on the Davood et al (2013) study in the
FAVAR work that follows.
Another study on the EAC region was conducted by Morales and Raei
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(2013) using a vector error correction model (VECM) in an investigation of
the evolution of the exchange rate and interest rate channels. The study was
conducted on two sample periods, firstly, from 2000Q1 to 2011Q4, as the
full sample period and secondly, from 2006Q1 to 2011Q4. The results
suggested that over time, both channels gained strength in the way they
influence prices and economic growth in the region albeit with differences
among the countries based on macroeconomic and institutional
environments. The improvement in the strength of the channels was higher
in Kenya and Uganda than the remaining countries. They attributed these
results to open account and flexible exchange rate regimes that enhance the
exchange rate channel in both countries. High levels of financial
development also enhanced the interest rate channel.
3.2.3 Contribution to Literature
As can be seen, the above literature presents mixed results on the
effectiveness of monetary policy in less developed countries. Notably, the
studies use different approaches in terms of method of analysis and specific
variables included in the analysis. When investigating the interest rate
channel, some studies choose the treasury bills rate as the policy rate
(Buigut, 2010; Mugume, 2011; Morales and Raei, 2013; Zgambo and
Chileshe, 2014) whilst others use the central bank’s policy rate (Cheng,
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2006; Lungu, 2008; IMF, 2010; Kabundi and Ngwenya, 2011). These
differences partly contribute to the variation of results. The studies which
use treasury bills and inter-bank markets may be interested in how
short-term interest rates affect the final goals of monetary policy. Our study
uses the central bank policy rate across all the countries as we aim to find
out how exogenous shocks to operational instruments of monetary policy
affect the final goals.
The above literature review also shows that most studies on the
transmission mechanism of monetary policy in the sub-Saharan Africa use
standard vector autoregression (VAR) methods. In macroeconomic analysis
the use of VAR methods is important as they take into account interactions
of all the variables in the system and the the structure of the model is
dynamic. Despite the complexity of the interactions in the system, VARs use
simple techniques such as ordinary least squares (OLS) to estimate the
models. Interpretation of the results is also practical due to use of impulse
response and variance decomposition analyses. However, the standard VAR
models mostly use up to a maximum of 6 to 8 variables in order to conserve
degrees of freedom especially when the time dimension is short. This means
that standard VAR approach to monetary policy analysis use a small amount
of information whilst in practice, central banks monitor developments in
many economic indicators when making monetary policy decisions. Sims
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(1992) argues that sometimes results that are contrary to theory (puzzles) are
due to the use of limited information in the analysis. This argument
motivated the use of factor analysis in macroeconomic modelling which
allows inclusion of a large cross section time series without including all the
variables in the model.
Studies on monetary policy transmission mechanisms have used factor
augmented vector auto regression (FAVAR) estimation methods in order to
address the problems of over-parameterization in VARs whilst
simultaneously using more information in the analysis. Bernanke et al
(2005) used the FAVAR approach in measuring the effects of monetary
policy in the USA. They find that “puzzles” disappear when more variables
from the central bank’s information set are included in the estimation. Their
results also provide a comprehensive picture of the effect of monetary policy
on the economy. In the COMESA-EAC-SADC region the studies that have
used the FAVAR method include Kabundi and Ngwenya (2011) for South
Africa, Davood et al (2013) on East African Community (EAC) and
Chiumia (2015) on Malawi.
Kabundi and Ngwenya’s study was for the period of 1985 - 2007. Our
study uses recent data and provides updated information on South Africa and
a comparison with the other countries in the region. Our study also differs
from Chiumia (2015) as he only focuses on the effect of the bank rate whilst
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in our case in addition to the bank rate, we also include reserve money as
one of the operational instruments of the central bank. We also differ on the
sample period. His study is quarterly from 1990 to 2013, whilst we employ
data at a monthly frequency focusing on the period from 2001 to 2015 when
monetary authorities in Malawi were actively using the bank rate as one of
the policy instruments.
Our study largely follows Davood et al (2013) approach especially in the
implementation of the FAVAR method. However, the two studies differ in 3
ways; (i) Our study includes more variables, 22 in the central bank’s
information as listed on the data section set whilst their study includes only
12 variables. The variables in their study are real GDP, consumer price
index (CPI), reserve money, nominal effective exchange rate, private credit,
narrow money (M1), broad money (M2 and M3), United States (U.S)
industrial production, U.S federal funds rate, global commodity price index
and global food price. (ii) The sample period in Davood et al’s study is from
2000 to 2010 whilst ours is from 2001 to 2015. By extending the time
period, this study takes into account financial and economic developments
and also adjustments in the conduct of monetary policy, in the countries
after the year 2010. For instance, Uganda and Kenya modernised their
monetary policy frameworks by giving the role of the central bank’s policy
rate more prominence in 2011. (iii) Our sample applies FAVAR method on
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data from a wider group of countries beyond the EAC.
In summary, this chapter contributes to the literature by investigating
monetary policy transmission mechanisms in the COMESA-EAC-SADC
region using FAVAR approach. This method is data intensive compared to
standard VAR methods. Because of this, the FAVAR method has mostly
been applied in data-rich countries and a few studies in our region. The
study seeks to find out how shocks to monetary policy instruments defined
as central bank’s policy rate and reserve money get transmitted to real GDP
and prices in each country. The study takes into account country-specific
features but endeavours to provide results that are comparable across the
countries by choosing the same policy instruments and goal variables. The
results provide insights on ways of improving the effectiveness of monetary
policy in each country. They also provide guidance on the main issues to
take into consideration when constructing the criteria for harmonising the
economic policies in the region.
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3.3 Method
3.3.1 Model: Factor Augmented Vector Auto Regression (FAVAR)
This section largely follows notation from Davood et al (2013) and Bernanke
et al (2005). A standard reduced form VAR would use an M × 1 vector Yt
which contains observable economic variables including policy indicators.
However, in practice, there is an additional set of economic information that
is also monitored by the central bank and taken into account when making
monetary policy decisions. That information may represent concepts such
as credit conditions, economic activity or price pressures but not be fully
covered by Yt; nor be represented by any observable series but several series
of economic indicators (Bernanke et al, 2005). Let the unobserved factors be
contained in a K×1 vector, Ft, where K < M . If the size of the information
set is small enough, it can be directly included in Yt . But if it is large the
VAR would suffer from over parameterisation.
Combining the two vectors Yt and Ft, we model a factor augmented vector






 + ...+ φq(L)
Yt−q
Ft−q
 + νt (3.1)
where φi(L) are polynomial lags. The error term νt has mean zero with
72
covariance matrix Σ. If the true system is a FAVAR, estimating a standard
VAR system in Yt excluding Ft will lead to biased estimates. Should the
terms φi(L) that relate Yt to Ft all be zero, then equation 3.1 is also reduced
to a standard VAR.
The factors, Ft are interpreted as forces that affect many economic
variables but they are unobservable hence equation 3.1 can not be estimated
directly. The factors have to be replaced by F̂t. Supposing that we have a
number of informational time series that are contained in a P × 1 vector Γt
where P is large. We assume that the informational time series in Γt are




yYt + et (3.2)
where Λf is a P ×K matrix of factor loadings, Λy is a P ×M matrix and et
is a P × 1 vector of error terms that are assumed to be mean zero. Stock and
Watson (1998) refer to equation 3.2 as a dynamic factor model. Bernanke et
al (2005) identifies two approaches to estimating equations 3.1 and 3.2, the
single step Bayesian approach and the two-step principal components
approach (PCA) used by Stock and Watson (2002). We use the static two
step principal component approach. This approach is used by most
researchers because it is computationally simple, easy to implement,
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imposes few distributional assumptions and allows some degree of
correlation in the error term, et. Furthermore, it does not exploit the
structure of the transition equation 3.2 (Bernake et al, 2005; Stock and
Watson, 2002).
In the first step we extract the factors from equation 3.2 using principal
component analysis. In the second step, the estimated factors, (F̂t) replace






 + ...+ φq(L)
Yt−q
F̂t−q
 + νt (3.3)
However, since the two step approach implies use of generated
regressors in the second step, a bootstrapping procedure based on Kilian
(1998) is implemented in order to obtain accurate confidence intervals that
account for the uncertainty of in the factor estimation.
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3.3.2 Data
The data are on a monthly basis for the period of 2001 to 2015. The starting
period is selected to coincide with the period when most financial sector
reforms which started in mid 1990s gained credence in the region. The
source of the data is International Finance Statistics (IFS). Table 3.3
provides description of the data and summary statistics are presented in
Table 3.6 in the appendix.
Table 3.3: Data Description
Variable Description
Policy Rate (pr) This is the rate commercial banks borrow from the central bank
Reserve money
(rm)
Composed of cash and reserves held by the central bank, vault
cash in commercial banks and currency in circulation
Consumer Price
Index (cpi)
A proxy of price level
Real GDP (gdp) Output
Exchange rate
(ex)
The nominal exchange rate of the national currency to the United
States Dollar. It is the average of buying and selling rates.
private credit (pr) Commercial banks’ loans and advances to the private sector
First Factor(F̂1)
The first principal component of common factors extracted from
the central bank’s domestic information set. These are, narrow
money, broad money, net credit to government from the central
bank, commercial banks’ net credit to government, treasury bills
rate, deposit rate, lending rates commercial banks’ net foreign
assets, central banks’ net foreign assets and dummies.
Second
Factor(F̂2)
The first principal component of common factors from US
industrial production, US federal funds rate, global commodity
price index and global food price and global energy price index.
This factor reflects the global information set
Source: The IMF’s International Financial Statistics accessed through the Datastream.
The central bank’s operational instruments are the policy rate and reserve
money and the final goals are the price level and output which are proxied
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by cpi and gdp, respectively. There are two intermediate targets that have
also been included in the model, these are private credit (pvtc) and nominal
exchange rate (er). In all countries except Botswana and South Africa, gdp
is available at an annual frequency. Following a common practice in the
literature, we interpolate the annual series of real GDP to monthly
observations. Firstly, the proportional Denton method which interpolates a
low-frequency flow time series (in this case GDP) using an associated
high-frequency indicator series (in this case Exports which is in quarterly
observations), whilst imposing the constraints that the interpolated series
obeys the low-frequency total is applied (Baum and Hristakeva, 2001). This
gives us real GDP in quarterly observations. Secondly, a cubic spline
interpolation method is applied on the quarterly series to get monthly
observations of the series. Finally the monthly series is deseasonalised using
Census X-12. Other studies that have used interpolated monthly GDP series
in VARs include, Cheng (2006); Borys and Hovarth (2007), Ngalawa and
Veigi (2011), Davood et al, (2013) and Chiumia (2015).
There are two generated series, F̂1 and F̂2. These are factors that are
extracted from other economic variables which the central bank monitors to
guide them in making their policy decisions. The factors are calculated by
principal component analysis. Following Davood et al (2013), the first
factor, F̂1, is the first principal component of common factors extracted from
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the domestic information set as listed in Table 3.3. Dummies are also
included in F̂1, to account for structural breaks in each economy. Ehrmann
(2000) states that inclusion of country specific dummies is important as it
helps to incorporate heterogeneities in the sample, provide a valid picture of
the transmission mechanism and improve the statistical fit of the model. The
structural breaks are calculated using Bai and Perron (2003) multiple break
tests. This test does not assume an apriori known break point. The first
extracted factor, F̂1, is then included in the model as an additional
endogenous variable.
The second extracted factor, F̂2 is the first principal component of
common factors from US industrial production, US federal funds rate,
global commodity price index, global food price, and global energy price
index. This factor reflects the global information set and it is included in the
model as an exogenous variable mainly taking into account that the
countries included in this sample are too small to influence the variables in
this set.
In total, taking into account both the domestic and global information set
of the central bank, there are 22 variables that are included in this study.
Although Stock and Watson (2002) recommend use of more data, Boivin and
Ng (2006) find that fewer data series also lead to better results in forecasting
exercise compared to more data. Following this finding, other studies such as
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Davood et al (2013) have used a smaller dataset.
All variables are in log levels except interest rates which are in
percentages. Unit root tests confirm that all variables are integrated of order
1. Cointegration tests also confirm that the data are cointegrated. This
justifies use of levels compared to differences. Apart from the cointegration
test results, Sims et al (1990) argue that use of levels rather than first
differences preserves any long-run relationship, if present, and does not
affect statistical inference. Following their paper, most VAR studies have
been conducted in levels such as Bernanke and Mihov (1996; 1998), Lungu
(2008), Ngalawa and Veigi (2013) and Davood et al (2013).
3.3.3 Estimation Technique
The study is conducted on a country by country basis. In the first step, the
principal component analysis is conducted as described under the data
section. The FAVAR is estimated in the second step using equation 3.3
above. The econometric analysis is conducted in Stata. The estimation is
conducted in levels to take into account long-run relationships among the
variables. All variables are entered in the model as natural logs except the
policy rates which are in percentages. The study follows Davood et al
(2013) and uses Peersman and Smets (2001) identification whilst taking into
account the institutional context of the conduct of monetary policy in the
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sub-saharan Africa. Ordering of the endogenous variables starts with lgdp
followed by lcpi, F̂1, lrm, pr, lpc and lastly lex. The factor, F̂2 is included
as an exogenous variable.
This ordering, assumes that lgdp (output) and lcpi (price) react to
innovations to the reserve money with a lag whilst reserve money respond
contemporaneously to changes in output and prices. The policy rate is
ordered after reserve money as an additional instrument to signal the stance
of monetary policy. The ordering also shows that most central banks (except
South Africa’s which follows fully fledged inflation targeting) often use
open market operations as they first choose the reserve money path in their
programs for achieving the targets. In this case, the policy rate is used as an
additional instrument. However, in South Africa, reserve money is ordered
after the policy rate. This is to reflect the fact that being an inflation
targeting country, the main instrument of monetary policy is the policy rate.
In all countries, F̂1 is placed after lcpi as additional information that the
central bank monitors in making monetary policy decisions. The model also
includes the exogenous factor, F̂2 which is ordered last.
Private credit, lpc is placed after the policy rate pr to allow it to respond
to changes in both instruments. This also reflects the fact that commercial
banks respond with a lag to changes in monetary policy. The exchange rate,
lex, is placed after private credit because it responds to changes in all the
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other variables in the system. The lag lengths are determined by the Akaike
Information, Shwartz, and Hannan-Quinn criteria.
In the third step, the validity of the FAVAR is assessed through tests for
stability. For interpretation of the results, we generate impulse responses
using the bootstrapping technique as the model includes generated
regressors. Confidence intervals are provided at 90 per cent error bands
computed from the bootstrap procedure with 500 repetitions. Impulse
responses indicate how a shock to any one variable filters through the model
to affect every other variables and feeds back to the original variable itself.
The study also calculates variance decompositions for each variable at
forecast horizon of one to three years in order to find the contribution of
each variable to the fluctuations in prices and output.
3.4 Empirical Results
3.4.1 Summary of all Results
The discussion under this section is based on Figure 3.1 which presents
impulse response functions that show how price and output respond to a one
standard deviation shock on the policy rate and reserve money. A full set of
impulse response functions for each country is presented in the appendix
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(Figures 3.2 to 3.12) and country-specific results are discussed in the next
section. In summary, the results show that monetary policy is effective in
influencing the ultimate goals in all countries, however, there are differences
across the countries in the way the mechanism works.
Shocks to the policy rate are found to affect both prices and output as
expected by theory in Botswana , South Africa, Kenya, Malawi, Tanzania
and Zambia. Tight monetary policy through a positive shock to the policy rate
reduces prices and the level of output. However, it is noted that the effects are
only statistically significant in countries with deeper financial markets. These
are South Africa, Kenya and Botswana. This outcome is in line with theory
and also similar to findings by Davood et al (2013). When the financial sector
is small, the link between monetary policy actions and financial variables is
weak as well as that of banks’ cost of credit and aggregate demand (Mishra
and Montiel, 2012). Because of this, the effectiveness of monetary policy is
also weak.
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The results also provide evidence that monetary policy as measured by
shocks to the reserve money affect both output and prices in most countries,
Angola, Botswana, Kenya, Malawi, Namibia, Tanzania , Uganda and
Zambia. Expansionary monetary policy through positive shocks to reserve
money raises prices and output. This result corroborates well with IMF
(2010) which found that the traditional channel of monetary policy is the
most effective channel in influencing output and prices in the sub-Sahara
African region.
The results for the variance decomposition of the CPI in Table 3.42
indicate that in most of the countries, the amount of change in CPI that is
explained by shocks to reserve money is larger than the magnitude arising
from shocks to the policy rate. This notwithstanding, the effects of shocks in
reserve money are statistically significant for both output and prices in
Kenya, Malawi, and Tanzania; and in Botswana (prices only). In the
remaining countries, the transmission is weak.
2Refer to tables 3.6 and 3.7 in the appendix for more detailed information on the variance of decomposition
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Table 3.4: Variance Decomposition
Decomposition of lgdp Decomposition of lcpi
Month lrm pr lrm pr
Angola 12 3.87 8.04 0.25 1.29
24 3.51 7.56 0.67 1.70
36 3.34 7.09 2.92 1.77
Botswana 12 1.90 0.83 5.31 2.40
24 0.88 2.43 12.97 3.20
36 3.40 3.89 19.22 3.34
Kenya 12 5.05 3.14 10.66 4.65
24 10.51 9.64 16.61 16.08
36 13.19 10.38 19.26 17.20
Lesotho 12 1.52 2.90 0.06 2.90
24 1.93 3.91 0.55 5.82
36 2.52 4.61 0.98 6.03
Malawi 12 3.62 0.07 25.65 0.22
24 1.42 7.14 34.18 1.25
36 10.13 0.07 38.32 0.24
Namibia 12 1.70 1.48 3.45 6.04
24 1.56 2.46 2.42 3.50
36 1.40 5.30 1.63 10.11
South Africa 12 6.94 2.64 6.79 1.38
24 13.51 2.03 6.16 3.45
36 16.25 1.26 7.57 3.75
Swaziland 12 0.33 0.95 10.57 1.75
24 2.21 2.57 30.76 0.80
36 9.69 1.93 38.86 0.44
Tanzania 12 16.10 1.79 7.09 3.20
24 20.13 1.58 15.19 4.53
36 22.32 1.34 20.37 4.91
Uganda 12 7.18 2.05 12.35 3.24
24 10.41 4.71 16.62 3.99
36 10.13 6.70 15.00 6.88
Zambia 12 0.87 1.83 4.89 3.37
24 2.22 2.03 6.24 2.27
36 2.82 1.94 7.15 2.27
Each entry shows percent of variance in the log of GDP or the log of CPI from lrm and pr.
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Our results also suggest that the exchange rate channel is one of the
important channels in influencing output and prices in the region (refer to
full impulse response functions presented in figures 3.2 to 3.12 in the
appendix). In most countries depreciation has a persistent positive effect on
the level of prices. The finding of the exchange rate is consistent with a
small open economy in which imports play a key role in production and
consumption systems. In a few countries, depreciation increases output
through net exports hence reflecting that most exports in the region are price
inelastic. This is a common feature of small open countries with agricultural
products as their main exports.
Another important result is that although our analysis includes most
variables that are monitored by the central bank in its policy decisions, in
some of the countries, we still find results that are contrary to theory. Prices
increase after a positive shock to the central bank’s policy rate in Angola,
Lesotho and Swaziland. There are some counter-intuitive results with regard
to output effects of changes in the policy rate in Uganda and Namibia.
Output increases following a positive shock to the policy rate.
Apart from shallow financial markets, the weak transmission and
counter-intuitive outcomes can be attributed to multiple goals of monetary
policy which might lead to inconsistent application of policies. The previous
chapter shows that in most countries, in addition to price stability and
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economic growth, there are other goals of monetary policy such as exchange
rate stability. Having multiple objectives can cause monetary authorities to
pay attention to both prices and monetary aggregates such as foreign
exchange reserves. This may lead to confusing signals being sent to market
participants thereby weakening the expectations channel of monetary policy
and reducing the effectiveness of the policy. Another explanation which is
more attributable to results for Lesotho, Swaziland and Namibia is limited
scope of monetary policy autonomy as the currencies of these countries are
pegged to the South African Rand. As noted in the previous chapter under
the exchange rate targeting framework, in this situation, monetary policy can
only respond to shocks that are independent from those of the anchor’s




We find expected output effects of shocks to both policy instruments. A
contractionary policy through an increase in the policy rate leads to a decline
in the the level of output. Similarly, an expansionary monetary policy
through a positive shock to reserve money increases output. Both effects are
significant only up to 12 months beyond which they become insignificant.
However, the results show that prices do not respond to reserve money
shocks or policy rate shocks in an expected way.
The full set of Angola’s impulse response functions are presented in
figure 3.2 in the Appendix. The figure shows a strong relationship between
the exchange rate and the prices. Exchange rate depreciation leads to
immediate increases in price levels in Angola. This effect is significant up to
28 months. On output, the effect is insignificant in the first 12 months after
which it significantly raises output. The lagged positive effect on output
rightly reflects that Angola’s main exports is oil whose prices are determined
on futures markets. Depreciation immediately increases import bills and
affect output negatively and after twelve months it increases exports more
than imports and this get reflected in the high real GDP. Overall, our results
suggest that the exchange rate channel is very important in influencing
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output and prices in Angola. And that prices only respond to exchange rate
movements in the expected way but not to changes in the policy rate or
reserve money.
B. Botswana
As expected by theory, we find that in Botswana, tight monetary policy
through an increase in the policy rate leads to declines in the price level and
output. Similarly, an expansionary policy shock such as in increase in
reserve money, raises output and prices. The effect on output is statistically
insignificant whilst the effect on prices is significant after 12 months hence
showing that both channels are weak. This scenario could be explained by
the limited scope of monetary policy autonomy that the country has as its
exchange rate is pegged to a basket of currencies composed of the South
African Rand, special drawing rights and the United States Dollar.
Botswana manages the peg using a crawling band.
C. Kenya
In Kenya, the results suggest that prices decrease following a tight monetary
policy through a positive shock in the policy rate. This effect is significant
between 10 and 28 months. Output also responds negatively to the decrease in
the policy rate. These results suggest that the use of policy rate as a monetary
policy instrument is effective in influencing the final goals in Kenya. We
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attribute the effective results to higher levels of financial development which
facilitate the operations of the interest rate channel. As expected by theory,
our results also suggest that expansionary monetary policy through increases
in reserve money raises output and prices. Both effects are experienced from
the first month and are highly significant thus suggesting that the traditional
channel of monetary policy remain the most effective channel in Kenya.
Our results are slightly different from Davood et al (2013) who found
counter-intuitive results in the short run with respect to the response of
output to both policy rate and reserve money shocks. The improved results
can be attributed to inclusion of more variables in our FAVAR analysis and
extension of the sample period to 2015. In the preceding chapter, we noted
that Kenya modernised its conduct of monetary policy by giving more
prominence to the role of policy rate in 2011 and adopting inflation targeting
(IT) framework. Therefore this result provides further evidence that IT
framework enhances the effectiveness of monetary policy. A further analysis
of the rest of the impulse response in the Appendix indicate a negative
association between interest rates and shocks to reserve money which shows
that movements in money and interest rates are consistent with each other
thus portraying consistent application of monetary policy, Davood et al




Using the full set of impulse response functions (figure 3.5 in the appendix),
we find that exchange rate movements are important in influencing the levels
of both output and prices in Lesotho. An increase in the exchange rate
(depreciation) leads to increases in prices. This effect is persistent and
statistically significant. Depreciation also increases the level of output but
this effect is statistically not significant. Overall, the results suggests that the
exchange rate channel is important in Lesotho.
The results for Lesotho further suggest a positive shock in reserve money
increases both prices and output as expected by theory. However, both
impacts are not statistically significant. On the other hand, our findings show
that monetary policy through use of central bank’s policy rate is ineffective
in Lesotho as it leads to puzzles on both price and output. In addition to a
shallow financial market, this outcome is also explained by the limited scope
of monetary policy as Lesotho’s currency, the Loti, is pegged to the South
African Rand.
E. Malawi
Results for Malawi portray a strong transmission from the reserve money to
the final goals. This is in line with the findings by IMF (2010) for the
sub-Sahara African region. Shocks to reserve money yield significant and
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expected results on both goals. Expansionary monetary policy through
increases in reserve money raises both output and prices. The effect on
output is immediate but significant from the 5th month onwards whilst on
prices the effect is significant from the first month. The results also shows
that price and output respond to changes in the policy rate as expected by
theory. Tight monetary policy through increases in the interest rate lead to a
decline in prices. A similar result is also observed on output which
decreases up to 8 months after-which the impact dies off. However, both
effects are not statistically significant. Nevertheless, the results are similar to
Ngalawa (2011), Mwabutwa et al (2013) and Chiumia (2015) who also
found that monetary policy through positive shocks to the policy rate
decreases prices in Malawi.
In addition to low levels of financial development, we attribute the weak
interest rate channel to monetary policy’s pursuing of multiple objectives
during the period. The maintenance of exchange reserves seems to be very
important in Malawi such that authorities have been found changing the
foreign exchange regimes regularly. From 1998 to 2006, Malawi was using
flexible exchange rate regime. In 2007, the Malawian kwacha was fixed in
United States Dollars up to April 2012. Malawi adopted the floating
exchange rate regime in May 2012. These policy reversals in the exchange
rate regime could impede the effectiveness of monetary policy as they bring
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uncertainties in the market which affect the expectations channel.
Nevertheless, using the full set of impulse response functions for Malawi
(Figure 3.6 in the appendix) we find that a positive shock to the exchange
rate significantly increases the level of prices from the first month. This
effect is highly significant up to 24 months. Output also increases with
depreciation however, the results are not statistically significant. The results
on the exchange rate are similar to Mangani (2012) and Simwaka (2012) and
are attributed to Malawi’s heavy reliance on imports and exports’ inelasticity
as they are mainly agriculture primary products.
F. Namibia
In Namibia, we get mixed results. We find evidence of price effects but not
output effects of monetary policy. Positive shocks to the policy rate lead to a
decrease in prices only up to 18 months. On the other hand, we get the
expected positive influence of shocks to reserve money on prices. Both
effects are statistically significant only in the short run, up to 10 months. As
in Lungu (2008), we do not find output effects from either shocks to the
policy rate or reserve money. In general, we attribute the weak monetary
policy transmission to the country’s limited scope of monetary policy
autonomy as the Namibian dollar is pegged to the South African Rand.
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G. South Africa
Results for South Africa, indicate that contractionary monetary policy
through positive shocks to the policy rate are effective in influencing both
prices and output negatively. The effect on output peaks at 7 months and it is
statistically significant up to the 10th month. The price effect is statistically
significant between the 9th and 27th month but peaks at the 11th month.
These results are similar to Kabundi and Ngwenya (2011) and further show
that the interest rate channel is relatively stronger in South Africa compared
to other countries. We attribute these results to high levels of financial
development in South Africa and the use of a clear strategy in policy
formulation and implementation of monetary policy that is associated with
the inflation targeting framework which was adopted in 2000.
Our results further suggest that expansionary monetary policy through
positive shocks to the reserve money only yields effective and significant
results on output. A different outcome is found on prices. In the short run,
prices decrease following an increase in reserve money but in the long run,
the price level increases. These results point to a breakdown in the link
between money supply and inflation and can explain why South Africa




In Swaziland, positive shocks to the policy rate decreases output. This effect
is only noticed up to 12 months and not significant. The results also display
an ambiguous picture on the impact of changes in reserve money on price
and output. Both price and output decline significantly after reserve money
increases. Prices also seem to increase following a tight monetary policy
using a positive shock to the central bank rate.
A number of factors can explain the above counter intuitive results. (i)
Monetary policy is not effective because the country also has a shallow
financial market; (ii) Authorities have limited autonomy over monetary
policy as the country’s currency, the Lilangeni, is pegged to the South
African Rand; (iii) Monetary policy may be impeded by government’s
interference. The central bank of Swaziland is not independent as it is
incorporated as one of the departments under the Ministry of Finance and
receives guidance from the Minister in the formulation of monetary policy.
This may bring conflicts between fiscal and monetary policy. Nevertheless,
just like in Lesotho, the exchange rate channel seems to be the strongest
channel in influencing both output and prices. Exchange rate depreciation
increases real GDP and CPI significantly. Since the currency is pegged to




The results for Tanzania show that monetary policy using both instruments
is effective in influencing both prices and output as expected by theory.
Expansionary monetary policy through increases in reserve money raise
both prices and output significantly, a similar result that was also found by
Montiel et al (2014). The results further provide evidence to the argument
by IMF (2010) that the shocks through reserve money are more effective in
influencing both output and prices in sub-Saharan Africa region. However,
the results by Davood et al (2013) showed that in Tanzania it was true for
output only. The difference between our results and Davood et al’s can be
due to inclusion of more economic variables in this study’s FAVAR
specification. Our results may be providing evidence that the central bank’s
policy decisions are based on developments of more variables than included
in their study. Some of the additional variables that included in this study are
the banking system’s financing of fiscal budget, the banking system’s net
foreign assets and market interest rates such as treasury bills, lending and
deposit rates.
The findings also suggest that a contractionary monetary policy to the
interest rate leads to a decline in both price and output but the effect on
prices has a 6 months lag and in both outcomes the results are insignificant.
The weak interest rate channel is explained by shallow financial system.
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Capital controls could also be one of the factors that weaken the interest rate
channel as noted by Davood et al (2013). According to theory, capital
controls weaken both the interest and exchange rate channels just like in
Tanzania where the exchange rate channel is also found to be very weak
(refer to Figure 3.10 the Appendix). Output and prices respond positively to
exchange rate depreciations but the response of output has a lag of 4 months
and is only significant from 6 to 10 months. Thereafter, the impact remain
positive but not significant. In contrast, prices respond negatively to positive
changes in the exchange rate. This result is strange showing that the channel
is not useful. The effectiveness of monetary policy through both channels
can therefore be enhanced by adopting market based policies, further
development of the financial system, and opening of the capital account.
J. Uganda
In Uganda we also find a strong transmission mechanism through the use of
reserve money. Both output and prices respond positively to shocks in reserve
money and the effects are statistically significant and persistent. However,
shocks to the policy rate produce ambiguous results on both prices and output.
The effect on output is not in line with theory as contractionary monetary
policy seems to raise output. The price effect is only negative in the short run
up to 12 months. In this case, this result is slightly different to Davood et al
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(2013) who found a persistence negative effect of the policy rate on prices
which was statistically significant in the first 3 months only.
In general, the inclusion of more information in our FAVAR specification
amplifies the strength of the reserve money channel showing that monetary
policy decisions are based on developments in more variables than included
in Davood et al’s study. We however attribute the weak transmission
mechanism through the interest rate channel to poor signalling that can be
explained by simultaneously choosing quantities and prices as monetary
policy anchors. Evidence to this conduct is shown by a highly significant
positive response of interest rate to reserve money shocks. As observed by
Davood et al (2013) this implies that shocks to the two instruments
sometimes move in directions that exert opposing impulses to the targeted
variables hence yielding insignificant impacts of either reserve money or
policy rate on the targets.
Finally, the findings indicate that although Uganda adopted inflation
targeting lite as the policy framework in 2011, they still need to continue
working on how to make the framework successful. The effectiveness of the
framework can be enhanced by having one anchor such as inflation forecast
like in other countries and adopting a clear strategy of achieving the the




For Zambia, we find results that are in line with theory. The results suggest
that prices and output decrease after a tight monetary policy through a
positive shock in the policy rate. Similarly, expansionary monetary policy
through increases in reserve money raise both output and price levels.
However, both channels are weak as the results are not statistically
significant. These findings are slightly different from Zgambo and Chileshe
(2014). While we both find that expansionary monetary policy through
increases in the level of money balances increases output and prices, we
differ on the response of these variables to changes in the policy rates.
Zgambo and Chileshe found price puzzles whilst we find expected
impact according to theory. The variation in the results are firstly
attributable to differences in method. Our estimation technique includes
more variables taking into account other economic variables that are
monitored by the central bank when making policy decisions. The results
therefore confirm that the central bank of Zambia include an assessment of
other economic variables when making policy decisions. Nonetheless, in
both studies, all results are statistically not significant. Overall, just like in




As indicated above, our estimations have been conducted in levels based on
Sims et al (1990) as we wanted to preserve long- run relationships. We also
conducted the estimations in first differences to compare with the results in
levels. The results obtained from the two methods are different but portray
the same general message regarding the effectiveness of monetary policy in
the region. The main difference is that, impulse response functions from the
differenced models die off very quickly compared to the ones in levels. In this
case, the forecast horizon in the differenced models may need to be shortened
to 12 months only hence losing the long run information.
In general and consistent with the estimation in levels, the results from
the differenced data show that the interest rate channel is more effective only
in countries with high levels of financial development; that the money
channel is more effective in influencing prices and output in most countries
in the region; the exchange rate is important in influencing prices in the
region. We therefore decided to maintain the discussions based on the
estimations in levels. Moreover this specification yields consistent results




This chapter examined the effectiveness of the channels of monetary policy
work in 11 countries from the COMESA-EAC-SADC free trade area. As
most previous studies in assessments of transmission mechanisms in the
region used standard VARs, this study employed factor augmented
augmented vector auto regression (FAVAR) model in order to include many
economic variables that monetary authorities monitor in their decision
making.
The main focus of the study has been on investigating price and output
effects of shocks to central bank’s policy rate and reserve money. Our results
suggest that monetary policy is effective in influencing the final goals in the
region however the main transmission channels differ across the countries.
The variations in the channels are due to different levels of financial
development and the conduct of monetary policy.
The results indicate that the interest rate channel is more effective in
countries with high levels of financial development. This provides further
evidence on the role of financial development in monetary policy
transmission. However, the majority of the countries in the sample have
shallow financial systems. In those countries, monetary policy works
through the traditional money channel. This finding is similar to IMF
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(2010). Adoption of policies that target financial development is paramount
in the region in order to enhance the interest rate channel which is believed
to be more effective in signalling the stance of monetary policy to economic
agents. The exchange rate also seems to be one of the most important
channels especially in influencing prices in the region.
On the conduct of monetary policy, in some countries, the effectiveness
of monetary policy is weakened by the pursuit of multiple goals. This also
leads to results that are contrary to theory as authorities end up applying
inconsistent measures which work contrary to each other and consequently
make the monetary policy to be ineffective. Apart from having price
stabilisation as the main goal, most countries in the sample also aim at
managing foreign reserves which causes the central bank to intervene in the
foreign exchange market regularly and this disturbs the transmission
mechanism. For enhancing the effectiveness of the channels we therefore
recommend narrowing the objective of monetary policy, having a clear
strategy of achieving the ultimate goals and adoption of market based
policies.
Overall, our results indicate that country specific measures are needed in
improving the effectiveness of monetary policy in the region. The authorities
of the COMESA-EAC-SADC therefore need to take this into account as they
work on the criteria for harmonising economic policies in the region.
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3.6 Appendix
Table 3.5: Summary Statistics
Angola Botswana Kenya Lesotho Malawi Namibia SA Swaziland Tanzania Uganda Zambia
lgdp mean 14.01 9.83 13.39 8.28 12.20 9.78 13.27 9.00 15.96 15.89 10.02
s.d 1.02 0.47 0.53 0.43 0.78 0.47 0.38 0.33 0.63 0.66 0.53
min 11.27 9.01 12.49 7.58 10.73 8.97 12.55 8.24 14.87 14.81 9.03
max 15.22 10.54 14.40 9.07 13.73 10.62 13.84 9.59 17.04 16.90 10.81
lcpi mean 4.28 4.45 4.46 4.50 4.54 4.50 4.51 4.50 4.52 4.51 4.38
s.d 0.67 0.32 0.48 0.24 0.50 0.24 0.25 0.27 0.35 0.34 0.42
min 2.32 3.87 3.69 4.06 3.76 4.07 4.07 4.01 4.01 3.98 3.45
max 5.15 4.91 5.11 4.87 5.65 4.87 4.92 4.93 5.08 5.04 5.09
lrm mean 12.79 9.34 12.05 6.65 10.65 7.71 11.57 6.74 7.69 7.48 8.21
s.d 1.36 0.66 0.55 0.40 0.98 0.67 0.45 0.60 0.77 0.68 0.80
min 9.81 8.00 11.21 5.89 8.88 6.73 10.71 5.68 6.27 6.39 6.64
max 14.40 10.09 12.98 7.45 12.35 9.07 12.32 7.69 8.83 8.65 9.74
pr mean 0.47 0.12 0.10 0.12 0.24 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.13 0.16 0.14
s.d 0.50 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.10 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.07
min 0.10 0.06 0.06 0.09 0.13 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.03
max 1.50 0.16 0.18 0.17 0.47 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.22 0.29 0.40
lpc mean 13.03 9.76 13.11 7.34 10.89 10.37 14.23 8.46 8.07 14.93 8.65
s.d 1.73 0.67 0.72 0.80 1.34 0.52 0.44 0.62 0.94 0.90 1.03
min 8.92 8.58 12.45 6.07 8.76 9.44 13.39 7.04 6.19 13.47 6.85
max 15.03 10.81 14.67 8.61 12.87 11.28 14.83 9.29 9.53 16.28 10.30
lex mean 4.42 2.29 4.39 2.11 5.12 2.11 2.11 2.11 7.19 7.66 1.58
s.d 0.24 0.23 0.12 0.22 0.55 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.20 0.20 0.22
min 3.42 1.87 4.13 1.74 4.21 1.74 1.74 1.74 6.82 7.38 1.16
max 4.91 2.73 4.66 2.71 6.46 2.71 2.71 2.71 7.68 8.21 2.50
N 169 169 169 169 169 169 169 169 169 169 169
Source: IFS, Period (2001 to 2015); lgdp is the log of real GDP; lcpi is the log of CPI; lrm is the
log of reserve money; pr is the central bank’s policy rate; lpc is the log of commercial bank’s credit
to the private sector; lex is the log of the exchange rate defined as local currency per US Dollar.
103
Table 3.6: Variance Decomposition of lgdp
Month lgdp lcpi lrm pr lpc lex F̂1
Angola 12 69.47 4.43 3.87 8.04 7.77 5.74 0.72
24 76.43 7.45 3.51 7.56 1.68 1.25 2.14
36 69.27 8.72 3.34 7.09 4.59 2.46 4.53
Botswana 12 92.25 0.04 1.90 0.83 1.56 3.28 0.12
24 84.64 0.88 2.43 2.89 4.79 3.36 1.01
36 78.35 2.34 3.40 3.89 6.66 3.12 2.23
Kenya 12 62.31 2.70 5.05 3.14 17.29 3.25 6.25
24 47.08 2.03 10.51 9.64 14.64 8.51 7.58
36 39.13 1.71 13.19 10.38 14.07 12.10 9.43
Lesotho 12 85.59 6.23 1.52 2.90 0.48 1.05 2.23
24 77.76 11.22 1.93 3.91 0.71 2.26 2.21
36 70.91 13.89 2.52 4.61 1.28 4.18 2.62
Malawi 12 83.40 1.26 3.62 0.07 1.73 1.44 8.48
24 78.21 1.42 7.14 0.07 2.92 1.97 8.26
36 73.68 1.42 10.13 0.07 3.99 2.49 8.22
Namibia 12 83.29 2.85 1.70 1.48 1.01 6.00 3.66
24 75.84 5.08 1.56 2.46 2.27 9.30 3.49
36 65.75 5.88 1.40 5.30 4.16 14.37 3.15
South Africa 12 79.78 0.28 6.94 2.64 6.26 0.35 3.75
24 60.32 2.47 13.51 2.03 14.01 2.12 5.54
36 50.40 4.77 16.25 1.26 18.05 4.00 5.27
Swaziland 12 82.99 4.23 0.33 0.95 6.75 4.23 1.33
24 71.24 3.83 2.21 2.57 14.67 3.70 1.80
36 54.09 5.46 9.69 1.93 1.14 14.87 2.82
Tanzania 12 65.43 5.09 16.10 1.79 6.00 4.87 0.70
24 54.55 6.12 20.13 1.58 12.17 4.72 0.72
36 48.46 5.43 22.32 1.34 16.09 5.39 0.96
Uganda 12 80.99 0.33 7.18 2.05 6.22 2.43 0.80
24 69.07 0.35 10.41 4.71 7.98 6.24 1.22
36 64.91 0.28 10.13 6.70 8.50 7.72 1.75
Zambia 12 51.94 9.52 0.87 1.83 9.06 13.84 12.93
24 42.04 9.15 2.22 2.03 12.51 11.96 20.09
36 37.82 9.21 2.82 1.94 15.04 10.85 22.30
Each entry shows percent of variance in the log of GDP from shocks in given variables
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Table 3.7: Variance Decomposition of lcpi
Month lgdp lcpi lrm pr lpc lex F̂1
Angola 12 9.92 54.20 0.25 1.29 16.20 15.66 2.52
24 7.62 35.88 0.67 1.70 25.61 18.44 10.08
36 6.48 28.26 2.92 1.77 28.25 15.75 16.57
Botswana 12 1.23 77.97 5.31 2.40 5.70 2.46 4.92
24 0.97 63.97 12.97 3.20 9.05 1.64 8.18
36 1.36 54.75 19.22 3.34 10.08 1.27 9.99
Kenya 12 0.32 79.07 10.66 4.65 2.04 3.20 0.07
24 0.97 56.68 16.61 16.08 1.95 7.07 0.64
36 1.48 45.91 19.26 17.20 2.33 11.15 2.67
Lesotho 12 8.71 81.88 0.06 2.90 0.37 2.89 3.19
24 11.07 64.84 0.55 5.82 1.97 8.65 7.10
36 13.21 57.63 0.93 6.03 2.96 11.23 7.94
Malawi 12 0.08 46.17 25.65 0.22 0.54 21.38 5.96
24 0.10 33.89 34.18 1.25 1.65 22.23 6.70
36 0.12 28.23 38.32 0.24 2.95 23.07 7.07
Namibia 12 6.52 46.60 3.45 6.04 0.52 36.60 0.27
24 3.69 36.21 2.42 3.50 1.19 51.81 1.16
36 2.05 26.61 1.63 10.11 3.19 55.63 1.14
South Africa 12 7.06 65.99 6.79 1.38 7.04 10.28 1.47
24 12.49 58.74 6.16 3.45 6.33 10.85 1.97
36 17.15 52.38 7.57 3.75 6.99 9.26 2.91
Swaziland 12 1.11 71.37 10.57 1.75 7.46 4.77 2.97
24 5.68 35.91 30.76 0.80 13.49 10.87 2.48
36 7.41 22.29 38.86 0.44 10.86 17.10 3.05
Tanzania 12 3.70 62.33 7.09 3.20 9.26 1.99 12.42
24 4.85 55.49 15.19 4.53 10.09 1.24 8.62
36 6.96 42.34 20.37 4.91 12.02 5.96 7.43
Uganda 12 3.53 56.32 12.35 3.24 16.78 4.79 3.00
24 20.49 38.83 16.62 3.99 11.46 6.50 2.01
36 32.91 17.00 15.00 6.88 17.84 8.01 2.37
Zambia 12 1.42 34.58 4.89 3.37 21.24 5.54 28.99
24 1.14 24.02 6.24 2.72 24.89 4.97 36.02
36 1.08 20.27 7.15 2.27 28.13 4.09 37.00
Each entry shows percent of variance in the log of CPI from shocks in given variables
105






0 10 20 30 40
months






0 10 20 30 40
months






0 10 20 30 40
months






0 10 20 30 40
months





0 10 20 30 40
months





0 10 20 30 40
months





0 10 20 30 40
months




0 10 20 30 40
months




0 10 20 30 40
months





0 10 20 30 40
months






0 10 20 30 40
months





0 10 20 30 40
months





0 10 20 30 40
months





0 10 20 30 40
months






0 10 20 30 40
months




0 10 20 30 40
months





0 10 20 30 40
months





0 10 20 30 40
months






0 10 20 30 40
months





0 10 20 30 40
months





0 10 20 30 40
months




0 10 20 30 40
months





0 10 20 30 40
months




0 10 20 30 40
months




0 10 20 30 40
months




0 10 20 30 40
months





0 10 20 30 40
months





0 10 20 30 40
months





0 10 20 30 40
months





0 10 20 30 40
months





0 10 20 30 40
months





0 10 20 30 40
months






0 10 20 30 40
months





0 10 20 30 40
months






0 10 20 30 40
months






0 10 20 30 40
months
Angola: lex -> lex
Angola: Orthogonalised Impulse Response Functions 90% CI
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Botswana: lex -> lex
Botswana: Orthogonalised Impulse Response Function 90%CI
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Kenya: lex -> lex
Kenya: Orthogonalised Impulse Response Functions 90% CI
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Lesotho: lex -> lex
Lesotho: Orthogonalised Impulse Response Functions 90% CI
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Malawi: lex -> lex
Malawi:Orthogonalised Impulse Response Functions 90% CI
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Namibia: lex -> lex
Namibia: Orthogonalised Impulse Response Functions 90% CI
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SouthAfrica: lpc -> lpc
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SouthAfrica: lex -> lex
South Africa: Orthogonalised Impulse Response Functions 90%
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Swaziland: lex -> lex
Swaziland: Orthogonalised Impulse Response Functions 90%CI
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Tanzania: lex -> lex
Tanzania: Orthogonalised Impulse Response Functions 90%CI
114






0 10 20 30 40
months





0 10 20 30 40
months






0 10 20 30 40
months




0 10 20 30 40
months






0 10 20 30 40
months






0 10 20 30 40
months





0 10 20 30 40
months





0 10 20 30 40
months




0 10 20 30 40
months





0 10 20 30 40
months




0 10 20 30 40
months





0 10 20 30 40
months





0 10 20 30 40
months





0 10 20 30 40
months




0 10 20 30 40
months





0 10 20 30 40
months




0 10 20 30 40
months




0 10 20 30 40
months





0 10 20 30 40
months






0 10 20 30 40
months





0 10 20 30 40
months




0 10 20 30 40
months






0 10 20 30 40
months





0 10 20 30 40
months





0 10 20 30 40
months





0 10 20 30 40
months






0 10 20 30 40
months





0 10 20 30 40
months






0 10 20 30 40
months





0 10 20 30 40
months






0 10 20 30 40
months






0 10 20 30 40
months





0 10 20 30 40
months






0 10 20 30 40
months





0 10 20 30 40
months





0 10 20 30 40
months
Uganda: lex -> lex
Uganda: Orthogonalised Impulse Response Functions 90%CI
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Zambia: lex -> lex
Zambia: Orthogonalised Impulse Response Functions 90%CI
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Chapter 4




Among the channels of monetary policy transmission, the interest rate is the
most traditional channel and has been subjected to a large volume of
empirical research most of which is on interest rate pass through (IRPT).
IRPT is a key component of monetary transmission that describes how
changes in central bank’s policy rate gets transmitted to longer-term retail
rates on loans and deposits (IMF, 2011). Studies on IRPT help to provide
information on its magnitude and nature in terms of whether it is complete
in the short or long run and asymmetric (i.e if the responses of the retail
rates are dependent on the direction of the change of market rates or not).
Monetary policy achieves its goals in a shorter period of time when the
pass through is symmetric, fast and complete. Information of IRPT is also
used to determine the efficacy of the financial system in facilitating
monetary policy transmission. Symmetric and complete pass through is
associated with a well-functioning, competitive and efficient financial
system while an incomplete and asymmetric pass through suggests the
opposite (Aydin, 2007; Hofmann 2006; De Bondt, 2005). The determination
of the size, speed and nature of the interest pass through is therefore crucial
for the central bank to correctly formulate its monetary policy stance for
achieving its desired goals efficiently.
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The foregoing considerations have led to a substantial amount of
empirical research on IRPT. The results point to a wide variation in size,
speed and nature across countries and time periods (Liu et al, 2008;
Aziakpono and Wilson 2013). Furthermore, IRPT varies depending on the
type of the interest rate whether lending or deposit (Cottarelli et al, 1995;
Mojon, 2000 ; De Bondt 2002 ; Sander and Kleimeier, 2004; Kwapil and
Scharler, 2006). The adjustment of the interest rate may also be symmetric
or asymmetric depending on whether the policy innovation is positive or
negative, or whether the bank retail rates are below or above the equilibrium
level (Mojon, 2000; De Bondt, 2002; Sander and Kleimeier, 2006).
The results from the existing IRPT literature for the sub-Saharan Africa
from the existing are difficult to compare across countries as they differ due
to different sample periods and methodology. Some studies use the
monetary approach which focuses on the transmission of monetary policy
impulses into the financial sector, whilst others use the cost of funds
approach which focuses on highlighting the role of market structure to the
transmission. Sander and Kleimeier (2004) observe that the two approaches
are complementary. However, a unifying analysis that allows for a direct
comparison of the results is important especially for countries which belong
to the same economic region.
This chapter contributes to the literature by providing a cross country
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comparison of IRPT for 11 countries1 in the COMESA-EAC-SADC region.
The econometric analysis is done on a country-by-country basis using the
auto regressive distributed lag (ARDL) model following the monetary
approach by regressing the average lending or deposit rate on the central
bank’s policy rate. It focuses on the size (completeness) of the IRPT in both
the short and long run, its evolution over time and predictability (presence of
asymmetries). Similar studies have been done on countries from advanced
and emerging markets such as Cas et al (2011); Karagiannis et al (2010);
Sorensen and Werner (2006); Sander and Kleimeier (2004); and on South
Africa by Aziakpono and Wilson (2013). The following are the main
hypotheses:
• There is complete pass through from the policy rate to the lending and
deposit rates of commercial banks.
• The response of lending and deposit rates to shocks in the policy rate is
symmetric.
• The IRPT has remained the same over time.
The results suggest that the short-run pass through (SRPT) is incomplete
in all countries for both deposits and lending rates. However, the long-run
pass through (LRPT) to the average lending rate is statistically complete
1Just like in the previous chapter, the countries are Angola, Botswana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Namibia,
South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia
120
(not different from 1) for Botswana, Namibia and South Africa mainly on
account of high levels of financial development. On the other hand, the
LRPT to the average deposit rate is statistically complete only in Swaziland
and incomplete in the remaining countries. The study also confirms the
presence of asymmetries in the loan markets of Angola and Tanzania which
is mainly explained by the collusive pricing hypothesis. We also find weak
evidence for the customer reaction hypothesis which is confirmed in the
deposits market for Angola and Namibia. A recursive analysis shows that in
some countries, the IRPT has evolved over time mainly on account of
financial and macroeconomic developments and change in the the conduct
of monetary policy.
Based on these results we recommend policies that target increasing
financial development, raising competition in the banking sector and
improving the conduct of monetary policy by adopting market based
regimes. Overall, favourable macroeconomic conditions such as low
inflation would also enhance the effectiveness of monetary policy in the
region.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows, section 4.2 provides a
literature review, section 4.3 provides econometric model, data and
estimation procedure; results are discussed in section 4.4; and the study is




Conventionally,2 studies on interest rate pass-through are theoretically based
on the Monti-Klein (1971) profit maximizing theory of commercial banks.
The theory assumes that, the balance sheet of commercial banks is composed
of loans (L) and precautionary reserves (R) on its assets side and deposits
(D) and settlement balances (S) on the liabilities side.
The theory is based on the following assumptions; (1) settlement balances
are held at the central bank and are used for clearing commitments with other
banks; (2) when the balances are in negative, the central bank penalizes the
commercial bank by charging interest rate penalty ip; (3) commercial banks
have a fixed cost function µL related to their role of intermediation. The
banks face downward sloping demand function for loans and upward sloping
supply for deposit functions. Hence the profit function of a commercial bank
is given by equation 1 below:
π(D,L) = iLL− iD(L+R− S)− iP δ(S −R)− µL (4.1)
Where iL is the price that commercial banks charge on loans and iD is
2This section, 4.2.1 and the next one, 4.2.2 largely benefits from a research proposal by Chipungu (2016),
that was submitted for assessment at the University of Birmingham for the Advanced Research Methods
module.
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the interest rate given to depositors. The choice variables for the bank are
the volume of loans granted (L) and the quantity of precautionary reserves
to hold (R). Therefore, differentiating equation (4.1) with respect to L and R
we get the following first order conditions:
∂π
∂L
; iL − iD = µ (4.2)
∂π
∂R
; iD = δiP (4.3)
Combining equations (4.2) and (4.3) we get:
iL = µ+ δip (4.4)
Equation 4.4 can be presented with parameters of estimation as follows;
rrt = α + βprt + ε (4.5)
where rrt is the commercial bank’s retail rate, prt is the official (policy) or
market rate, ε is the error term, α is the fixed cost of the bank and β is the
multiplier. In a highly competitive market, β is expected to to take the value
of 1 and that would imply complete pass-through. De Bondt (2005) argues
that β can also be equal to or greater than 1 when banks attempt to offset
risks resulting from asymmetric information by charging high interest rates.
Empirically, it appears that in most cases, retail interest rates do not adjust
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by the same magnitude of the change in policy rates due to factors that are
discussed in section 4.2.1.
4.2.2 Factors that influence retail interest rates’ adjustments
Several factors have been identified in the literature relating to the way retail
interest rates are adjusted following changes in policy rates. The factors are
macroeconomic conditions (Gigineishvilli, 2011; Egert and Mac Donald,
2009), the way monetary policy is conducted especially in terms of whether
it uses direct controls or depends on market dynamics (Soresen and Werner,
2006; Egert et al, 2007; Cas et al, 2010); and also whether the process of
monetary policy is transparent or has formal accountability measures
(Sander and Kleimeier, 2006; Liu et al, 2008); the economy’s financial
structure and level of financial development (Cottarelli and Kourelis, 1994;
Thomson, 2006; IMF, 2010; Archer and Turner, 2006). Other factors
include menu costs (Hofman and Mizen, 2004; Fuertes and Heffernan,
2009); asymmetric information and adjustment (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981;
Hannan and Berger, 1991; Neumark and Sharpe, 1992) and quality of legal
and regulatory institution (Mishra and Montiel, 2012).
Macroeconomic conditions: Banks pass-on changes in policy rates to their
retail interest rates faster when there is macroeconomic stability and high
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levels of economic growth. High market volatility causes interest rates to be
sticky. This is because the information content of policy signals is reduced
as noise increases. Consequently, firms wait longer to change their rates
Egert and Mac Donald (2009). Contrary to this, Gigineishvilli (2011) argues
interest rates may also adjust more frequently during periods of inflation just
as all other prices in the economy.
The conduct of monetary policy: Interest rates are found to be rigid where
authorities intervene in markets compared to where market forces are
allowed to operate freely ( Sorensen and Werner, 2006; Egert et al, 2007).
Interest rates are therefore less rigid in flexible exchange rate regimes as
monetary authorities are able to send clear policy signals to market
participants (Cas et al, 2010). Interest rates are found to be more flexible in
economies with high degree of central bank independence (IMF, 2010) and
high levels of transparency in the conduct of monetary policy. Transparency
decreases interest rate volatility and consequently enhances IRPT as market
participants become certain of the direction of future short-term rates
(Sander and Kleimeier, 2006; Liu et al, 2008).
Financial development and structure: The literature provides evidence that
interest rates are flexible in highly developed and open financial systems
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than in shallow or closed systems. This is because in deep and open
financial markets, banks’ reliance on the central bank’s accommodation
facilities is reduced as they can more easily access external sources of
finance. Such a system also provides alternative financial instruments for
investors and savers which help to reduce the market power of individual
commercial banks (Cottarelli and Kourelis, 1994). In a competitive market,
profit maximising behaviour forces banks to follow market conditions
closely and respond promptly to changes. Interest rates are therefore more
flexible when market forces are strong. Related to this, Thompson (2006)
found that interest rates are rigid in economies that are dominated by state
owned financial institutions mainly because profit maximising is not their
primary objective.
Switching Costs: This hypothesis argues that commercial banks may
capitalise on the influence of switching costs on customer’s behaviour and
not be proactive in changing the retail rates. Customers may be reluctant to
switch banks or financial products for the ones with more favourable
conditions when “switching costs” are high. These are costs related to
access to information on competing products and firms as well as
transaction costs for switching to the products and firms with favourable
conditions. Interest rates are therefore rigid when switching costs are high
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(Lowe and Rohling, 1992).
Menu costs: These are fixed costs that are incurred when changing prices
such as printing of new price lists and other costs attached to communication
about the revisions. The theory of menu costs predicts that firms will adjust
their prices only when the benefits from adjusting are greater than the cost of
being out of equilibrium. Because of this, banks consider the menu costs
associated with the adjusting of the interest rates. If the associated costs are
large, the adjustments will be more rigid than if the costs were less
(Hofmann and Mizen, 2004). This also results to differences in the nature of
pass through across different products (Fuertes and Heffernan, 2009). The
hypothesis of menu costs is explainable at a firm level as such it is included
in the next chapter which assesses heterogeneities in IRPT across retail
products and across firms in Malawi.
Asymmetric information and adjustment: Asymmetric information causes
commercial banks to retain large interest rate spreads between lending and
deposit rate in order to defend their profit margins. This conduct causes
interest rates to be rigid as the lending rate may be relatively insensitive to
small changes in the official rate Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). Rigidity in
interest rates is also attributed to asymmetric adjustment in the rates which
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are explained by two theories namely collusive pricing arrangements and
adverse customer reaction by Hannan and Berger (1991) and Neumark and
Sharpe (1992).
Under the collusive behaviour hypothesis, deposit rates move rigidly
upward after an increase in the policy rate as the bank tries to avoid higher
payments to depositors in order to reduce costs. Lending rates also move
rigidly downward after a decrease in the official rate as banks attempt to
maintain their revenue and defend their profit margins. The adverse
customer reaction hypothesis argues that banks will aim at maintaining their
market power by giving their customers favourable terms such as not
reducing deposit rates after a reduction in policy rates; or not raising lending
rates after an increase in the policy rate.
Quality of Institutions: Mishra and Montiel (2012) argues that a good
institutional and regulatory environment helps to strengthen the interest rate
transmission mechanism as commercial banks’ intermediation costs get
reduced on account of quality contract enforcement and reduced levels of
asymmetric information.
Overall, IRPT is expected to be faster in sound banking systems and
strong economies. This is because when the economy is weak and when risk
aversion and information costs rise, the banks could be reluctant to lend
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(Archer and Turner, 2006). Moreover, when the health of the financial
system is not sound, financially weak banks may respond to expansionary
monetary policies by raising their capital, or increasing their provisioning
through accumulation of liquidity rather than extending credit, (IMF, 2010).
4.2.3 Empirical literature review
There are a host of studies on interest rate pass-through most of which have
been conducted on developed countries since early 1990s. IRPT studies for
developing countries started emerging during the late 2000s. In general, the
results of the studies have reflected differences in the size, speed and nature
of the pass through across countries, time periods and types of products. The
variation in the results are found in all regions, within and across the
advanced countries, emerging economies and developing countries. In
addition to the above factors that affect the adjustment of interest rates,
Sander and Kleimeier (2004) also attributes the diversity in the findings to
differences in methods especially in the choice of endogenous and
exogenous variables across the studies and the design of the analysis. Table
4.1 on the next two pages provide a list of the studies on IRPT.
In advanced countries, one of the oldest studies was conducted by
Cottarelli et al (1995) for Italy using error correction models. The sample
period was from June 1986 to December 1993. He examined the IRPT from
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the discount rate to the lending rate. The study found that the pass through
of changes in the discount rate was incomplete in the short run as only 7 %
of the change in the discount rate was transmitted to the lending rate.
However, in the long run, the transmission was nearly complete at 92 %.
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Table 4.1: Studies on Interest Rate Pass Through
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...Table 4.1 continued
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Sander and Kleimeier, (2004) used vector auto regression (VAR) and
VECM models to analyse interest rate pass through in ten countries from the
Euro zone. They use both monetary and cost of funds approaches. For the
monetary approach, the overnight money market rate is the exogenous
variable and various lending and deposit rates are included as endogenous
variables. The results provide evidence for asymmetric adjustment in most
countries, heterogeneity in the IRPT across the countries, and that IRPT
changed over time. The study also included structural determinants of the
pass through and found that ”competition, banking market integration, a
stable monetary policy regime, a more homogeneous growth performance
etc. are important variables for homogenizing the pass-through and thus
monetary transmission in the euro zone” Sander and Kleimeier (2004;
p.490).
Similar studies that have provided evidence of heterogeneity of IRPT
across advanced countries include Sorensen and Werner (2006), Egert et al
(2007)and Marrotta (2009) for the Euro area. Kwapil and Schaler (2009)
compared USA and Euro area’s IRPT of the 3 months money market rate to
the deposit and lending rates. Their study used the Engle- Granger (EG)
cointegrating model and auto regressive distributed lag (ARDL) model for
the period of 1995 to 2003. The results indicated that in the USA the short
run pass through to the deposit rate was nearly complete (an average of
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97%) and the long run pass through was complete (an average of 101%).
However, in the Euro area, average SRPT to deposit rate was 42.8% and
LRPT to the deposit rate was 58%. In both regions, the LRPT to lending
rates averaged 73% but the SRPT was higher in the USA (56%) than in the
Euro area (30.4%).
In another study for the Euro area, De Bondt (2005) provided further
evidence that IRPT can change over time. His study used VECM and VAR
models for analysing the IRPT of the overnight interest rate to deposit and
lending rates using monthly data for the period of 1996 to 2001. The results
showed that the pass through from the overnight interest rate to deposit and
lending rates was faster since the introduction of Euro. The results also
indicated that the SRPT was incomplete for all rates but complete for the
lending rate.
In addition to the above evidence on presence of asymmetries, Scholnick
(1996) provided further evidence from Malaysia and Singapore. He used co-
integration and error correction models in the investigation of the response
of deposit rates to changes in the policy rate in Malaysia and Singapore. His
results showed asymmetric adjustments in both markets that were explained
by collusive pricing by banks as deposits were more rigid when the policy
rate was adjusted upwards than downwards.
Karagianis et al (2010) found mixed results for Greece, Bulgaria and
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Slovenia. They found symmetric adjustments for both lending and deposit
rates in Greece whilst in Bulgaria and Slovenia, they found evidence for
adverse customer reaction hypothesis with respect to the loan rates as banks
seemed to be rigid in passing increases to their customers. Furthermore, in
Slovenia, they also found collusive pricing behaviour in deposit rates as
banks were reluctant to pass on reductions in deposit rates.
Jankee (2005) examined how changes in inter-bank market rate were
transmitted to lending and deposit rates during the period of 1998 to 2003 in
Mauritius using TAR and M-TAR models. In addition to very low and
incomplete long run pass through, he finds evidence for asymmetric
adjustments in the lending rates that was explained by the adverse customer
reaction hypothesis. Wang and Lee (2009) assesses IPT in the USA and nine
Asian countries. They report evidence for asymmetries in Hongkong,
Taiwan and the Phillipines. The asymmetries are explained by collusive
pricing behavior by banks as rates on deposits are rigid on upward
adjustments and also reluctant to adjust the lending rates downwards.
Aziakpono and Wilson (2013) conducted an assessment on how changes
in the central bank’s policy rate get transmitted to six market interest rates in
South Africa. They used cointegration and asymmetric ECM models on a
sample from 1980 to 2007 and rolling windows analysis to assess the
evolution of IPRT over time. Their results generally suggested that IRPT
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improved after adoption of inflation targeting in 2000 in South Africa and
also showed evidence for asymmetric adjustments in both the credit and
deposit markets. The results further indicated that over time, banks in South
Africa started to be sensitive to customers’ reaction in the credit market. The
banks were quick to adjust the lending rates downward than upward. To the
contrary, the deposit market was characterised by collusive pricing as the
deposit rates were found to be rigid in moving upwards than downwards.
Dube and Zhou (2014) employed autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL)
and fully modified least squares (FMLS) models to examine the pass
through of the repo rate and treasury bill rate to commercial bank rates and
participation mortgage bond rate for the period of January 1998 to January
2011. Results from the ARDL model show over shooting of the pass
through from the repo and treasury bill rates to the commercial bank rates.
The LRPT of the repo rate to bank rates range from 83% to 121% and the
LRPT of the treasury bill rate to participation mortgage bond rate range
from 100% to 129% . They attribute the overshooting of the IRPT to
developments in the exchange rate market which resulted to increases in all
prices in the economy.
Evidence on IRPT from developing countries is provided by Samba and
Yan (2010) on the Central African Economic and Monetary Community
(CAEMC). Their study assessed the pass through of the central bank’s
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policy rate to lending and deposit rates using ARDL models for the period
of 1990 to 2007. The results showed that the SRPT to lending rates was
higher than deposit rates and the LRPT to deposit rates was incomplete but
portrayed an overshooting effect on lending rates. In their discussions of the
results, Samba and Yan argue that the above results were on account of an
under-developed financial markets with excess liquidity and low levels of
competition in the banking which lead to incomplete pass through to the
deposit rates. They also attributed the overshooting effect on the lending
rates to high levels of risk in the market an argument similar to De Bondt
(2005).
Misati et al (2011) also provide evidence for incomplete pass through in
Kenya for the period of July 1993 to September 2010. Their study examined
the pass through of the inter-bank market rate, 91 days Treasury bills rate and
repo rate to lending and deposit rate using Engle-Granger 2 step procedure.
On the lending rate, short run pass through (SRPT) ranged from -0.08 to 0.07
and the long run pass through (LRPT) ranged between 0.07 to 0.33. The IRPT
to the deposit rate was also incomplete and lower than the lending rate’s as it
ranged between (0.02 to 0.14) in the short run and (0.05 to 0.18 ) in the long
run. Sheefeni (2013) found that in Namibia, SRPT and LRPT to deposit rates
nearly complete as the coefficients ranged from 88.9% to 92.6%. On the side
of lending rates, LRPT ranged from 73.3% to 76.2%. The SRPT was also
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higher in deposit rates (26.0% to 45.2%) than lending rates (0.4% to 13.6%).
Morales and Raei (2013) examined the pass through of the central bank’s
discount rate and the 91-days Treasury bills rate to commercial banks’ deposit
and lending rates in the EAC region. They employed the ARDL model on
data from January 2000 to February 2012. The results suggested that the
pass through of the discount rate to lending and deposit rates has improved
over time in Uganda and Kenya. In the investigations of the evolution of the
IRPT this study used two sample periods by imposing a break point of June
2011 in the series that related to the period when Uganda and Kenya changed
from targeting quantities to prices. They attribute the improvement in the
IRPT to adoption of monetary policy frameworks that provide policy signals
clearly to market participants.
Okello (2014) investigated the IRPT in Uganda using Engle-Granger
cointegration method for the period of January 2005 to May 2014. The
study focused on IRPT from the 7-days inter-bank rate to lending, deposits
and Treasury bills rates. The results suggest that the IRPT to the lending rate
has improved over time as it was statistically not different from zero before
the adoption of inflation targeting framework lite regime, and 30 % after the
adoption of the regime. The results for the whole sample shows that IRPT to
lending rates is incomplete at 43 % and lower than the pass-through to time
deposit rates which ranged from 56 to 60 %. He attributed the incomplete
138
pass through to low levels of competition in the banking sector and
recommended for policies that increase competition.
4.2.4 Contribution to Literature
The reviewed literature presents mixed results in completeness of IRPT. The
size of IRPT is different between the lending and deposit rates, or short and
long run. In some cases IRPT is symmetric whilst in others, it is
asymmetric. Some studies also show that IRPT can change over time. This
shows the importance of empirical studies of IRPT to get specific results
which can guide authorities appropriately in every country. The literature
also provide different results across countries and regions. Notably, most
studies on IRPT that provide comparison across countries are for advanced
countries. This chapter seeks to contribute to the literature by providing
comparable results of central bank’s policy rate pass through to commercial
bank’s average lending and deposit rates for countries in the sub-Saharan
Africa focusing on the COMESA-EAC-SADC region. Comparability is
achieved through the choice of the same exogenous and endogenous
variables across the countries.
The above literature also indicates that most studies in the region mainly
focused on the assessment of the completeness hypothesis. In addition to the
size of the pass through, this study examines the evolution of the IRPT over
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time and whether there are asymmetric adjustments in the commercial banks’
interest rates. As such, our approach largely follows Aziakpono and Wilson
(2013) on South Africa which was conducted on a sample period of 1980 to
2007. Since South Africa is also included in this study, our results provide
updated information on the IRPT in this country as our sample period is up
to 2015.
This chapter also provides updated evidence on evolution of IRPT in
Uganda and Kenya. Morales and Raei (2013) investigated the evolution
using a sample from January 2000 to February 2012 and in their analysis,
they determined the structural break apriori in June 2011. The problem of
imposing a single break point to all countries is that it might not be
applicable in other countries a fact previous researchers such as Sander and
Kleimeier (2004) have argued against. Our approach in the investigation of
evolution of IRPT is different as it does not impose any break points but use
recursive analysis to assess if the size has changed.
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4.3 Econometric Model and Data
4.3.1 Econometric Model
Size of Pass Through (Completeness)
Conventionally, most studies use the auto regressive distributed lag (ARDL)
model as presented in equation 4.6 below;




j=1δjrrt−j + εt (4.6)
where rrt is the commercial bank retail rate (either average lending rate or
deposit rate) and prt is the central bank’s policy rate, n and m are number of
lags of the independent and dependent variables, respectively. Equation 4.6
is used if the series are stationary at levels or I(1) with cointegration.
If the variables are I(1) variables but without cointegration, the following
equation is used in order to avoid spurious regression.




j=1δj∆rrt−j + εt (4.7)
where the symbol, ∆, represents the first difference of the relevant variable.
Although equation 4.7 solves the problem of spurious regression, it loses
information on the long run relationship. However, if rrt and prt are
cointegrated, the information on long run relationship is extracted from a
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conditional error form as presented in equation 4.8.




j=1δj∆rrt−j + φµt−1 + εt (4.8)
In equation 4.8, µt−1 is the error correction term which measures the
deviation from the long-run equilibrium. It is obtained from the residual of
the cointegration equation 4.9 which gives the long-run relationship between
the policy rate and the market rate. The parameter, φ, is known as the
adjustor.
rrt = α + λprt + µt (4.9)
When equation 4.8 is used, the value of the long-run pass (LRPT) can be
obtained directly from equation 4.9 by the multiplier , λ. Otherwise, when
equations 4.6 and 4.7 are used, the long run pass through, λ, is calculated







In all equations 4.6, 4.7 and 4.8, the value of the instantaneous pass through
is given by β0. Other studies that have used this method include Sander and




Asymmetric analysis is important as it shows whether the response to
changes in market rate is based on the direction of the adjustment of the
policy rate. We follow Aziakpono and Wilson (2013) to determine the
nature of the adjustment depending on whether the market rates are above or
below equilibrium level. We therefore split the series of the residuals µ from
the cointegrating equation 4.9 into two, µ+ and µ− as follows;
µ+ = µ if µ > µ and; µ+ = 0 if µ < µ
µ− = µ if µ < µ and; µ− = 0 if µ > µ
where µ is the mean of residuals in equation 4.4. The asymmetric
specifications are introduced as separate variables (in the form of dummy
variables) in the error correction model. Equation 4.11 is therefore a
modified version of equation 4.8 as it includes the dummies.
∆rrt = β0∆prt + Σ
n−1
i=1 βi∆prt−i + Σ
m−1







where φ1 and φ2 are the coefficients of the error correction term when the
interest rate is above and below equilibrium, respectively. The presence of
asymmetries is tested using Wald test on the restriction that φ1 = φ2 in
equation (4.11). If equality is accepted, this implies no asymmetries, while
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rejection of equality points to existence of asymmetries. We further follow
Scholnick (1996), as well as Doornik and Hendry (1994) to calculate the
length of time for the adjustment to be complete using mean lags (ML) as
presented in equations 4.12 and 4.13;
ML+ = (1− β0)/φ1 (4.12) ML− = (1− β0)/φ2 (4.13)
The mean lags (ML+) and (ML−) are the asymmetric adjustment lags in
the commercial bank’s retail interest rates if they are above and below their
equilibrium, respectively. In both cases, a high ML implies slow adjustment
of the retail interest rates in response to changes in the official rate. If
ML+ > ML−, it suggests that banks are quicker to adjust their rates
downwards than they are to adjust them upwards, while if ML− > ML+,
means that banks would adjust their rates upwards faster than they are to
adjust them downwards. According to usual practice in literature , the
analysis of asymmetries is conducted on cointegrating equations only. This
is because the analysis uses error correction models (Aziakpono and Wilson,
2013; Egert, 2007).
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Evolution of the IRPT
We use recursive window analysis in order to assess the evolution of the pass
through in each country and per each market rate. This method of analysis
is employed firstly, in order to find out if the pass through has changed over
time and also to identify periods that registered asymmetric adjustments as
explained in the previous section. The first window includes 40 quarters.
This width was chosen in order to avoid having a very short time period at
the start of the analysis as the study uses time series analysis which favours a
long sample period.
4.3.2 Data
The exogenous variable is the policy rate (pr) used by the central banks to
signal the stance of monetary policy. The endogenous variables are average
lending rate (lr) and average deposit rates (dr). The source of the data is the
International Financial statistics (IFS) database that is compiled by the
International Monetary Fund (IMF). The data were accessed through the
Datastream. The data are in quarterly observations and runs from 1995
quarter 1 to 2015 quarter 4 for most countries except Kenya (starts from
2004 quarter 3.) and Zambia (from 1999 quarter 4). Summary statistics are
provided in Table 4.7 in the appendix.
Figure 4.1 entitled, Interest Rates by Country, provides a graphical
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presentation of the policy rate (pr), lending rate (lr) and deposit rate (dr) in
each country during the period under review. In general, the graphs show
that the lending rates and deposit rates have been following the trend of the
policy rates.
Figure 4.1: Interest Rates by Country (1995 - 2015) in percent per annum
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Time Series Properties
We conduct unit root and cointegration tests to assess the time series
properties of the data. Table 4.2 presents results for the degree of stationarity
that were examined using the Augmented Dickey Fuller test. It shows that in
all countries, all series are integrated of order one {I(1)} except in Tanzania
and Uganda. The policy rate and the average lending rate in Tanzania are
stationary {I(0)} and in Uganda the deposit rate is I(0) whilst the policy rate
is I(1).
Table 4.2: Augmented Dickey Fuller Unit Root Tests
Policy Rate Lending Rate Deposit Rate
Level 1st difference Level 1st difference Level 1st difference
Angola -1.948 -10.101*** -2.267 -5.462*** -2.590 -6.464***
Botswana -1.309 13.29*** -1.493 -4.93*** 0.4 -8.45**
Kenya -2.758 -6.057*** -1.354 -3.376*** -1.396 -2.734*
Lesotho -1.443 -9.774*** -1.196 -7.210*** -1.523 -7.772***
Malawi -1.545 -8.209*** -1.683 -8.153*** -1.565 -6.695***
Namibia -1.376 -7.727*** -0.93 -7.027*** -0.878 -5.265***
South Africa -1.167 -7.111*** -1.084 -6.058*** -1.332 -6.784***
Swaziland -0.919 -5.135*** -0.731 -4.500*** -0.715 -4.729***
Tanzania -5.505*** -1.946 -6.218*** -3.480***
Uganda -3.64*** -2.485 -8.972*** -2.232 -6.633***
Zambia -1.849 -6.79*** -0.658 -5.393*** -1.068 -5.437***
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
Table 4.3 presents results for cointegration tests using Engle Granger,
Johansen and ARDL Bounds techniques. Cointegration was confirmed in
the lending rate equations for Angola, Botswana, Namibia, South Africa,
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Swaziland and Tanzania and deposit rate equations for Angola, Malawi,
Namibia and South Africa.
Table 4.3: Cointegration Test Results
Johansen (Trace) Engle Granger ARDL Bounds Decision
2 Step
r=0 r=1 t-stat F-stat t-stat
Angola lr -3.029** 30.2 -7.712 Cointegrated
dr -2.684* 12.3 -4.938 Cointegrated
Botswana lr 34.259 0.005** -5.12** 12.163 -4.443 Cointegrated
dr 10.811** 0.435 -4.33** 0.808 -1.136 No
Kenya lr 15.437 1.675** -1.44 1.792 -1.846 No
dr 19.869 0.667** -2.42 1.495 -1.414 No
Lesotho lr 14.044* -3.065 2.861 -2.369 No
dr 13.774* -2.082 2.725 -1.643 No
Malawi lr 9.546** -1.73 2.698 -2.029 No
dr 30.488 7.213 -3.25 12.615 -4.678 Cointegrated
Namibia lr 20.815 2.219** -3.38** 8.860 -4.126 Cointegrated
dr 14.2418** -1.79 5.466 -3.283 Cointegrated
South Africa lr 26.497 3.026** -4.54** 10.900 -4.635 Cointegrated
dr 15.289** -3.62** 5.952 -3.215 Cointegrated
Swaziland lr 39.0325 2.4582* -5.810*** 16.244 -5.693 Cointegrated
dr 11.3182* -3.595**
Tanzania lr 31.438 14.721 -0.43 43.548 -7.527 Cointegrated
dr 21.011 6.239 -1.72 2.210 -1.961 No
Uganda lr 33.631 9.403 -1.87 5.700 -3.226 No
dr 22.714 8.623 -1.17 3.468 -2.625 No
Zambia lr 14.776** 2.55 4.712 -2.695 No
dr 21.449 7.058 1.7 5.69 -3.339 No
** p < 0.05; Critical Values for Johansen r = 0 is 15.41; r = 1 is 3.76; and for Engle Granger is -3.37. For
Bounds Test the Critical Values are 5.73 for F-stat and -3.22 for t-stat. No means the decision is that the series
are not cointegrated.
4.3.3 Estimation Procedure
The econometric analysis firstly estimates the size of the pass through
coefficients in each country and for each type of rate to assess the
completeness. In total, we estimate 22 equations thus 11 equations per retail
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rate. As explained under the section entitled econometric model and also
based on the results for unit root and cointegration tests, equation 4.6, the
ARDL model in levels, was used for estimating pass through to the deposit
rate in Tanzania because the policy rate and deposit rate series were
stationary in levels but not cointegrated with each other.
Equation 4.7, the ARDL model in first differences, was applied in
estimating the pass through to the lending rate in Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi,
Uganda and Zambia. The same model was employed for estimating pass
through to the deposit rates in Botswana, Kenya, Lesotho, Uganda and
Zambia. This is because the series were found to be integrated of order one
I(1) but not cointegrated with the policy rate. In both cases, equation 4.10
was used for the calculation of the long run pass through (LRPT) and the
standard errors are based on the delta method.
Equation 4.8, the error correction model, was used for lending rate
equations of Angola, Botswana, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland and
Tanzania as this variable was cointegrated with the policy rate and both are I
(1). This equation was also used for estimating the pass through to the
average deposit rate in Angola, Malawi, Namibia and South Africa for the
same reasons. In all cases, the number of lags were chosen empirically using
the Akaike Information Criteria.
Secondly, all models are subjected to recursive window analysis in order
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to examine the evolution of the pass through over time. Thirdly, we conduct
asymmetric analysis for all retail rates that are cointegrated with the policy
rates. This analysis uses equation 4.11. The countries that were subjected to
the asymmetric analysis on their lending rate equations are Angola,
Botswana, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland and Tanzania. On the deposit
rate equations, the countries include Angola, Malawi, Namibia and South
Africa. Where asymmetric adjustment is confirmed, the results are
explained with reference to collusive pricing arrangements and adverse
customer reaction hypotheses as defined in the literature review.
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4.4 Results
We find heterogenous responses of average lending and deposit rates to
changes in the central bank’s policy rate across the countries in the
COMESA-EAC-SADC region. The differences are mainly explained by the
diversity in macroeconomic conditions, levels of financial development and
the conduct of monetary policy among the countries.
4.4.1 Size of policy rate pass through to average lending Rates
Table 4.4 summarises 3 results for the econometric analysis on policy rate
pass through to the lending rate. The results indicate differences in the sizes
of the adjustor, short and long-run pass through across the countries.
Short Run Pass Through (SRPT) to the lending rate
In all countries the SRPT is incomplete but statistically significant except in
Tanzania. The values of the SRPT are heterogeneous ranging from 10.5% to
75.1% when Tanzania is excluded. The SRPT is less than 50% in 7 out of the
11 countries. This shows that the banks are reluctant to pass on the changes
in the policy rate to their lending rates in the short run. The results suggest
that the SRPT is the highest in South Africa where 75.1% of the shock in
3Detailed Results are in Appendix tables 4.8 and 4.9
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Table 4.4: Policy Rate Pass Through to Lending Rate
Angola Botswana Kenya Lesotho Malawi Namibia SA Swaziland Tanzania Uganda Zambia
SRPT 0.385*** 0.196** 0.205** 0.574*** 0.593*** 0.414*** 0.751*** 0.562*** 0.012 0.105*** 0.308***
(0.07) (0.04) (0.07) (0.21) (0.11) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.10)
82.78 402.20 123.57 4.12 14.93 131.13 33.67 177.29 706.06 576.27 45.57
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.04] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Adj -0.276*** -0.18*** -0.326*** -0.604*** -0.623*** -0.199***
(0.03) 0.04 (0.08) (0.13) (0.11) (0.03)
LRPT 0.717*** 1.084*** 0.397*** 0.682*** 0.802*** 0.973*** 0.963*** 0.939*** 0.166 0.36*** 0.505***
(0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.16) (0.11) (0.04) (0.02) (0.01) (0.12) (0.06) (0.14)
9.64 1.08 46.78 17.56 8.10 0.62 3.48 44.89 50.06 122.32 12.88
[0.00] [0.30] [0.00] [0.00] [0.03] [0.43] [0.07] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
R2 0.86 0.48 0.70 0.46 0.67 0.66 0.82 0.94 0.69 0.39 0.42
Model ECM ECM BASIC BASIC BASIC ECM ECM ECM ECM BASIC BASIC
Robust Standard Errors in Parenthesis; * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01; SRPT is short run pass through
(β̂0) and LRPT is the long run pass through (λ̂). Adj implies the adjustor (φ̂). This is the coefficient of µt−1 in
equation 4.8. Statistics in italics are F or Chi− square statistics for the testing completeness hypothesis. The
null is that the parameters for SRPT or LRPT, β0 or λ, respectively is satisically equal to 1 and the P −V alues
for this test are in the square brackets. ECM means equation 4.8, the error correction model whilst BASIC
means equation 4.7 the ARDL model in first differences. For the Basic ARDL model, the standard errors for
the long-run pass-through are calculated according to the delta method (Greene, 2000, p.330).
the policy rate is transmitted to the average lending rate in the short run. The
statistics in italics are F−Statistics for testing the completeness hypothesis.
For the SRPT, the null is that β0 is equal to 1. Using the 0.05 significance
level, the results suggest that the SRPT of the policy rate to lending rate is
statistically incomplete in all countries.
The Adjustor (Coefficient for the Error Correction Term)
The adjustor, φ, has the correct sign and is highly significant in all countries
where cointegration was confirmed. The countries are Angola, Botswana,
Namibia, South Africa and Tanzania. This confirms that long run forces are
in operation of restoring equilibrium after a shock in the policy rate. The
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speed of restoring the equilibrium is fast in Swaziland where 62.3% of the
imbalance is corrected in the next period whilst Botswana has the lowest
speed of 18.0%.
Long Run Pass Through (LRPT) to the lending rate
Botswana, Namibia and South Africa record the highest LRPT of 108%,
97.3% and 96.3%, respectively (refer to Table 4.4). Furthermore, the results
suggest that the LRPT is complete as we fail to reject the null hypothesis
that λ is equal to 1. According to macroeconomic and financial background
presented in the previous chapter, the outcomes for these countries are as
expected. This is because their financial systems are relatively more
developed than in the other countries as shown in Tables 2.1 and 2.2 of
chapter 2.
Angola and Malawi’s LRPT to the average lending rates are 71.7% and
80.2%, respectively, whilst the other countries except Zambia record less
than 50%. Angola and Malawi’s results are interesting as both countries
have unfavourable macroeconomic and financial conditions almost in all
indicators and for the whole sample period (refer to Tables 2.1 and 2.2 in
chapter 2). Therefore, according to the literature, their policy rate pass
153
through was expected to be low. The high LRPT to lending rate in these
countries could be explained by high inflation which causes prices to change
fast. It may also reflect the prevalence of high risks in the credit market that
are associated with unstable macroeconomic conditions. In such an
environment banks would calculate high risk premiums and incorporate
them in the loan prices (Sander and Kleimeier, 2004; De Bondt 2002; 2005).
Results for Kenya suggest that the LRPT is incomplete and low at 39.7%
despite the country having relatively high levels of financial development.
These results are similar to the findings by Misati et al (2011) who attributed
the stickiness of the interest rate to inefficiencies in the banking system that
are associated with high concentration in the banking market.
The results for Tanzania are statistically insignificant and very low (1.2%
SRPT and 16.6% LRPT.) These findings are in line with our results in
chapter 3 and also Davood et al (2013) both of which showed that the
interest rate channel is very weak in Tanzania because of capital controls,
low levels of financial development and a framework that targets monetary
aggregates.
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4.4.2 Size of the policy rate pass through to deposit rates
Table 4.5 summarises4 results for the econometric analysis on policy rate pass
through to the deposit rate. It shows that the size of the pass through differ
across the countries. The results also suggest that the short and long-run pass
through of the policy rate to the deposit rate is incomplete in all countries
except for Swaziland’s long run pass through.
Table 4.5: Policy Rate Pass Through to Deposit Rate
Angola Botswana Kenya Lesotho Malawi Namibia SA Swaziland Tanzania Uganda Zambia
SRPT 0.464*** 0.109** 0.202*** 0.198*** 0.608*** 0.31*** 0.675*** 0.532*** 0.207** 0.279*** 0.181*
(0.06) (0.05) (0.02) (0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.06) (0.09) (0.08) (0.04) (0.09)
80.66 364.09 132.38 189.33 47.24 361.17 33.67 28.73 98.70 407.31 82.11
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Adj -0.203*** -0.374*** -0.198*** -0.269***
(0.04) (0.08) 0.06 (0.08)
LRPT 0.337*** 0.256** 0.435*** 0.316*** 0.777*** 0.684*** 0.766*** 0.91*** 0.429*** 0.425*** 0.356**
(0.12) (0.11) (0.06) (0.11) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.11) (0.08) (0.16)
6.86 89.69 63.87 36.16 22.27 47.59 16.73 3.54 25.04 59.57 17.00
[0.01] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.06] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
R2 0.78 0.36 0.77 0.33 0.67 0.70 0.73 0.87 0.54 0.62 0.43
Model ECM BASIC BASIC BASIC ECM ECM ECM BASIC BASIC BASIC BASIC
Robust Standard Errors in Parenthesis; * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01; SRPT is short run pass through
(β̂0) and LRPT is the long run pass through (λ̂). Adj implies the adjustor (φ̂). This is the coefficient of µt−1 in
equation 4.8. Statistics in italics are F or Chi− square statistics for the testing completeness hypothesis. The
null is that the parameters for SRPT or LRPT, β0 or λ, respectively is satisically equal to 1 and the P −V alues
for this test are in the square brackets. ECM means equation 4.8, the error correction model whilst BASIC
means equation 4.7 the ARDL model in first differences. For the Basic ARDL model, the standard errors for
the long-run pass-through are calculated according to the delta method (Greene, 2000, p.330).
Short Run Pass Through (SRPT)
The coefficient of the SRPT is statistically significant in all the countries. In
terms of size, we find that the SRPT to the deposit rate is less than 50 % in
4Detailed results are in tables 4.10 and 4.11 in the appendix.
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all countries except for South Africa (67.5%), Malawi (60.8%) and
Swaziland (53.2 %). The SRPT to the deposit rate is very low in Botswana
at 10.9%.
The adjustor(The coefficient of the error correction term)
The coefficient of error correction term, φ, is statistically significant in all
the countries that used the error correction model (Angola, Malawi, Namibia
and South Africa). The results show that the disequilibrium gets corrected
faster in Malawi as the value of the adjustor is the highest at 37.4%. In
South Africa the size of the adjustor is 26.9% this shows that in this country,
the speed of reverting to the long run equilibrium is slower in deposit rates
than in lending rates (60.4%).
Long Run Pass Through (LRPT)
Swaziland, Malawi, South Africa and Namibia record relatively large LRPT
of the shocks in the policy rate of the deposit rates of 91.0%, 77.7%, 76.6%
and 68.4%, respectively. Nonetheless, in all countries, results for
completeness test reject the null hypothesis that the LRPT, (λ), is equal to 1
except for Swaziland. In the other countries, the pass through is below 50%
with Botswana recording the lowest at 25.6%. Unlike the low and
insignificant results on IRPT to lending rate in Tanzania, the results on
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deposits are statistically significant. The LRPT for Tanzania is 42.5% and
compares well with results for most of the countries.
In general, the incomplete and low values of IRPT for most of the
countries in our study is in line with the literature. This is because with an
exception of South Africa which is an emerging market all the others are
low income countries. South Africa has complete LRPT in the lending rate
and relatively large SRPT and LRPT to the deposit rate firstly because of
high levels of financial development. Additionally, as discussed in the
previous chapter, during this period, monetary policy had a sole objective of
price stability and authorities had adopted inflation targeting framework
whose elements enhances the interest rate channel of monetary policy. We
therefore attribute the incomplete IRPT in the low income countries to low
levels of financial development and weak signalling power of monetary
policy. Poor signalling is mainly caused by the pursuit of multiple objectives
and adoption of less transparent frameworks such as monetary aggregate
targeting that is followed by Angola, Malawi, Tanzania and Zambia (refer to
Table 2.3 in chapter 2).
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4.4.3 Results for the Evolution of the Pass Through
In the recursive window analysis, we track the progress of the pass through
coefficients over time in all the countries. The first window has 40 quarters
and we add one period at a time to the end of the sample period. The results
are displayed in Figures 4.2 and 4.3 which contain country-specific charts of
SRPT and LRPT to the lending and deposit rates, respectively. Overall, the
results suggest that on the lending rate, the size of the pass through has
increased in 5 countries namely Angola, Botswana, Kenya, Lesotho and
Malawi; remained unchanged in Namibia, South Africa and Uganda and
declined in Tanzania and Zambia. In most countries, the improvement in
IRPT is associated with periods when the countries changed conduct of
monetary policy either by becoming more transparent, or using market
based regimes. For IRPT to deposits, the results suggests that the degree of
the IRPT to the deposit rates has only increased in Uganda and declined in
most of the countries.
Chart 1a under Figure 4.2 shows a decline in the SRPT over time in
Angola but a gradual increase in the LRPT from 2006 quarter 4 up to 2009
when the LRPT stabilises around 72 %. Although the pass through has
increased, it remains incomplete in both the short and long run. Chart 1b for
Botswana shows a different picture. Both SRPT and LRPT drops in the third
second of 2006 and remains low up to the first quarter of 2010 after which
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Figure 4.2: Evolution of IRPT to Lending Rate by Recursive Analysis
the LRPT starts increasing and overshoots from 2012 quarter 4 onwards
whilst the SRPT remained low. The interesting issue is that the drop in
SRPT and LRPT which occurred in the second quarter of 2006 is similar to
developments in Lesotho and South Africa as displayed by charts 1d and 1g.
We therefore attribute this result to developments in the exchange rate
market of South Africa since the Pula and Maloti (currencies for Botswana
and Lesotho, respectively) are liked to the South African Rand. Notably, the
Rand depreciated sharply in May 2006 (Venter, 2009). This might have
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resulted to uncertainties in the financial market and affected the IRPT
negatively.
Chart 1c for Kenya indicates that the LRPT to the lending rate increased
in the fourth quarter of 2011 from below 10 % to above 30% up to the end of
the 2015. This increase is explained by Kenya’s change of monetary policy
framework from targeting monetary aggregates to prices interest rates. Our
results are similar to Morales and Raei (2013) who split their sample in June
2011 to indicate the change in the framework as a structural break. They
found that the pass through increased in Kenya after they adopted a new
framework of monetary policy. Chart 1c shows that the IRPT remains
incomplete in Kenya showing that market inefficiencies still exist in the
economy some of which might be arising from high concentration in the
banking system.
Chart 1d for Malawi shows that both SRPT and LRPT dropped in 2006
quarter 1 and remained low up to the second quarter of 2012 when it started
increasing. Although the changes in the SRPT and LRPT in Malawi are not
large, the picture clearly mirrors developments in the exchange rate market
in the country. The IRPT in Malawi was lower between 2006 and 2012 when
the country’s currency was fixed to a United States Dollar value. The country
adopted a floating exchange rate regime in the second quarter of 2012. This
shows that the IRPT is high in periods when the country followed flexible
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exchange rate regimes.
Chart 1i, 1j and 1k for Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia shows a general
decline in the SRPT and LRPT to the average lending rate. However, an
interesting trend is displayed in Chart 1j for Uganda. The charts show a
gradual decline in SRPT and LRPT up to the first quarter of 2011 after which
they both shift upwards. This period coincides with the adoption of inflation
targeting lite. Our results corroborate Morales and Raei (2013) whose study
split the sample period January 2000 to February 2012 into two periods based
on a predetermined break point, June 2011 that was related to the change of
monetary policy framework. Their results suggested that IRPT was higher in
the post break-date period.
Chart 1g for South Africa shows that over time the SRPT to the lending
rate has decreased from above 90% before 2006 to around 75% from 2012
to 2015. However a different pattern is displayed in the LRPT to the lending
rate. It also drops in the second quarter of 2006 but it does not continue to
decline rather remains strong (above 90 percent) and statistically complete
by the end of 2015.
Figure 4.3 shows the results for evolution of the deposit rate. The
patterns for SRPT and LRPT in charts for Botswana (2b), Kenya (2c),
Lesotho(2d), Namibia (2f), Tanzania (2i), Uganda (2j) and Zambia (2k) are
largely the same as displayed in the evolution of IRPT to lending rates. The
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Figure 4.3: Evolution of IRPT to Deposit Rate by Recursive Analysis
most interesting result is for South Africa as displayed by chart 2g. The
coefficients of the SRPT rapidly decline just as in the chart 1g for lending
rates. The trend for LRPT are different from the second quarter of 2006 to
the first quarter of 2012. During this period, decline is rapid in LRPT to
deposit rate compared to lending rate.
To sum up, the recursive analysis has provided further evidence of
heterogeneities in IRPT within the same country over time and also across
the countries. All coefficients for LRPT were tested for stability using
cusum analysis. The results for stability tests are included in the appendix in
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Figure 4.4 for the LRPT to the lending rate, and Figure 4.5 for the LRPT to
the deposit rate. Overall, the cusum plots confirm that the coefficients are
stable at 95% confidence interval in all countries except for Uganda’s
deposit rate which shows a structural break in 2012 (refer to chart 2u under
Figure 4.5).
4.4.4 Results for the Asymmetric Analysis
Table 4.4 presents results for the assessment of whether there are
asymmetric adjustments in the interest rates based on the direction of
change in the policy rate. As explained in section 4.3, this analysis was only
conducted on the retail rates which are cointegrated with the policy rates.
The investigation uses the Wald test, by testing the equality between the
coefficients of the positive and negative lagged residuals in the asymmetric
error correction model in equation 4.6. The table also shows results for
mean lags equations 4.7 and 4.8 that provide more information on the
direction of rigidity. In general, The results suggest that the adjustment is
symmetric in most countries with the exception of Angola and Tanzania.
The results for Angola and Tanzania suggest that the response of the
lending rate to changes in the policy rate is more rigid when there are
expansionary shocks. These results are statistically significant at 5%, and
1% critical values, respectively. The asymmetric mean lags show that in
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Table 4.6: Results for Analysis on Presence of Asymmetries
µ+t−1 µ
−
t−1 Wald Test Mean Lags IRPT Adjustment
coef. se coef. se F-Stat P-Value ML+ ML− Mechanism Rigidity
Lending Rate
Angola -0.40 (0.06) -0.16 (0.09) 4.36 0.04 1.63 4.12 Asymmetric Downward
Botswana -0.16 (0.10) -0.12 (0.10) 0.70 0.41 5.10 6.77 Symmetric* More downward
Namibia -0.31 (0.13) -0.20 (0.12) 0.28 0.60 1.93 3.02 Symmetric* More downward
South Africa -0.59 (0.14) -0.55 (0.22) 0.03 0.87 0.42 0.45 Symmetric -
Swaziland -0.46 (0.15) -0.30 (0.14) 0.76 0.39 1.01 1.52 Symmetric -
Tanzania -0.30 (0.05) -0.06 0.04 19.65 0.00 3.30 18.60 Asymmetric Downward
Deposit Rate
Angola -0.28 (0.07) -0.10 (0.09) 1.74 0.19 2.10 5.57 Symmetric* More downward
Malawi -0.37 (0.16) -0.36 (0.17) 0.00 0.99 0.97 0.98 Symmetric -
Namibia -0.24 (0.11) -0.07 (0.08) 1.06 0.31 2.87 10.21 Symmetric* More Downward
South Africa -0.21 (0.15) -0.20 (0.14) 0.00 0.99 1.53 1.56 Symmetric -
se means standard errors. The symbol, ”*” ,implies although the Wald test indicate symmetric
mechanism, the value of the mean lag indicate some rigidity.
Angola, it takes more than four quarters for the commercial banks to
respond fully to downward adjustment in the policy and less than two
quarters in terms of upward adjustment of the policy rate. In Tanzania, in the
loan market commercial banks take just over 3 quarters to fully respond to
tight monetary policy but over 18 quarters when the policy rate is adjusted
downwards. This is evidence for collusive pricing hypothesis in the loan
market showing that commercial banks in Angola and Tanzania endeavour
to make as much profit as possible by maintaining high interest rates on
loans.
The results also provide weak evidence of collusive pricing in Botswana
and Namibia when we refer to the values of the the asymmetric mean lags.
In Botswana, commercial banks take close to 7 quarters to fully respond to
expansionary monetary policy compared to 5 quarters in case of tight
monetary policy. Similarly, in Namibia the commercial banks take relative
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more time (about 3 quarters) when the shocks on the policy rate are negative
than with positive shocks (less than 2 quarters). Since the F-Statistics are
insignificant in both of these countries, we consider this evidence of
collusive pricing to be weak. Nonetheless, we recommend that commercial
banks should aim at responding correctly to monetary policy signals in order
to enhance the transmission mechanism.
In contrast, there is weak evidence of symmetric adjustment in Angola’s
deposit market as the F-Statistic for the Wald test is not statistically
significant. However, the asymmetric mean lags suggest that the adjustment
is more rigid downwards. This is weak evidence for customer reaction
hypothesis which shows that commercial banks more concerned with
defending their market power in the deposit market. This downward rigidity
can also be explained by the commercial banks’ avoidance of negative real
interest rates on deposits due to high levels of inflation in the country. Weak
evidence for customer reaction hypothesis is also registered for Namibia’s
deposit market. We attribute Namibia’s results to commercial banks’ efforts
to defend their market power in a highly concentrated market.
Strong evidence for symmetric adjustments is found in lending rates for
South Africa and Swaziland; and deposit rates for Malawi and South Africa.
We note that the Wald tests reject the presence of asymmetries and the mean
lags also point to symmetric adjustments. This implies that the commercial
165
banks in these countries responded in an expected manner when adjusting
the given retail rates following shocks of either direction in the policy rate.
Thus the commercial banks were able to respond to expansionary monetary
policy (that was expressed through downward adjustment of the central
bank’s official policy rate) by cutting their rates on loans and deposits; and
also responded to contractionary monetary policy by raising the lending and
deposit rates. This conduct of commercial backs enhances the effectiveness
of monetary policy.
Our results for South Africa are similar to the findings by Aziakpono and
Wilson (2013) in a rolling window analysis for the period of 2000 to 2007.
They attributed the symmetric adjustment to improvements in the
accountability and transparency of the monetary policy following the
adoption of inflation targeting framework in the year 2000. Since their
analysis was only for the period up to 2007, our results provide further
evidence for the period up to 2015.
Overall, the study finds evidence for asymmetries in some markets within
the COMESA-EAC-SADC region. In the loans market, the most prevailing
conduct is collusive pricing. This can be attributed to the fact that the
banking systems in these countries are very concentrated hence no
competitive behaviour among the banks. This conduct of the commercial
banks make monetary policy to be less effective. Increasing the level of
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competition in the credit market is key to remove collusive pricing in the
loans market. We also find evidence for customer reaction hypothesis in
some of the deposit market in the region. Under this hypothesis, commercial
banks are reluctant to adjust deposit rates downwards (Hannan and Berger,
1991; Neumark and Sharpe, 1992). In addition to low levels of competition
in the markets, we also attribute the results to high prevalence of inflation in
the region which might restrict the banks to reduce deposit rates downwards
in order to avoid negative real interest rate in the deposit market.
4.5 Conclusion
This chapter also used aggregated data on a cross country analysis of the
central bank’s policy rate pass through to average lending and deposits rate in
11 countries from the COMESA-EAC-SADC region. It employed time series
techniques on a country-by-country basis for the period of 1995 to 2015.
The model that is used is the auto regressive distributed lag model (ARDL).
The analysis focused on the completeness, evolution and also presence of
asymmetries.
The results provide evidence of heterogeneity in the size of the pass
through of the central bank policy rate to lending and deposit rates across
countries. However, in all countries, the short run pass through of the central
bank’s policy rate to both average lending and deposit rates is statistically
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incomplete. The pass through of the policy rate to average deposit rate is
also incomplete in all countries (except Swaziland) with most of them
recording very low magnitudes. The findings further suggest that the long
run pass through of the central bank’s policy rate to average lending rate is
statistically complete in Botswana, Namibia and South Africa and
incomplete in the remaining countries. In general, these results provide
evidence that IRPT to the lending rates is larger in countries with high levels
of financial development than in others.
Asymmetric analysis provides strong evidence for collusive pricing
arrangements in the loan markets in Angola, and Tanzania. In these markets,
commercial banks take longer in responding to declines in the policy rate.
There is also weak evidence of the same hypothesis for Botswana and
Namibia as lending rates are relatively more rigid to downward adjustments
of the central bank’s policy rate. The results further suggest that in Angola
and Namibia, deposit rates are adjusted faster when the shocks in the policy
rate are positive than when they are negative hence supporting the customer
reaction hypothesis. The main contributing factor to asymmetric
adjustments is low levels of competition in the banking sector. In Angola,
high inflation levels have also led to downward rigidity of deposit rates as
commercial banks avoid negative real interest rates.
The assessment on the evolution of the pass through reveals that in some
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countries, Angola, Botswana, Kenya, Malawi and Uganda the IRPT has
increased over time whilst in Tanzania and Zambia it has declined. In most
countries, the main factor that has led to the increase in the IRPT is
improvement in the conduct of monetary policy by increasing transparency
in the conduct and adoption of market based policies.
Overall, the results for this chapter give further evidence that the interest
rate channel in the COMESA-EAC-SADC region is weak as the pass
through of the central bank’s policy rate to commercial bank’s average
lending and deposit rates is incomplete for most countries and in some
countries not predictable because of asymmetric adjustments. Based on
these findings we recommend policies that target increasing financial
development, raising competition in the banking sector and improving the
conduct of monetary policy by adopting market based regimes. Favourable
macroeconomic conditions such as low inflation would also enhance the
effectiveness of monetary policy in the region.
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4.6 Appendix
Table 4.7: Summary Statistics-Quarterly data from 1995q1 to 2015q4
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs.
Policy Rates
Angola 64.82 56.37 2.0 160.0 84
Botswana 12.27 2.69 6.0 15.5 84
Kenya 9.42 3.02 4.58 18.0 46
Lesotho 13.40 3.16 9.18 21.00 84
Malawi 29.70 13.19 10.0 64.26 84
Namibia 10.21 4.36 4.67 21.08 84
South Africa 10.09 4.26 4.5 21.68 84
Swaziland 9.79 4.01 5.0 18.0 84
Tanzania 15.60 8.72 3.7 56.87 84
Uganda 15.43 4.72 5.40 35.33 84
Zambia 16.28 9.18 4.20 40.4 65
Lending Rates
Angola 62.01 71.19 1.83 385.0 84
Botswana 13.82 2.64 7.5 17.0 84
Kenya 15.12 2.10 12.2 20.21 46
Lesotho 14.30 3.38 9.92 23.33 84
Malawi 38.89 11.25 23.75 61.67 84
Namibia 13.32 4.09 8.26 22.58 84
South Africa 13.52 4.15 8.5 25.0 84
Swaziland 13.14 3.76 8.5 21.0 84
Tanzania 19.28 7.26 13.56 46.67 84
Uganda 21.09 2.01 17.73 27.22 84
Zambia 25.21 11.99 9.23 48.57 65
Deposit Rates
Angola 29.76 46.56 0.5 256.0 84
Botswana 7.70 2.69 2.3 10.76 84
Kenya 6.60 2.47 2.19 12.88 46
Lesotho 5.95 3.41 1.03 13.73 84
Malawi 17.05 11.63 3.25 42.0 84
Namibia 7.53 2.94 3.92 14.24 84
South Africa 9.30 3.61 5.09 19.85 84
Swaziland 6.30 3.31 2.08 13.43 84
Tanzania 8.25 4.60 2.7 25.13 84
Uganda 10.13 2.84 3.71 20.32 84
Zambia 11.99 6.36 6.23 24.3 65
Source: Datastream IFS
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Table 4.8: Detailed Results for Policy Rate Pass Through to Lending Rate (lr) by ECM
Angola Botswana Namibia South Africa Swaziland Tanzania
∆pr 0.385*** 0.196*** 0.414*** 0.751*** 0.562*** 0.012
(0.068) (0.040) (0.052) (0.048) 0.033 0.037
∆prt−1 0.075 0.238*** 0.155 0.142 0.001
(0.081) (0.077) (0.100) (0.087) (0.035)
∆prt−2 -0.218*** -0.023
(0.076) (0.032)
∆lrt−1 0.484 *** 0.463 -0.137 -0.008 -.034 -0.056
(0.058) (0.103) (0.084) (0.104) (0.081) (0.085)
∆lrt−2 -0.033 0.012 0.093** -0.068
(0.056) (0.115) (0.041) (0.077)
∆lrt−3 -0.083* -0.228 -0.231***
(0.05) (0.103) (0.074)
Cons 0.964 0.044 1.073 2.291*** 2.42*** 2.718
(2.055) (0.211) (0.327) (0.499) (0.426) (0.344)
Lags (lr, pr) (4,3) (4,1) (2,2) (2,2) (3,2) (4,3)
R2 0.861 0.484 0.661 0.820 0.939 0.692
SRPT(β0) 0.385*** 0.196*** 0.414*** 0.751*** 0.562*** 0.012
(0.068) (0.040) (0.052) (0.048) 0.033 0.037
ECM (φ) -0.276**** -0.18*** -0.326*** -0.604*** -0.623*** -0.199***
(0.034) (0.04) (0.079) (0.130) (0.109) (0.026)
LRPT (λ) 0.717*** 1.09*** 0.973*** 0.963*** 0.939*** 0.166
(0.091) (0.088) (0.041) (0.020) 0.009) (0.118)
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01; Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
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Table 4.9: Results for Policy Rate Pass Through to Lending Rate by Basic ARDL
Kenya Lesotho Malawi Uganda Zambia
∆pr 0.205*** 0.574*** 0.592*** 0.105*** 0.308***
(0.072) (0.208) (0.105) (0.037) (0.102)
∆prt−1 0.142 0. 025 0.259*** 0.150*** 0.035







∆lrt−1 0.197 0.201 -0.029 -0.317** 0.226*
(0.148) (0.153) (0.098) (0.141) (0.127)
∆lrt−2 -0.072 -.079 -0.032 0.053
(0.095) (0.067) (0.079) (0.078)
Cons 0.093 -0.014 0.095 0.046 -0.190
(0.067) (0.075) (0.231) (0.107) (0.188)
R2 (0.698) 0.464 0.666 0.387 0.424
Lags(lr, pr) (2,1) (2, 1) (2,1) (1,4) (2,2)
SRPT (β0) 0.205*** 0.574*** 0.593*** 0.105*** 0.308
(0.072) (0.208) (0.105) (0.037) (0.102)
LRPT (λ) 0.397*** 0.682*** 0.802*** 0.360*** 0.505***
(0.089) (0.258) (0.112) (0.058) (0.138)
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01; Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
Standard errors for the LRPT(λ) are computed using the delta method.
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Table 4.10: Results for Policy Rate Pass Through to Deposit Rate by ECM
Angola Malawi Namibia South Africa
∆pr 0.464*** 0.608*** 0.31*** 0.675***
(0.059) (0.057) (0.036) (0.056)




∆drt−1 0.310*** 0.253*** 0.163* -0.146





CONS -0.348 -2.407*** 0.109 0.412**
(1.94) 0.852 (0.108) (0.174)
Lags (dr, pr) (4,3) (2,1) (2, 2) (2,2)
R2 0.778 0.671 0.702 0.734
SRPT (β0) 0.464*** 0.608*** 0.31*** 0.675***
(0.059) (0.057) (0.036) (0.056)
ECM (φ) -0.203*** -0.374*** -0.198*** -0.269***
(0.041) (0.080) (0.06) (0.084)
LRPT (λ) 0.337*** 0.777*** 0.684*** 0.766***
(0.117) (0.047) (0.046) (0.057)
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01; Robust Standard errors in parenthesis
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Table 4.11: Policy Rate Pass Through to Deposit Rate by Basic ARDL
Botswana Kenya Lesotho Swaziland Tanzania Uganda Zambia
∆pr 0.109** 0.202*** 0.198*** .532*** 0.207** 0.279*** 0.181*
(0.047) (0.024) (0.058) (0.087) (0.080) (0.036) (0.09)
∆prt−1 0.068 0.142** 0.067 0.438*** 0.177** 0.093** 0.072*
0.063) (0.054) (0.084) (0.128) (0.082) (0.045) (0.036)
∆prt−2 0.044 0.133*** 0.235 0.175*** 0.025





∆drt−1 0.260 0.484** 0.161 -0.207 -0.039 0.125 0.186
(0.120) (0.222) (0.144) (0.155) (0.144) (0.111) (0.181)
∆drt−2 -0.125 -0.243* -0.101 -0.102 -0.344 0.033




Cons -0 .050 0.122 -0.107 0.007 -0.023 0.052 -0.091
(0.031) (0.084) (0.061) (0.031) (0.093) (0.117) (0.107)
R2 0.362 0.767 0.314 0.865 0.543 0.617 0.435
Lags(dr, pr) (2,2) (3, 1) (1,1) (3,2) (2,3) (2, 4) (2,2)
SRPT (β0) 0.109** 0.202*** 0.198*** 0.532*** 0.207 ** 0.279*** 0.181
(0.047) (0.024) (0.058) (0.087) (0.080) (0.036) (0.090)
LRPT (λ) 0.256** 0.435*** 0.316*** 0.905*** 0.429*** 0.425*** 0.356**
(0.113) (0.062) (0.112) (0.050) (0.114) (0.075) (0.156)
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01; Robust standard errors in parenthesis are computed using the delta
method.
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Figure 4.4: Cusum Plot for LRPT to Lending Rate
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Banks and across Retail Products in




In chapter 4, we examined the interest rate pass through for the central
bank’s policy rate to average lending and deposit rates. The literature further
shows that banks’ financial structures might cause heterogeneities in their
pricing policies and cause variations in the policy rate pass through to retail
interest rates (Gambacorta, 2008; Fuertes and Heffernan, 2009;
Stanisławska, 2014; Holton and Rodriguez, 2015). However, the empirical
literature present mixed results on the nature of the influence of individual
bank characteristics on the strength and speed of the policy rate pass through
to retail rates. This shows the importance of examining the hypothesis
empirically in all countries and regions.
This chapter uses bank level data from Malawi to investigate the presence
of heterogeneities in the interest rate pass through (IRPT) from the central
bank’s policy rate to interest rates on five retail services in ten commercial
banks. The analysis is conducted on monthly observations for the period of
1995 to 2015 using time series analysis on a bank-by- bank and product-by-
product basis. The study assesses heterogeneities on the size of the short
run pass through (SRPT) and long run pass through (LRPT) across banks
and across different products per bank using auto regressive distributed lag
model. We also use recursive window analysis to examine the evolution of
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the IRPT per retail product in each commercial bank.
This research contributes to the literature on IRPT in three ways. Firstly,
it uses a novel data-set from Sub-Saharan Africa to provide more evidence
on the hypothesis of heterogeneity of the IRPT across commercial banks and
products. Most studies that have tested this assumption are on developed
countries and emerging countries. Research on developing countries, and
in particular, the Sub-Saharan region mostly use aggregated data due to the
challenges in finding more detailed data for all commercial banks in each
country. Our results confirm heterogeneities in the size of the IRPT in both
the short and long run across commercial banks. In some commercial banks,
the IRPT is complete whilst in other banks it is incomplete. The variations
in the size of IRPT are also noticed over time across the commercial banks.
Overtime and on a given retail rate, we find the IRPT getting stronger in some
banks while not changing, or weakening in others.
Secondly, the study examines the nature of the pass through across
different products within the same bank. This analysis is important as De
Graeve et al. (2007) argue that differences in the price setting behaviour
over products may be the source of differential responses of consumption
and investment to shocks hitting the economy. Our findings suggest marked
differences in the magnitude of the IRPT across type of products within the
same bank. An earlier study by Chiumia and Palamuleni (2016) concluded
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that big banks’ IRPT was complete in lending rate and deposit rates. This
study sheds more light by showing that the high IRPT from the big banks
was only to deposits with a longer term whilst IRPT to short term deposits is
low. The variation is also reported in the evolution of the PT in a way that in
some rates, the size has increased, in others decreased or remained
unchanged. This shows that interest rates may respond differently to
changes in macroeconomic and financial conditions.
Thirdly, the study investigates the influence of specific bank characteristics
on the IRPT. This analysis provides more insights on the dynamics of the pass
through in relation to specific characteristics of the commercial banks. The
IRPT to the lending rate is found to be positively associated with the size
of the bank and levels of non performing loans. However, contrary to the
literature on insignificance of the size effect in the long run (Gambacorta,
2008), we find that the size effect is significant in both the short and long run
on the lending rate. On the side of deposits, there are mixed results. There is
a negative association between size and IRPT to all the deposits in the long
run. However, in the short run, the IRPT to the 3 months time deposit rate
seems to be positively associated with the size of the bank. This result is
similar to Chiumia and Palamuleni (2016) who found that big banks passed
on most of the changes in the policy rate to deposits rates.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows; Section 5.2 provides a
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literature review, section 5.3 discusses Malawi’s financial system followed
by section 4 which describes the data and the method used. The results are
discussed in 5.5 and the chapter is concluded in section 5.6.
5.2 Background Literature
The empirical literature provides evidence of heterogeneities in interest rate
transmission mechanisms to retail rates across products and also across
financial institutions. Most of these studies are for advanced countries and
emerging economies. However, the literature provide mixed results on the
way bank-specific characteristics affect interest rate pass through to retail
rates. This shows the importance of testing the hypothesis before coming up
with any conclusions in any country or region.
Table 5.1 presents a summary of reviewed literature. We have split the
literature into two sub-sections namely heterogeneities across commercial
banks and across products for easy referencing.
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Table 5.1: Studies on Heterogeneities in the Interest Rate Pass Through
Authors Country Sample PolicyRate
Market
Rate Main Findings
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small banks.
Source: Compiled by Author
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Table 5.1 Continued
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5.2.1 Heterogeneities across Commercial Banks
Weth (2002), conducted his study on the German financial market for the
period from April 1993 to December 2000. His results show a fast speed of
adjustment in big banks. He attributes the result to different types of
customers, in particular, the fact that big banks deal with large firms which
have better access to other sources of financing such as trade credit and
corporate bonds. This compels the big banks to follow market developments
very closely in order to retain their clients. In another study by Gambacorta
(2008) for Italy, no significant size effect is found on overall pass through.
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He therefore concludes that the size effect is only present in the short run.
De Graeve et al (2007) examine heterogeneities in pricing across banks
in Belgium for the period before the financial crisis. They find that well
capitalized and high liquid banks react less to changes in policy rates. Their
results are similar to Gambacorta (2008) for Italy. In contrast, Holton and
Rodriguez (2015) find that banks with less liquidity had a lower overall pass
through (67 %) compared to banks with high liquidity (78 %) in the Euro
Area. However, the difference was not statistically significant. A significant
difference is reported in the speed of adjustment. More liquid banks correct
the deviation from the long run equilibrium faster (32 %) than the less liquid
(19 %). For capital and reserves, Holton and Rodriguez (2015) also find a
negative association between capital and the size of IRPT both in the short
and long run; and also with the speed of adjustment.
Fuertes and Heffernan (2009) use error correction models to test for
heterogeneities across financial firms and seven retail rates for deposit and
loan products using monthly data for the period of 1993 to 2004 in the
United Kingdom. The results provide significant evidence for variations in
the speed of the IRPT across financial firms that were explained by
managerial performance indicators such as profitability and cost.
Gigineishvilli (2011) find that lending rates are rigid to cost of funds as
banks are able to charge higher premiums and deviate from marginal cost
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pricing.
Stanisławska (2014) investigates the dynamics of the IRPT in Poland
from market rates to banks’ deposit and lending rates based on individual
bank’s data. He uses error correction models and pooled ordinary least
squares techniques to assess the presence of heterogeneities across
banks.The results confirm the presence of heterogeneities with banks which
have lower assets, lower liquidity ratio and weaker deposit base recording
high LRPT to the deposit rates. The LRPT to lending rates, is higher in
institutions with a better quality of credit. Gigineishvilli (2011) and Sander
and Kleimeier (2004) find that the level of non-performing loans (NPL) is
negatively associated with IRPT as banks with high NPLs demand high risk
premium which raises the lending rates. This result implies that credit
quality improves the pass through.
5.2.2 Heterogeneities Across Products
This section provides a review of studies that assess for heterogeneities
across products. Sander and Kleimeier (2004) analyse IRPT in eight
transition economies from Europe from January 1993 to December 2003 on
four loan and three deposit products. They find that the pass through is
higher in corporate loans and smaller in personal loans and deposit rates. De
Graeve et al (2007) find similar results from their study on six loan and
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seven deposit products for 31 banks in Belgium. Corporate loan rates are
reported to be more responsive to adjustments in the money market rates
than consumer credit across banks. The outcomes in these studies are
attributed to the effects of type of client and menu costs. Corporate
customers are believed to have easy access to alternative financing such that
banks are keen to reflect market developments in their pricing to avoid
losing their customers to other competitors. Additionally, personal loans are
smaller in magnitude than corporate loans such that banks find menu costs
associated with adjustments of interest rates on personal loans relatively
higher than on corporate loans.
A study by Hofmann and Mizen (2004) on UK’s mortgage and 90-days
term deposit rates find complete pass through on the IRPT to mortgages but
not deposits. They use the base rate for the four major clearing banks as a
proxy for the policy rate. In another study for the UK, Fuertes and
Heffernan (2009) find that financial institutions adjusted the rate for the 90
days household savings faster than the mortgages rate. They however noted
that during their sample period the Bank of England’s policy rate was
generally declining. This result was therefore attributed to literature on
asymmetric adjustments based on the direction of the policy change.
De Graeve et al (2007) also provides evidence of term effect where
products with a longer maturity record higher pass through than the ones
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with short maturities. Fuertes and Heffernan (2009) find similar results as
53.3 % of their financial institutions record high LRPT for deposits with
longer maturity. Their tests are on 30, 60 and 90 days term deposits. Their
study also provides evidence for collateral effect as a larger LRPT is found
on interest rate for credit cards (87 %) than on rates for mortgages (42.9 %).
They conclude that LRPT is high on credit cards because the debt is
unsecured whilst mortgage loans are secured by collateral.
In developing countries the most available empirical evidence is the
variation in the size of the IRPT between the average lending rate and the
average deposit rate. Chiumia and Palamuleni (2016) examines the pass
through of central bank policy rate to the lending and deposit rates on nine
banks in Malawi for the period of 2005 to 2015 using an ARDL model.
Their results indicate complete pass through to the lending rate whilst the
deposit rate record incomplete pass through. In section 4.4, the results for
the central bank’s policy rate pass through to average lending and deposit
rates in eleven countries show that the IRPT to the lending rate was higher
than the IRPT to the deposit rate in nine countries. This outcome is
attributed to commercial banks’ behaviour of defending profit margins by
maintaining a high interest rate spread. Low levels of competition in the
banking sector and limited alternative sources of investment cause
customers to remain price takers and stick with their banks.
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The above studies show that the transmission varies across financial firms
and retail products. Significant evidence of heterogeneities entails less
predictability on the transmission mechanism hence less effectiveness of
monetary policy.
5.2.3 Contribution to the literature
This study seeks to provide further evidence on heterogeneities in IRPT
across commercial banks and financial products in Sub-Saharan Africa using
Malawi as a case study. Our study is different from Chiumia and Palamuleni
(2016) firstly because the interest rates are more disaggregated than theirs.
They use averages at each bank’s level. For instance, their lending rate is the
average of the minimum and maximum rate on loans and their savings rate
is an average of deposits with maturity of more than one year. In this study
we use the base lending rate. This is the rate which the commercial banks
announce as the minimum rate for loans. The maximum rate is not included
in this study because it also depends on other factors such as risk associated
with different customers approaching the banks. On the deposit side, we
also use disaggregated data on four different products, the ordinary savings
rate (this is a rate on savings with no maturity profile), two demand deposit
rates ( the 7 days demand deposit rate and the 30 days demand deposit rate),
and one time deposit rate (the 3 month’s time deposit rate). The increase in
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the number of products on the deposit side provides an opportunity for
testing for heterogeneities across retail products within a commercial bank.
Secondly, in addition to completeness of the pass through, this study also
assesses the evolution per rate as the sample is longer by 10 years (from
1995 to 2015). This analysis provides further insights in the way each
product’s pass through has been changing following changes in
macroeconomic and financial conditions over time. Lastly, it also applies
econometric methods in investigating the effects of specific commercial
bank characteristics on the strength of the IRPT in both the short and the
long run for all the retail products. The variables included are size of the
commercial bank, capital adequacy ratio, liquidity level, credit quality (level
of non performing loans) and profitability (return on assets). The results
from this analysis provide a solid basis for drawing recommendations on
how to enhance the effectiveness of monetary policy in Malawi.
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5.3 Stylized Facts for Malawi’s Financial System
Figure 5.1 presents the distribution of assets in Malawi’s financial system.
The banking system is the largest sector with a total of 61.0 % followed by
the insurance and pension funds that hold about 18.0 % of the assets each.
The rest of the assets are shared between microfinance institutions and the
Malawi Stock Exchange (MSE). This research is conducted on the banking
system only.
Figure 5.1: Distribution of Assets as at end 2015
As outlined in Mwabutwa et al (2016) and Ngalawa and Veigi (2011), the
financial sector in Malawi has undergone three major periods: the repression
period (1964-1986), the financial liberalisation period (1987-1994) and post
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liberalization period (1995-to present). Several financial and monetary
policy reforms were implemented in different periods. The reforms
comprised of removing direct controls on credit and deregulation of interest
rates, adopting market based exchange rate regimes, introducing indirect
monetary policy instruments, reviewing the legal and regulatory framework
of the banking system, and removing capital controls. Our study focuses on
the post liberalisation period.
During the time of financial repression (1964 to 1988), the banking
system was composed of four commercial banks with two of the banks
holding over 70 % of assets. Malawi went into structural adjustment
programs (SAP) supported by the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
beginning the second half of 1988. The SAP included the development and
diversification of financial institutions; and the elimination of direct controls
for indirect techniques. Credit ceilings and rationing was stopped by 1989.
Financial institutions were given the power to set their own prices guided by
the central bank’s discount rate; and grant credit based on their own risk
management techniques, (Chirwa (2001)). Following this, other commercial
banks started to enter the system in the mid 1990s. By the end of 2015, the
banking system was composed of twelve banks compared to four banks
during the 1980s.
Mlachira and Chirwa (2002) investigates the impact of the above
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financial sector reforms on interest rate spreads (defined as the difference
between the average lending and average deposit rate) in the banking system
in Malawi. Their panel regression results point to high monopoly power,
high reserve requirements, high central bank discount rate and high inflation
as determinants of high interest rate spreads in Malawi. Their period of
analysis is from 1989 to 1999. Figure 5.2 shows that interest rate spreads
remain high beyond the period of their analysis to 2015.
Figure 5.2: Interest Rate Spread in percent (1990-2015)
The degree of monopoly power in the banking system has been
improving however the market remains concentrated as three (out of
thirteen) commercial banks hold 64.3 % of the market share in terms of
assets, deposits and loans. In terms of ownership, as at the end of year 2015,
government had shares in two banks, five banks were foreign owned and the
other six were domestically owned.
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The banking system is also characterized by structural excess liquidity.
This is because the interbank market is segmented with big banks lending to
each other at low interest rates while charging very high interest rates to small
banks. This behaviour affects the level of activity on the market and also its
efficiency as very often some banks seek access to central bank’s financing
facilities whilst other banks are holding volumes of liquidity (RBM, 2016).
The Malawi Stock Exchange (MSE) was established in 1994 in order to
deepen the financial sector through provision of a capital market where
companies could raise equity. The companies listed on the MSE cover a
number of sectors such as financial services, tourism, manufacturing
telecommunications and real estate. As at the end of 2015, only four
commercial banks ( out of thriteen) were listed on the stock exchange.
According to RBM (2016b), the MSE has been growing slowly over the
years. The slow growth is due to macroeconomic instability, poor economic
infrastructure and stagnation in economic diversification. However, other
basic foundations for a successful exchange are in place. These are,
government support, sound regulatory framework enacted through Financial
Services Act, 2010 and the Securities Act 2010. Additionally, there is good
governance structure in place as the Registrar of Financial Institutions only
has an oversight role whilst the Board of the Exchange and market
participants are responsible for day-to-day operations.
193
5.4 Method and Data
5.4.1 Econometric Framework
This study employs a two steps method following Sander and Kleimeier
(2004) and Fuertes and Heffernan (2009). In the first stage, a series of pass
through coefficients are calculated from a regression that only includes the
commercial bank retail interest rate and the central bank’s policy using auto
regressive distributed lag (ARDL) model. In this stage we also run a
recursive analysis to track the performance of the coefficients over time and
also to extract the values of short run pass through (SRPT) and long run pass
through (LRPT) for use as dependent variables in the next stage. In order to
avoid unnecessary repetitions, we do not describe the ARDL model as it has
already been described in section 4.3.1 of chapter 4 and the same techniques
are used.
The second stage of the econometric analysis involves an investigation of
the influence of different commercial bank characteristics on SRPT and
LRPT. This analysis is implemented using panel estimation techniques.
Following Weth (2002) and Stanslawska (2014) the characteristics are
entered in the equation one at a time for each product’s IRPT using the
following equation;
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Yit = α +X
′
itβ + νit (5.1)
where Y is a series of either SRPT or LRPT that was extracted from the
recursive analysis in the first stage for a specific retail rate, i is the commercial
bank andX is the specific bank characteristics and t is time, α is the intercept,
the effect of X on Y is given by β, and ν is the error term.
5.4.2 Data
The study is conducted on monthly retail interest rates for five products for
the period of January 1995 to December 2015. We use bank level data on
interest rates as submitted by commercial banks to the central bank of
Malawi. The data are on 10 commercial banks (out of a total of 13 in
Malawi). In terms of coverage, the included banks cover approximately 91.3
% of the market. The commercial banks have been coded numerically from
1 to 10 for confidentiality reasons. The retail interest rates are the base
lending rate (lr), ordinary savings rate (osr), 7 days demand deposit rate
(ddr7d), 30 days demand deposit rate (ddr30d) and the 3 months time
deposit rate (tdr3m). The choice for type of product was based on the
availability of a long series for the product in each bank. The explanatory
variable in the first stage is the central bank’s policy rate. Table 5.2 presents
summary statistics for the interest rates.
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Table 5.2: Summary Statistics
Bank 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.
Rate
Base Mean 32.36 32.02 33.10 38.41 31.21 32.87 27.81 33.28 32.73 27.32
Lending Std.dev 13.38 10.98 11.18 11.64 11.14 11.05 8.84 11.26 10.90 8.20
Min 17.75 17.75 17.75 18.25 17.0 17.75 17.5 17.75 17.75 18.0
Max 62.0 53.0 56.0 59.75 51.0 60.0 45.0 53.0 58.0 46.0
Obs. 180 235 252 252 185 252 159 252 252 151
Ordinary Mean 5.92 14.60 8.34 n.a 9.59 13.96 13.58 7.17 13.41 n.a
Savings Std.dev 2.8 9.30 5.73 n.a 5.49 11.08 9.18 3.45 11.23 n.a
Min 3.5 4.5 3.5 n.a 4.0 2.5 4.5 4.0 2.5 n.a
Max 12.0 36.0 25.0 n.a 18.0 38.0 38.0 18.0 39.0 n.a
Obs. 103 235 161 n.a 180 252 252 145 252 n.a
7 Days Mean 12.91 12.4 10.71 14.36 7.69 12.43 11.82 10.77 12.40 8.15
Demand Std.dev 10.92 8.91 9.37 9.27 4.71 10.06 7.91 8.68 10.00 2.57
Min 3.5 3.00 2.50 5.00 3.53 1.75 3.00 3.00 2.5 5.0
Max 39 34.50 40.00 30.00 22.00 40.00 29.50 33.00 39.0 12.0
Obs. 193 235 185 204 161 252 249 193 252 139
30 Days Mean 14.93 14.63 15.73 16.54 9.45 14.34 n.a n.a 14.25 10.47
Demand Std.dev 11.61 9.53 11.44 9.43 5.90 10.56 n.a n.a 10.62 5.00
Min 5.00 4.00 3.00 6.00 5.00 2.75 n.a n.a 3.5 5.5
Max 42.00 36.50 42.00 35.00 27.00 42.00 n.a n.a 41.0 26.0
Obs. 193 235 252 204 161 252 n.a n.a 252 151
3 Months Mean n.a 16.65 17.95 27.31 14.59 16.71 17.03 17.58 16.02 11.54
Time Std.dev n.a 10.44 12.51 10.69 10.0 11.55 11.35 12.51 12.46 6.28
Min n.a 4.5 4.0 11.5 5.50 3.25 4.5 3.5 2.0 5.0
Max n.a 36.5 46.0 46.5 37.0 45.0 45.0 46.25 45.0 28.0
Obs. n.a 235 252 156 185 252 252 252 252 151
Mean Std.dev Min Max Obs.
Policy Rate 29.75 13.10 13.00 75.53 252
Source: Reserve Bank of Malawi; n.a means the product is not available for that commercial bank.
Table 5.3 further presents the balance sheet characteristics of the
commercial banks. Following Gigineishvilli (2011) and Stanisławska
(2014), capital is represented by total capital adequacy ratio which shows
how well a bank is equipped in relation to the risk it is taking. It is compiled
as a ratio of total capital to total assets. We use the log of total assets for
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each bank as the size variable and it also represents market power.
Liquidity is calculated as the ratio of liquid assets to deposits and short
term liabilities. The variable representing credit quality is calculated as the
ratio of non-performing loans (NPL) to total assets whilst profitability is
represented by return on assets (ROA).
Table 5.3: Summary of Bank Characteristics
Mean value No. of Banks Bank Codes
Capital (Full Sample) 20.90
High Capital Adequacy Ratio 25.10 6 2,4,6,8,9,10
Low Capital Adequacy Ratio 15.73 4 1,3,5,7
Liquidity (Full Sample) 52.11
High Liquidity Ratio 61.41 6 1,2,4,6,8,9
Low Liquidity Ratio 40.39 4 3,5,7,10
Size (Full Sample) 10.11
Log of bank assets (Big banks) 11.12 3 2,6,9
Log of bank assets (Small banks) 9.65 7 1,3,4,5,7,8,10
NPLs (Full Sample) 3.29
Low non-performing loans 2.21 5 3,6,8,9,10
High non-performing loans 5.01 5 1,2,4,5,7
ROA (Full Sample) 3.63
High Return on Assets 6.21 5 2,4,6,8,9
Low Return on Assets 2.03 5 1,3,5,7,10
Source: Author’s Calculations; Banks have been coded from 1 to 10
Just for the purpose of understanding the structure of the banking system,
each indicator is split into two groups of high or low level of the values as
in Holton and Rodriguez (2015). The splitting has been based on the full
sample mean at the 50th percentile. All banks with a higher mean than the
50th percentile mean of the whole sample are in one group. Similarly, the
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banks whose mean is below that benchmark are in one group. The table
shows that for the balance sheet indicator capital, the 50 percentile mean for
the full sample is 20.90 %. Specifically, there are 6 banks with high capital
and their sub-sample mean is 25.10 % whilst the mean for the group with
lower capital is 15.73 %. Six banks which are in the group of high liquidity
have a sub-sample mean of 61.41 % whilst the lower group, consisting of 4
banks, has a mean of 40.39 %.
With respect to size, there are only three big banks and the average of
their total assets in logs is 11.12 and 7 small banks with a mean of 9.65 for
their log of assets. Five banks have a high credit quality (low NPL) with
an average ratio of non performing loans to total assets of 2.21 % whist the
other five banks have an average of 5.01 % implying low credit quality. For
return on assets (ROA), we have five banks in each category and in the high
profitability group ROA has a mean value of 6.21 % whilst compared to 2.03
in the group of low profitability. As stated above, the splitting is only for the
purposes of understanding the structure of the market and not included in the
estimations.
5.4.3 Time Series Properties
The time series plots in Figure 5.3 in the appendix portray some
co-movements between all retail rates and the policy rate in all banks. We
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conduct formal unit root tests on each rate using the augmented Dickey
Fuller test and the Bounds Wald procedure developed by Pesaran et al,
(2001) to test for cointegration. The coefficients of the IRPT are calculated
on a bank-by-bank and product-by-product basis, whilst the coefficients of
determinants of the IRPT are calculated using panel estimation techniques.
Table 5.4: Results for Unit Root tests
Base Ordinary 7 Days 30 Days 3 Months
Lending Savings Demand Demand Time
Bank
1. level -2.24 -1.04 -1.38 -1.44 -1.64
∆ -12.32 -9.32 -13.41 -13.01 -13.82
2. level -1.54 -1.62 -1.76 -1.81 -1.75
∆ -13.38 -13.69 -14.12 -14.31 -14.08
3. level -1.53 -3.08 -2.06 -1.69 -1.85
∆ -15.07 -11.06 -15.14 -16.39 -15.74
4. level -1.55 -1.57 -1.71 -1.88
∆ -14.69 -14.79 -15.86 -11.57
5. level -1.36 -1.73 -2.67 -3.56 -2.51
∆ -12.05 -14.03 -11.59 -18.77 -19.40
6. level -1.60 -1.81 -1.70 -1.69 -1.84
∆ -16.09 -15.36 -16.45 -16.25 -16.20
7. level -1.46 -1.75 -1.95 -1.75
∆ -11.35 -15.60 -15.67 -15.12
8. level -1.510 -3.251 -1.89
∆ -15.36 -11.95 -15.54
9. level -1.57 -1.83 -1.57 -1.59 -1.67
∆ -14.79 -14.86 -15.07 -15.30 -14.42
10. level -1.89 -1.88 -3.27 -2.98
∆ -11.43 -11.64 -12.18 -11.91
Policy Rate level -1.69 ∆ -17.24
Critical Values;1% (-5.711); 5%(-5.155); 10% (-4.8609). ∆ means first difference.
Tables 5.4 displays results for unit root tests. The results show that the
policy rate and all retail rates are integrated of order one I(1). Table 5.5
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presents results for cointegration tests.
Table 5.5: Cointegration Results
Bank 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.
Rates
Base Lending T-Stat -1.81 -1.74 -2.04 -4.27 -0.92 -2.38 -1.25 -2.24 -2.14 -1.28
F-Stat 2.36 2.21 2.61 9.18 0.92 3.59 1.07 3.14 3.04 0.84
Ordinary Savings T-Stat -2.04 -1.89 -1.93 n.a n.a -2.92 -2.91 -1.87 -2.26 n.a
F-Stat 3.77 2.58 4.57 n.a n.a 6.26 6.11 -2.85 4.99 n.a
7 Days Demand T-Stat -2.71 -1.75 -1.91 -4.11 -2.4 -2.5 -4.67 n.a -2.56 -1.83
F-Stat 3.72 2.47 3.36 8.6 3.2 4.57 11.25 n.a 4.79 2.07
30 Days Demand T-Stat -2.65 -2.84 -3.92 -4.8 -3.59 -4.41 n.a n.a -2.59 -3.23
F-Stat 3.61 4.58 8.39 12.0 7.52 10.87 n.a n.a 4.75 5.24
3 months time T-Stat -0.269 -3.77 -4.06 -3.87 -3.50 -4.58 -3.31 -3.78 -2.46 n.a
F-Stat 3.85 7.40 9.19 7.49 6.33 11.70 6.58 8.00 5.04 n.a
Critical Values; T-Stat 1% (-3.82); 5%(-3.22); 10% (-2.91); F-Stat 1%(7.84), 5%(5.73), 10% (4.78).
n.a means product not included for that bank. Bold colour indicate evidence for cointegration at 0.05
significance level.
Cointegration of the retail interest rate with the policy rate is confirmed
for the prime lending rate in bank 4, the 7 days demand deposit rate in banks
4 and 7, the 30 days demand deposit rate in banks 3, 4, 5 and 6. The 3 months
time deposit rate is cointegrated with the policy rate in almost all banks with
an exception of banks 1,and 9. Just like in chapter 4, these results guide us to
use equation 4.7 where there is no evidence of cointegration and equation 4.8
for the cointegrated variables. In both cases, the number of lags is chosen by
minimising the the Akaike information criteria.
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5.5 Empirical Results
5.5.1 Heterogeneities Across Commercial Banks
Table 5.6 displays results for policy rate pass through to the base lending
rate in each bank. The findings confirm that banks respond differently in
their immediate response to changes in the central bank’s policy rate on their
base lending rates.
Table 5.6: SRPT and LRPT to the Base Lending Rate (lr)
SRPT LRPT Adjustor R-sq. Completeness Test
Bank SRPT LRPT
1. 0.44*** 0.91** - 0.23 13.10 0.05
(0.16) (0.43) - [0.000] [0.825]
2. 0.42*** 0.62 *** - 0.35 21.16 4.98
(0.13) (0.17) - [0.000] [0.025]
3. 0.39*** 0.64*** - 0.29 22.59 3.81
(0.13) (0.18) [0.00] [0.041]
4. 0.21*** 0.83*** -0.14*** 0.18 19.83 159.45
(0.05) (0.07) (0.03) [0.000] [0.000]
5. 0.28*** 0.41*** - 0.27 48.67 14.54
(0.10) (0.16) - [0.000] [0.000]
6. 0.43*** 0.66*** - 0.32 18.96 5.14
(0.13) (0.15) - [0.000] [0.000]
7. 0.88*** 1.07*** - 0.63 1.36 0.26
(0.10) (0.14) - [0.244] [0.613]
8. 0.34*** 0.63*** - 0.27 32.52 6.85
(0.12) (0.14) - [0.000] [0.000]
9. 0.40*** 0.66*** - 0.29 22.83 3.92
(0.12) (0.17) - [0.000] [0.043]
10. 0.96*** 1.11*** - 0.66 0.11 0.62
(0.13) (0.14) - [0.739] [0.432]
Average IRPT 0.48 0.75
Range of IRPT {0.28, 0.96} {0.41, 1.11}
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Standard error for LRPT calculated by the delta method. ** p < 0.05;
*** p < 0.01; Range of the pass throughs in curly brackets. The null hypothesis for the completeness test of
SRPT is H0 : β0 = 1; and for LRPT is H0 : λ = 1. In square brackets are the P-Values for this test.
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The SRPT ranges from 21 % in bank 4 to 96 % in bank 10. Results for the
test of the completeness hypothesis indicate that at the 0.05 significance level,
the SRPT is equal to 1 in banks 7 and 10. In the remaining 8 commercial
banks, the SRPT is incomplete.
Similarly, the range of the results for the LRPT confirm heterogeneity in
the response of the base lending rate. The range is from 41% in bank 5 to 111
% in bank 10. It can be noted that there is an over-reaction in banks 7 and
10. Table 5.3 indicate that the two banks share the same characteristic of low
liquidity level and low return on assets. The results also suggest that in bank
1 the LRPT is statistically complete as at 0.05 significance level, we fail to
reject the null hypothesis that λ is equal to 1. This bank is characterised by
high non-performing loans, low return on assets and low capital. The high
LRPT of the central bank’s policy rate to the base lending rate in this bank
may therefore be explained by De Bondt (2005)’s argument of the bank’s
effort in trying to offset risks by charging high interest rates on loans.
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Table 5.7 displays results for policy rate pass through to the ordinary
savings rate. The SRPT ranges from 18 to 67 % whilst the LRPT spreads
from 38 % to 69 %. The averages are 39 % for the immediate pass through
and 52 % for the overall pass through in the whole banking system.
Table 5.7: SRPT and LRPT to the Ordinary Savings Rate (osr)
SRPT LRPT R-sq. Completeness F-Stat
Bank SRPT LRPT
1. 0.38*** 0.41*** 0.40 32.59 28.04
(0.11) (0.11) [0.000] [0.000]
2. 0.*** 0.44*** 0.31 75.54 22.52
(0.08) (0.12) [0.000] [0.000]
3. 0.67*** 0.65*** 0.78 20.04 15.42
(0.08) (0.09) [0.000] [0.000]
6. 0.32*** 0.53*** 0.26 45.27 12.03
(0.10) (0.13) [0.000] [0.000]
7. 0.18*** 0.38*** 0.17 136.59 23.21
(0.07) (0.13) [0.000] [0.000]
8. 0.67*** 0.69*** 0.74 11.72 11.54
(0.08) (0.09) [0.000] [0.000]
9. 0.25*** 0.56** 0.22 86.94 4.04
(0.08) (0.22) [0.000] [0.014]
Average IRPT 0.39 0.52
Range of IRPT {0.18, 0.67} {0.38, 0.69}
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Standard error for LRPT calculated by the delta method. Banks 4, 5 and
10 not included for this product. Range of the pass throughs in curly brackets. The null hypothesis for the
completeness test of SRPT is H0 : β0 = 1; and for LRPT is H0 : λ = 1. In square brackets are the P-Values
for this test.
The test for the completeness hypothesis indicate that the pass through of
the central bank’s policy rate to ordinary savings rate is incomplete in all
banks both in the short and long run.
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Further evidence of heterogeneity across commercial banks is reported
in Table 5.8 which presents the policy rate pass through to 7 day demand
deposit rate. The SRPT ranges from 20 % in bank 7 to 37 % in bank 10
whilst the LRPT disperses from 38 % to 69 %. The averages for the whole
banking system are at 34 % and 53 %, for the immediate and overall reaction,
respectively.
Table 5.8: SRPT and LRPT to the 7 Days Demand Deposit Rate (ddr7d)
SRPT LRPT Adjustor R-sq. Completeness Test
Bank SRPT LRPT
1. 0.23*** 0.38** - 0.14 25.17 53.57
(0.09) (0.17) - [0.000] [0.000]
2. 0.34*** 0.43** - 0.36 38.69 10.51
(0.11) (0.18) - [0.000] [0.000]
3. 0.28*** 0.38*** - 0.42 41.72 17.09
(0.11) (0.15) - [0.000] [0.000]
4. 0.22*** 0.67*** -0.16*** 0.19 37.52 279.56
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) [0.000] [0.000]
5. 0.64*** 0.69*** - 0.70 10.53 7.53
(0.11) (0.11) - [0.001] [0.001]
6. 0.41*** 0.64*** - 0.35 19.82 6.99
(0.13) (0.14) - [0.000] [0.008]
7. 0.20*** 0.56*** -0.17*** 0.21 41.10 252.04
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) [0.000] [0.000]
9. 0.35*** 0.59*** - 0.31 34.31 8.06
(0.11) (0.14) - [0.000] [0.005]
10. 0.37* 0.43** - 0.26 7.65 6.67
(0.23) (0.22) - [0.007] [0.009]
Average IRPT 0.34 0.53
Range of IRPT {0.20, 0.37} {0.38, 0.69}
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Standard error for LRPT calculated by the delta method. ** p < 0.05;
*** p < 0.01; Bank 8 is not included for this product. The range of the pass throughs is in curly brackets. The
null hypothesis for the completeness test of SRPT is H0 : β0 = 1; and for LRPT is H0 : λ = 1. In square
brackets are the P − V alues for the test.
In terms of completeness of the pass through, the results suggest that both
SRPT and LRPT are incomplete in all banks.
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In Table 5.9, the contemporaneous pass through to the 30 days demand
deposit rate ranges from 23 % in bank 1 to 105 % in bank 5. The results also
show that the speed of adjustment varies across the banks. In bank number
3 only 16 % of the deviation from the long run equilibrium gets corrected in
the next period whereas in bank 5, up to 30 % of the deviation is corrected.
Table 5.9: IRPT to the 30 Days Demand Deposit Rate (ddr30d)
SRPT LRPT Adjustor R-sq. Completeness Test
Bank SRPT LRPT
1. 0.23*** 0.38** - 0.15 68.53 12.01
(0.09) (0.18) - [0.000] [0.000]
2. 0.36*** 0.54** - 0.31 33.19 3.41
(0.11) (0.25) - [0.000] 0.048]
3. 0.37*** 0.78*** -0.16*** 0.27 63.34 178.22
(0.05) (0.06) (0.04) [0.000] [0.000]
4. 0.27*** 0.68*** -0.25*** 0.22 42.78 539.94
(0.04) (0.03) (0.05) [0.000] [0.000]
5. 1.05*** 0.55*** -0.30*** 0.46 1.08 58.71
(0.13) (0.07) (0.08) [0.28] [0.000]
6. 0.34*** 0.71*** -0.17*** 0.29 64.14 196.18
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04) [0.000] [0.000]
9. 0.35*** 0.65*** - 0.30 40.56 26.32
(0.10) (0.23) - [0.000] [ 0.028]
10. 0.71*** 0.87*** - 0.42 4.12 0.76
(0.14) (0.15) - [0.041] [0.383]
Average IRPT 0.46 0.65
Range of IRPT {0.23, 1.05} {0.38, 0.87}
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Standard error for LRPT calculated by the delta method. ** p < 0.05;
*** p < 0.01; Bank 7 is not included for this product. The range of the pass throughs is in curly brackets. The
null hypothesis for the completeness test of SRPT is H0 : β0 = 1; and for LRPT is H0 : λ = 1. In square
brackets are the P − V alues for the test.
The completeness test fail to reject hypothesis for the SRPT in bank 5 and
LRPT in bank 10. Low liquidity conditions as indicated in Table 5.2 may be
the driving factor for high pass through to this product in these two banks.
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Table 5.10 presents results for the policy rate pass through to the 3 months
time deposit rate. The immediate pass through ranges from 22 % in bank 4
to 74 % in bank 10. The overall pass through disperses from 48 % in bank 1
to 100 % in bank 10.
Table 5.10: IRPT to the 3 Months Time Deposit Rate (tdr3m)
SRPT LRPT Adjustor R-sq. Completeness F-Stat
Bank SRPT LRPT
1. 0.28** 0.48** - 0.12 34.44 9.44
(0.12) (0.23) - [0.000] [0.000]
2. 0.37*** 0.74*** -0.14*** 0.23 52.29 104.99
(0.05) (0.07) (0.04) [ 0.000] [0.000]
3. 0.41*** 0.83*** -0.16*** 0.24 56.12 149.99
(0.05) (0.07) (0.04) [0.000] [0.000]
4. 0.22*** 0.85*** -0.17*** 0.21 7.33 37.82
(0.08) (0.14) (0.04) [0.008] [0.000]
5. 0.36*** 0.71*** -0.22 0.26 22.69 90.44
(0.08) (0.07) (0.06) [0.000] [0.000]
6. 0.40*** 0.77*** -0.18*** 0.29 66.91 197.13
(0.05) (0.05) (0.04) [0.000] [0.000]
7. 0.28*** 0.70*** -0.11*** 0.19 32.84 59.82
(0.05) (0.09) (0.03) [0.000] [0.000]
8. 0.38*** 0.79*** -0.13 0.22 49.47 84.81
(0.05) (0.09) (0.03) [0.000] [0.000]
9. 0.37*** 0.66*** - 0.25 62.88 29.09
(0.12) (0.12) - [0.000] [0.000]
10. 0.74 *** 1.00 *** - 0.27 3.30 0.12
(0.14) (0.21) - [0.072] [0.732]
Average IRPT 0.42 0.75
Range of IRPT {0.22, 0.74} {0.48, 1.00}
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Standard error for LRPT calculated by the delta method.The range of
the pass throughs is in curly brackets. ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01;The null hypothesis for the completeness
test of SRPT is H0 : β0 = 1; and for LRPT is H0 : λ = 1. In square brackets are the P − V alues for this test.
The results indicate that in bank 10 the central bank’s policy rate pass
through to the 3 months time deposit rate is complete in both the short and
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the long run SRPT and LRPT as we fail to reject the hypothesis of unity pass
through in both cases.
Overall, our results in tables 5.6 to 5.10 the standard errors show that all
coefficients of the SRPT and LRPT are statistically significant in all banks
and the values of the R − Squared are similar to other findings in
literature1. The findings provide evidence of heterogeneities in the SRPT
and LRPT across commercial banks for the same type of products as the
range of the pass throughs are wide and statistical tests fail to reject the
completeness hypothesis in some banks whilst in others the hypothesis is
rejected. We therefore summarise the statistics of the SRPT and LRPT from
these tables in Table 5.11 to proceed in assessing heterogeneity across
products in the next section.
Using Table 5.11 presented in the next subsection, further evidence of
differences across commercial banks in the adjustment of interest rates is
noted. Only banks 3 and 8 have lower IRPT to the lending rate than to the
ordinary savings rate both in the short and long run. It is noted that both
of these banks are small in size suggesting that high interest rate spreads
are propagated more by big banks. These results can be explained by an
interaction market power and type of clients. Big banks have large market
power and alternative avenues for external financing. They also prefer to deal
1See Fuertes and Heffernan (2009)
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with corporate (or big) clients who do not mainly keep ordinary savings but
time deposits. The banks therefore focus on the products for their preferred
clients. In contrast, small banks have limited sources of financing and most of
their customers keep ordinary savings hence pass on the changes in monetary
policy to the deposit rates.
5.5.2 Heterogeneity Across Products
Table 5.11 presents results for intra-bank heterogeneities across products.
The results show that in most banks, the pass through to the lending rate is
on the high side compared to almost all deposit rates except the 3 months
time deposit rate. This result is in line with literature and its attributed to
commercial banks’ efforts of safeguarding their profit margins by keeping
the interest rate spread wide.
Among the deposit rates we find evidence for maturity effect. We find
that in 75 % of the commercial banks, the LRPT to the 30 days demand
deposit rate is higher than LRPT to the 7 days demand deposit rate. This
effect is clearer when we compare the LRPT to the 3 months time deposit
rate with both the 7 days and 30 days demand deposit rates. In all
commercial banks the LRPT to the 3 months deposit rate is the highest
compared to these two retail products. The high IRPT in the 3 months time
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Table 5.11: SRPT and LRPT Per Interest rate for each Commercial Bank
Bank 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.
SRPT
Lending Rate 0.44 0.42 0.39 0.21 0.28 0.43 0.88 0.34 0.40 0.96
Savings Rate 0.38 0.28 0.67 n.a n.a 0.32 0.18 0.68 0.25 n.a
7 Days Demand Deposit 0.23 0.34 0.28 0.22 0.64 0.41 0.20 n.a 0.35 0.37
30 Days Demand Deposit 0.23 0.36 0.37 0.27 1.05 0.34 n.a n.a 0.35 0.71
3 Months Time Deposit 0.28 0.37 0.41 0.22 0.36 0.40 0.28 0.38 0.37 0.74
LRPT
Lending Rate 0.91 0.62 0.64 0.83 0.41 0.66 1.07 0.63 0.66 1.11
Savings 0.41 0.44 0.65 n.a n.a 0.53 0.38 0.68 0.56 n.a
7 Days Demand 0.38 0.43 0.38 0.67 0.69 0.64 0.56 n.a 0.59 0.43
30 Days Demand 0.38 0.54 0.78 0.68 0.55 0.71 n.a n.a 0.65 0.87
3 Months Time 0.48 0.74 0.83 0.85 0.71 0.77 0.70 0.79 0.66 1.00
This is a summary from tables 5.3 to 5.7; n.a means the product is not available
deposit rate can also be explained by the availability of a competing product,
the 90 days Treasury bills on the market which serves as an alternative
avenue for investment. Commercial banks therefore reflect changes to the
central bank’s policy rate in their retail product in order to avoid losing their
customers to the government product.
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5.5.3 Evolution of the IRPT
Recursive analysis was conducted in the same way as in the previous chapter
in order to track the performance of the coefficients over time. Results of
recursive window analysis are presented on rate-by-rate basis from Figures
5.4 to 5.8 in the appendix. The graphs present the evolution of the SRPT
and LRPT for a particular interest rate per commercial bank. The figures
suggest the trend of the IRPT to the base lending rate is largely homogenous
across the banks whilst on the part of deposits, the evolution is mixed hence
reflecting differences in refinancing strategies across commercial banks in
Malawi.
Figure 5.4 is for the evolution of SRPT and LRPT to the base lending
rate in each bank. The figure shows that both SRPT and LRPT increased
markedly in almost all banks. The increases are noted in 2005 (in all banks)
and in the year 2012 except for bank number 4. However, a test for structural
breaks only confirmed the change in 2012 and not in 2005. The break is
associated with a major change in the foreign exchange management policy
by the central bank.
In May 2012, the foreign exchange rate was devalued by 49.0 % and the
central bank adopted a free floating exchange rate regime after six years of a
fixed regime. The previous regime was associated with a wide exchange rate
misalignment between the formal and informal sectors and shortages of
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foreign exchange in the system which led to an accumulation of import
backlogs in the private sector. Soon after the foreign exchange regime
change, the banking system experienced a liquidity crunch as the private
sector was clearing the imports backlog. The decline in liquidity is one of
the factors that explains the increase in the IRPT to the lending rate.
Furthermore, a review of the central bank’s conduct of monetary policy
during this period also shows that it became more transparent in its conduct
of monetary policy. This could have contributed to the improvement in the
strength of IRPT as Sander and Klemeier (2006) and Liu et al (2008) find
that increased transparency in the conduct of monetary policy enhances the
degree of the IRPT.
Figure 5.5 is for ordinary savings rate. The graphs do not show a clear
pattern. The IRPT decrease in three banks (1, 3 and 8) and remain stable over
time in banks 2, 6, 7 and 9. A closer look at graphs for banks 3 and 8 shows
that a major decrease occurred in the year 2012. Similarly, the pass through
to the 7- day demand deposit rate also shows no clear pattern in Figure 5.6
The IRPT increase in 3 banks (1,2 and 3), decreases in banks 3 banks (4,
5 and 10) and remain relatively stable in the rest banks 4, 6, 7 and 9). On
the other hand, graphs for the 30 days demand deposit rate in Figure 5.7 are
relatively stable in all banks with an exception of 1 and 2 both of which show
an increase. The graphs for the 3 months time deposit rate that are displayed
211
in Figure 5.8 are relatively stable except in two banks, 1 and 10 which record
increases from the year 2012.
An overall assessment on the individual responses on the side of deposit
products provide evidence of heterogeneity in the evolution of the IRPT for
each retail rate on products across the commercial banks. We also note that
the responses were mostly contrary to theory. Following the developments
in the year 2012 as described above, commercial banks were expected to be
aggressive in attracting deposits by raising interest rates as the central bank
had adopted tight monetary policy and the system was hit by a liquidity
crunch. The subdued response to the central bank’s actions could firstly, be
attributed to the central bank’s introduction of unconventional monetary
policy by extending uncollateralized loans to stressed banks during the
period of liquidity crunch. Secondly, the continued decline in the IRPT
could be explained by a noncompetitive behaviour of commercial banks in
an oligopolistic market. This behaviour further explains the increase in
interest rate spread from May 2012 onwards in Chart 2 under section 5.3.
In summary, the recursive analysis has revealed that over time IRPT to
the lending rate has increased in all banks whilst IRPT to most deposit rates
has decreased in most banks.
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5.5.4 Influence of Specific Bank Characteristics
This section uses Table 5.12 which reports a summary of the results of the
analysis of the influence of specific bank characteristics on the pass through
of the policy rate in both the short and long run. We find weak evidence
(coefficients are too small in size ) of the effects of the balance sheet
characteristics on the IRPT. The results also show random effects hence a
summary of Breusch and Pagan Lagragian Multiplier test results are
reported separately in Table 5.13 in the appendix.
Table 5.12: Effect of Bank Characteristics on IRPT
Dependent variable: Short Run Pass-Through (SRPT)
Base Ordinary 7 Days 30 Days 3 Months
Lending Savings Deposits Deposits Deposits
Bank Size 1.861*** -0.141 -0.683 -1.912 0.691*
(0.371) (0.275) (0.101) (1.671) (0.31)
Liquidity -0.043** -0.026 -0.012 0.091 -0.041***
(0.023) (0.031) (0.056) (0.089) (0.011)
Non-perfroming loans (NPL) 0.39*** 0.158 -0.906 -1.104 0.591***
(0.012) (0.262 ) (1.111) (1.287) (0.204)
Capital -0.042 0.002 -0.036 0.014 -0.031
(0.039) (0.003) (0.056) (0.018) (0.044)
Return on Assets 0.141 0.118 0.252 0.044 0.132**
(0.124) (0.099) (0.261) (0.051) (0.062)
Dependent Variable: Long Run Pass-Through (LRPT)
Bank Size 3.041*** -0.027 -0.861 -1.542 -0.399
(0.665) (0.299) (1.11) (1.322) (1.09)
Liquidity -0.033 0.021 -0.042 0.072 0.037
(0.029) (0.019) (0.038) (0.073) (0.033)
Non-perfroming loans (NPL) 2.52*** -0.026 -0.968 -1.042 0.474
(0.196) (0.299) (1.229) (1.017) (0.956 )
Capital -0.134 0.042 -0.113 0.098 0.141
(0.129) (0.039) (0.109) (0.101) (0.137)
Return on Assets 0.149 0.125 0.292 -0.049 0.112
(0.002) (0.001) (0.274) (0.056) (0.096)
Robust Standard errors in parentheses,∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01; coefficents have been scaled up by 100
In general, on the specific bank characteristics that are included in this
analysis, the results suggest that bank size, liquidity level, non-performing
loans (NPL) and return of assets (ROA) have significant influence on the
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pass through to some of the interest rates. The influence of capital level is not
significant in all the equations. Our results are slightly different from Horvath
and Podpiera (2012) in the sense that our coefficients are smaller compared
to theirs. This can be attributed to differences in estimation techniques. In
their estimations, they stack all the bank products together whilst our panel
estimations are conducted on a product by product basis.
Bank Size: The results suggest a positive influence of size of the bank
on the pass through to the base lending rate both in the short and long run.
This implies that big banks are able to transmit most of the changes in the
policy rate to the lending rate. This result can be attributed to different types
of clients between the large and small banks. Larger banks usually cooperate
with larger companies, which have better access to other sources of credit.
Competitive behaviour causes the banks to reflect market conditions in the
pricing of their products as a way of trying to retain their customers. We find
that these results are significant in both the short and the long run. This is
contrary to findings by Gambacorta (2008) and Horvath and Podpiera (2012)
whose results suggests that the size effect was only significant in the short
run.
On the side of deposit rates, we find that bank size has a negative influence
on the long run pass through of all the deposit rates. However, in the short
run, bank size seems to affect the pass through to the 3 months deposit rate
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positively and in the short run only. It must be noted that our results give
more details on the effect of bank size on deposit rates in addition to the
information provided by Chiumia and Palamuleni (2016) study. Their results
indicated that big banks pass on much of the change in the policy rate to the
average deposit rates which was proxied by an average of deposits with a
maturity of more than one year. This study indicates that such a reaction is
accorded only to deposits with longer maturity as big banks are found to be
rigid on the part of deposits with shorter maturity.
Liquidity level: This variable shows a significant effect on the pass
through to the lending rate and the 3 months deposit rate. However, in both
cases, the coefficients are very small thus showing a very weak association.
Nonetheless, in both cases the negative sign imply that more liquid banks
are rigid to pass on changes in policy rate to their prices on loans and
deposits. The results are similar to Gigineishvilli (2011), Sorensen and
Werner (2006) and Kashyap and Stein (2000).
Non-performing loans (NPL): Our results show a positive relationship
between the level of the NPL and the strength of the pass through to the
lending rate both in the short and the long run. The coefficients are
statistically significant. This implies that the IRPT to the lending rate is
stronger in banks with high NPLs (low credit quality) than banks with high
quality of credit. These results are in line with the argument by De Bondt
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(2002; 2005) that IRPT can be large where there are high risks as
commercial banks incorporate high levels of risk premium in the lending
rates. On the side of deposits, our results suggest that non-performing loans
positively influences the short run pass through to the 3 months time deposit
rate only.
Capital: The influence of capital to all the interest rates is insignificant in
both the short and long run. The insignificance can be explained by the fact
that this variable is also used for regulatory purposes by the central bank
such that all banks are subjected to penalties if they do not meet a required
level. This could make the variable inflexible to other market conditions.
Nevertheless, the signs show that capital negatively influences the pass
through to the base lending rate in both the short and long run. This is in line
with literature that well capitalised banks respond less to market conditions
Kashyap and Stein (2000).
Return on Assets: The coefficient on return on assets has a positive sign
in all interest rates for the five products except in the LRPT for the 30 days
demand deposit rate. Thus higher returns on assets are associated with a
stronger pass through in both the short run and the long run for the most of
the interest rates. Intuitively interest rates for commercial banks that operate
in a non-competitive environment are expected to be less elastic to changes
in market conditions as they are able to charge higher premiums and deviate
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from marginal cost pricing (Gigineishvilli, 2011). Our results are contrary to
this literature but they are also not statistically significant.
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5.6 Conclusion
The objective of this chapter was to investigate the presence of
heterogeneities across commercial banks and products in the IRPT of central
bank’s policy rate to various retail interest rates. Most of the studies on
IRPT in the Sub-Saharan Africa region use aggregate retail rates hence
assume homogeneity in the IRPT across commercial banks. The study is
conducted on monthly bank level data on interest rates for five retail
products of ten commercial banks in Malawi for the period of 1995 to 2015.
In terms of market coverage, the ten banks cover 91.3 % of the whole
banking system. The retail interest rates are base lending rate, ordinary
savings rate, 7 days demand deposit rate, 30 days demand deposit rate and 3
months time deposit rate. The heterogeneities are assessed on the size of the
short and long run pass through across the banks and also across the
products. A recursive window analysis is also conducted to provide an
evolution of each interest rate per bank over time. Lastly, it examines the
effect of bank specific characteristics on the strength of the IRPT. The bank
specific variables that are considered are bank size, liquidity, level of non
performing loans, capital adequancy ratio and return on assets.
On average, the results show incomplete pass-through of the policy rate to
both the lending rate and all the retail deposit rates. However, an inter-bank
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examination provide evidence for the presence of heterogeneities across the
commercial banks in the IRPT to the base lending rate and all interest rates
for the deposits. The heterogeneities are explained by market power, banks’
refinancing needs and level of non-performing loans. There is also evidence
for heterogeneities across retail products within a bank that are explained by
menu costs and balance sheet effects.
With regard to the IRPT to the base lending rate, the results show that the
LRPT overshoots in two banks whilst the rest of the banks record
incomplete pass through. Both of these commercial banks are small and
hold low liquidity levels. Additionally, one of the banks also has high levels
of non performing loans. These factors explain the over pass through of the
central bank’s policy rate to the base lending rate due to high risk
assessment at the banks. The positive effect of level of non-performing loans
and IRPT to the base lending rate is statistically confirmed in an analysis on
the determinant of the IRPT to the base lending rate thus reflecting inclusion
of high risk premiums on the interest rates for loan when the quality of
credit is poor. In line with the literature, we also find a negative association
between the level of liquidity and the IRPT to the lending rate. The results
also shows a positive association of the magnitude of the IRPT to the base
lending rate and the size of the bank in both the short and long run. These
results are attributed to the influence of type of customers associated with
219
the banks and menu costs as big banks deal with large clients with large
amount of loans compared to small banks.
The heterogeneities in the IRPT across banks are also confirmed for all
retail deposit rates. There are wide variations across banks in both the SRPT
and LRPT for each retail product. This shows the differences in refinancing
strategies across the commercial banks. With regard to the determinants of
the IRPT, significant results are recorded for bank size and liquidity on the 3
months deposit rate only. The size effect is positive whilst the liquidity
effect is negative but very small in magnitude. In all the other deposits, there
is a negative association between bank size and IRPT to deposit rates.
Relating this to the results on lending rates, our findings show that market
power contributes to high levels of interest rate spreads in Malawi as big
banks are more flexible on adjustments for interest rates on loans but rigid
on deposits.
The results also reflect heterogeneities in the strength on the IRPT across
the retail products within the same banks. Generally, there is evidence for
the balance sheet effect where IRPT to interest rate on assets (lending rate)
is higher than to liabilities (deposit) as banks try to safeguard their profit
margins. There is also evidence for the maturity effect in all commercial
banks as the LRPT is higher for deposits with longer maturity.
On the evolution of the IRPT, there is a homogeneous pattern which is
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displayed for the IRPT to the base lending rate across banks in a way that
over time, the IRPT has increased in almost all banks. However, on the part
of deposits the evolution of IRPT is mixed but mostly showing a decreasing
trend in most retail products and commercial banks.
In sum, our study confirms heterogeneities in the IRPT of the central
banks policy rates to interest rates across commercial banks and retail
products in Malawi. It is also noted that over time, there has been an
improvement in the size of the IRPT only on the side of lending rates and
worsened on the size of deposits.
Policy Recommendations
Overall, the main findings of this chapter indicate that the interest rate
channel is less efficient in transmitting monetary policy as the pass through
is incomplete and less predictable because of heterogeneities across banks
and products. Because of this, monetary policy is bound to miss its targets
when controlling inflation using this channel. To a certain extent2, these
results therefore provide more insights to high inflation levels in Malawi
during the study period.
The incomplete and less predictable pass through is attributed to a highly
concentrated banking system with a limited range of financial products and
2Other factors that explain high levels of inflation in Malawi are discussed in Chapter 2 section 2.2
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alternative sources of financing in the economy. Additionally, the banking
system operates in an unstable macroeconomic environment which affects
its effectiveness in supporting monetary policy. The following policies are
therefore recommended in order to improve the transmission through the
interest rate channel.
• Adoption of policies that aim at increasing the level of financial
development is highly recommended. This is because a deep financial
system provides alternative financial instruments to investors and
savers. In line with the literature (IMF, 2010; Cottarelli and Kourelis,
1994; Fuertes and Heffernan, 2009), this research find that the pass
through to a specific product is high where there is a similar product in
the market. Adoption of such policies would therefore help to address
the challenge of incomplete pass through.
• Adoption of policies that are geared towards increasing the level of
competition in the banking system is also recommended as IRPT is
also believed to be high in highly competitive markets (IMF, 2010;
Thomson, 2006). This would help to deal with heterogeneities across
commercial banks. In a competitive market, profit maximising
behaviour causes banks to respond economic and market developments
in an expected manner to avoid losing their clients to their competitors.
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• It is further recommended that the Reserve Bank of Malawi should
continue to improve the conduct of monetary policy by relying on
market dynamics and also increasing transparency and communication.
This is because the results for the evolution of the interest rate pass
through has revealed that the size of the IRPT increased from 2012
after the central bank adopted market based policies especially in the
foreign exchange rate management policy and also mordenised its




Figure 5.3: Commercial Banks’ Retail Interest Rates
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Table 5.13: Breusch and Pagan LM Test Results for Random Effects
Dependent variable: Short Run Pass-Through (SRPT)
Base Ordinary 7 Days 30 Days 3 Months
Lending Savings Deposits Deposits Deposits
Bank Size 6358.43 6547.00 5082.72 6358.43 6547.00
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Liquidity 5887.09 3816.32 4695.47 4162.25 5587.20
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Non-perfroming loans (NPL) 6298.3 3791.66 5027.15 6342.61 6540.39
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Capital 6149.42 4246.04 4682.46 5505.72 6667.44
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Return on Assets 5883.04 3948.31 4451.49 5910.17 6219.54
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Dependent Variable: Long Run Pass-Through (LRPT)
Bank Size 5619.05 4259.31 4086.01 5517.74 6461.58
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Liquidity 5343.92 5343.92 3980.97 4752.56 5909.16
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Non-perfroming loans (NPL) 5648.00 4283.39 4770.78 5453.10 6500.69
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Capital 5318.34 6149.42 5021.39 5124.19 5278.42
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Return on Assets 4998.48 4308.82 4759.04 4886.60 6082.85
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
P-values in square brackets
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Figure 5.4: SRPT and LRPT to the Base Lending Rate per Bank






















































































Figure 5.5: SRPT and LRPT to Ordinary savings Rate per Bank






























































Figure 5.6: SRPT and LRPT to the 7 Days Demand Deposit Rate per Bank



















































































Figure 5.7: SRPT and LRPT to the 30 Days Demand Deposit Rate per Bank














































































Figure 5.8: SRPT and LRPT to the 3 Months Time Deposit Rate per Bank






















































































This research has used multivariate and single equation econometric methods
to investigate the effectiveness of monetary policy in 11 countries from the
COMESA - EAC - SADC free trade area of the sub-Saharan Africa region
from 1995 to 2015. The countries are Angola, Botswana, Kenya, Lesotho,
Malawi, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia.
The main objective of the trade area is to strengthen and deepen economic
integration of the region through harmonisation of policies and programs.
The research firstly provided historical information which revealed
differences in the levels of macroeconomic and financial developments in
the region. As expected of an emerging country, South Africa has high
levels of economic and financial development compared to the rest as they
are low income countries. Notably, Botswana, Kenya and Namibia also have
relatively higher levels of financial development compared to the rest.
Differences were also noticed in the degree of central bank independence
and the conduct of monetary policy across the countries. South Africa’s
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central bank is independent as it is instituted as a private entity whilst in all
the other countries the central banks are public institutions.
The research also finds that in addition to price stability and economic
growth, some countries’ monetary policy have additional objectives such as
management of foreign exchange reserves and stable exchange rate. The
countries with multiple objectives are Angola, Botswana, Malawi, Tanzania,
Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland. The multiple objectives become sources
of conflicts in the conduct of monetary policy.
We also find different monetary policy frameworks among the countries.
South Africa follows Inflating Targeting (IT) since 2000, Kenya and Uganda
adopted the IT from 2011. Monetary aggregate targeting is followed by
Angola, Malawi, Tanzania and Zambia whilst the rest follow exchange rate
targeting with an exception of Botswana which follows a composite
framework. Overall, these differences are reflected in our empirical
investigation of the effectiveness of monetary policy in the region.
Results from a factor augmented vector auto regression (FAVAR)
analysis of the influence of changes in central bank’s policy rate and reserve
money on real GDP and prices suggest that monetary policy is effective in
influencing the final goals however, transmission mechanism differ in
channels and their strengths across the region. In line with the literature, we
find that the interest rate channel is strong in countries with high levels of
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development. These are South Africa, Kenya and Botswana. The channel is
also effective in influencing the final goals but generally weak (not
significant) in Malawi, Tanzania and Zambia mainly on account of low
levels of financial development and weak signalling power of monetary
policy due to multiple objectives and less transparent framework. Our
results further corroborate IMF (2010) that the traditional monetary channel
is effective in influencing both output and prices in most of the countries.
Tight monetary policy through negative shocks to reserve money decreases
output and prices in Angola, Botswana, Kenya, Malawi, Namibia, Tanzania,
Uganda and Zambia. The effects are statistically significant in Botswana
(only on price), Kenya, Malawi and Tanzania. The findings also shows that
the exchange rate channel is important in explaining price developments in
region.
Our examination of the pass through of central bank’s policy rate to
commercial banks’ retail rates reveal heterogeneities across countries in
terms of completeness and presence of asymmetries. The long run pass
through to the lending rate is statistically complete in Botswana, Namibia
and South Africa whilst in the remaining countries it is incomplete. This
result echoes the importance of high levels of financial development in the
interest rate channel of transmission mechanism. The pass through is
incomplete in the short run in all countries and also to deposit rates.
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Recursive analysis suggest that over time the pass through has been
increasing in most of the countries due to adoption of market based policies
and modernising the conduct of monetary policy by becoming more
transparent. Asymmetric analysis of the pass through indicate collusive
pricing of the lending rates in Angola, Botswana, Namibia and Tanzania that
is explained by high concentration levels in the banking system. On the
deposit side, it provides weak evidence for customer reaction hypothesis in
Angola and Namibia.
Finally, a bank level analysis on Malawi provide evidence for
heterogeneities across commercial banks and products. Interest rate pass
through is large in banks with low liquidity levels, high levels of
non-performing loans and big in size. On the part of deposits, the
heterogeneities across products are explained by menu costs and balance
sheet effects.
Overrall, our research suggest that the effectiveness of monetary policy in
the COMESA-EAC-SADC region is generally impeded by low levels of
macroeconomic and financial development, the practice of trying to achieve
multiple objectives and use of less efficient frameworks in the conduct of
monetary policy. It also suggests that the financial systems are less efficient
in facilitating monetary policy due to high levels of concentration in the
banking system. Overall, the implications of the less effective monetary
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policy are reflected in high levels of inflation and low levels of economic
growth in the region as reflected in Table 2.1 in chapter 2. Strengthening of
monetary policy transmission mechanism in the region is therefore
paramount and based on the gathered evidence through this research it
requires addressing the following factors;
• Narrowing the goals of monetary policy to price stability and economic
growth and adopting a clear strategy to achieving the goals in order to
send clear signals to market participants.
• Monetary authorities may need to adhere to the requirements of their
chosen frameworks by ensuring that operating instruments are
consistent with intermediate targets for instance when targeting money,
interest rate must be allowed to be endogenous and vice-versa.
• Authorities must also avoid interfering with market dynamics by
adopting flexible regimes and increasing operational independence of
the central banks.
• Modernising the frameworks to increase transparency is also important
to remove uncertainties in the market and enhance the expectations
channel of monetary policy.
• Adopting policies that aim at increasing financial development in order
to widen the range of financial products and refinancing avenues for
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market participants.
• Adopting policies that aim at increasing competition in the banking
system in order to address the issues of market power and consequently
enhance the response of the commercial banks to monetary policy.
• Authorities also need to adopt policies that strengthen legal and other
institutions that help to reduce information asymmetries and enforce
adherence contracts. This will assist to reduce risks in the banking
system.
Overall, based on the about findings, it is recommended that the
authorities of the COMESA-EAC-SADC free trade area must take into
account the country differences highlighted in this study in their design of
the criteria for harmonising economic policies in the region as one strategy
might not fit all the countries.
This study has been conducted on 11 out of 23 countries that belong to
the COMESA-EAC-SADC region. An obvious starting point of extending
this literature is to include all countries in the region in order to have a more
balanced view of the effectiveness of monetary policy in the whole region.
This literature can also be extended by building on the results for IRPT
analysis in chapter 4 to empirically investigate the determinants of IRPT for
the whole region as in Sander and Kleimeier (2004) and the extent of
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banking market integration in the region as by Aziakpono et al (2012) for
SADC. Lastly, the study in chapter 5, on heterogeneities across financial
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